



THE ROLE OF THE OPPOSITION PARTIES IN SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS DURING THE PERIOD, 1949-62.

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POLITICAL SCIENCE**

**UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF
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
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P R E F A C E

P R E F A C E

The nature of relationship between India and China is crucial in determining the impact of global politics on Asia. India, after winning liberation from foreign rule in 1947 and China, after socialist revolution in 1949, emerged as two leading nations of Asia. Both of them had to face the same problems i.e. the need to reconstruct their economy and to meet the political challenge to survive and secure their independence. However, they adopted two different ways — one preferred democratic socialism supported by non-alignment in international politics, while the other adopted communism to achieve their goals through closer co-operation with U.S.S.R.

During the later forties, a new political phenomena was sweeping all over Asia — the phenomena of liberation and search for a new political order. The newly liberated Asian nations were increasingly becoming conscious of their political rights. The intensity of this consciousness differed from country to country. The other aspect of the situation was the development of national movements in the countries who were yet to get its liberated. In fact, a third world was emerging.

The increasing political, social and economic consciousness of the Indian people led to the emergence of several political parties. The Indian National Congress (established 1885), and the Communist Party of India (established 1923), had already taken roots in the Indian politics. As the Indian National Congress was the ruling party since independence, the only strong Opposition party in the country was the Communist Party of India. The early fifties saw the emergence of yet another strong Opposition party — the Jana Sangh. These two

parties in the Opposition played a crucial role in the Sino-Indian relations since 1950. This study has been focussed on the role of the Opposition in the formulation of India's foreign policy during the pre-war period (pre-Bandung period, Chapter II) and the post war period which led to confrontation between India and China.

The Chinese aggression was strongly condemned by all the Opposition parties except the Communist Party of India. They projected this point of view in the Parliament and outside the Parliament. They tried to arouse public opinion both against China as well as against communism. The communists maintained a low profile. They expressed displeasure and unhappiness on the development but maintained a discreet silence. They found themselves isolated and the communist movement in India recieved a serious setback.

A comparative method has been adopted to bring this work which has helped in creating interest in the field of Sino-Indian relations. It makes the point clear that there is a need of a strong Opposition in India.

To complete this work and to carry on my studies, I am grateful to Professor S.A.H. Haqqi. My thanks are due to Dr. A.F. Usmani, under whose inspiring guidance and everlasting helpful attitude led to the completion of this study.

I am highly indebted to the staff of Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi, who were always helpful to me in providing every facility which I needed. I am also thankful to the Librarian, Seminar Library, Department of Political Science, Aligarh Muslim University.

iii.

It is not possible for me to thank my friend Miss Shahida Siddiqui, without whose generous assistance and inspiration, I will not be able to concentrate on my studies in a peaceful and pleasant atmosphere .

It is not possible to thank individually all the officials and non-officials who have not been helpful in placing at my disposal all the desired materials connected with my research work.


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
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
FIG GENERAL MAP OF THE EASTERN SECTOR OF THE SINO-INDIAN BORDER



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
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FIG GENERAL MAP OF THE WESTERN AND
MIDDLE SECTORS OF THE SINO-INDIA BORDER



Source: NEVILLE MAXWELL "INDIA'S CHINA WAR" 1970

FIG. CONFLICTING CLAIMS IN THE WESTERN SECTOR



MAP NO. 10 "INDIA'S CHINA WAR" 1970

THE FORWARD POLICY IN THE WESTERN SECTOR

C H A P T E R I

ASIA IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

CHAPTER I

ASIA IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

It has often been said that Western colonialism carried within it the seeds of its own destruction. "Once motives of economic and political self-interest began to be infused by humanitarian ideals aimed at improving the welfare of the indigenous peoples, forces were generated within the Southeast Asian societies which the colonial powers unable to control."¹ Such motives were also observed in South Asian British colonies i.e. India, Ceylon and Burma. "The response of the Western colonialism powers to the nationalist challenge varied from country to country and was itself largely conditioned by the objectives of, and the methods employed by, the nationalists themselves."² There was a flow of national feelings, patriotism and the sense of nationality among the Asian peoples of South and Southeastern region which ultimately resulted in the emergence of national states with independent status. The present analysis is intended to delineate the chief characteristics of the flow of nationalism in the South and Southeastern region of Asia.

(1) Nationalism in Indonesia

The Netherland's Indies was the official name of the Dutch dependency in the tropical East. It was, however, more generally known as the Dutch East Indies. Since World War II, it has become better known as Indonesia, though its official title is the Republic of Indonesia.

1. John Bastin : The Emergence of Modern Southeast Asia : 1511- 1957, Prentice Hall, (1967), p 119

2. Ibid, p 120

"The history of foreign rule in Indonesia begins with the arrival of Dutch traders in the sixteenth century when the first ships in number four under the command of Cornelis de Hautman anchored off Banten in western Java."³ The rapid expansion of the Dutch shipping and trade in Europe led to great success in trade for the Dutch traders. But in the coming centuries, the very success became a point of rivalry between the Dutch and the Britishers. The precious wealth of spices, pepper, coffee, coconut, rice etc. attracted many traders among which the Dutch and the Britishers established stable positions in the different parts of Indonesia. Since the very arrival of the Dutch traders in Indonesia, they were least interested in the local affairs of politics and administration "..... all they wanted was a quick turnover of their investment. They understood that the acquisition of territory adversely affected profits because of the increased cost of administration; they found, however, that, in order to establish stable conditions in which to conduct their commercial operations, they were obliged to interfere in the affairs of the Southeast Asian rulers."⁴

The very nature of the control exercised by the Dutch in Indonesia was largely determined by the mercantile character of the East India Company itself. Originally the Dutch paid money for tropical produce such as pepper, spices, coffee and rice which was need by the Company for its trading transactions. Realising, however, that direct collection of this produce and the close supervision and the administration of Indonesian people involved heavy financial burdens for the Company, the Dutch generally left the indigenous rulers in effective control of their districts. These rulers who were called regents by the

3. John Bastin....op. cit. p 25

4. Ibid, p 32

Dutch after their own officials in the Netherlands, were under treaty obligations to their Western masters to see that the Indonesian peasantry obeyed their orders for planting the export crops and delivering the requisite amounts of produce annually.⁵ By 1750, the Company had largely shifted from a commercial to a territorial and political basis. Its steadily dwindling profits, however, caused the Company to collapse towards the end of the eighteenth century, and in 1800 the Dutch Government took it over.⁶ This was the formal beginning of the Dutch rule in Indonesia. To safeguard the commercial interests of the Dutch in the region. The Home Government established political control over Indonesia but their way of control was totally different of the Britishers in India, Burma and Malaya, French rule in Cambodia and American rule in the Philippines. Actually they adopted the principle of least intervention in the local administration of public affairs. They left all these subjects to the indigenous rulers and the administrators.

The growth of nationalism in Indonesia presents a unique picture of its gradual development through organized ways. They inherited sounder economic bases for their national independence than any other Asian dependency. The long period of Dutch rule ——— about three and a half centuries ——— led to a very different situations than any other colony in the region. The Dutch rule brought an integration of about more than three thousand large and small islands and developed a sense of national unity among them. This is strange but a fact to be believed that things went on there in such a way that the Queen of the Netherlands, without any pressure

5. Ibid, p 32

6, Mills....op. cit. p 80

from her Indonesian colony, declared in 1901 that the Netherlands have a moral duty to fulfill towards the people of the Indies. This proved accidentally the beginning of a new era in the life of Indonesian people leading to the establishment of the various organisations which aimed at the social, economic, educational, and political uplift of their countrymen.

Indonesian nationalism first expressed itself in an organised way with the founding in 1908 of Budi Utomo, Javanese for "Beautiful (or High) Endeavour."⁷ This society organised by Javanese intellectuals had at first only a social, economic and cultural program; but later it also entered the political field.⁷ It was composed of Western educated intellectuals which "primarily concerned with training its members for social and educational leadership; its battle was to be against poverty and ignorance rather than against 'imperialism'; its aim was a gradual and general advance, under the guiding hand of Dutch rule, towards Western standards of living and of social and political conduct."⁹

Sarakart Islam was another important organisation which followed the declaration of the Queen of Netherland of 1901. This organisation declared the promotion of economic welfare and the advancement of the interests of Islam as its main objectives. This movement began in 1911 and gained popularity in the masses in a very short successive period, which gradually as a national movement in the coming years.

Some unique types of organisations like the "study clubs," "wild schools" etc. present a very interesting picture of nationalism in Indonesia. While the "study clubs" were organized "for the ^{is} discussion of social and political questions," wild schools were established to give the children a strongly Indonesian, nationalistic training, as well as to bring the masses to

7. Mills....op cit. p 32

8. Harrison Brian : South-East Asia. MacMillan & Co. London (1955), p 241

a higher level of development. In this movement, students played a leading role.^{"9"} From these incipient nationalist movements, with their vaguely defined objectives, grew the hard core political parties aimed at the overthrow of the colonial regime.^{"10"}

Till 1930, the national movement was peacefully and gradually developing. It became slow and went under depression. The continuing declining economic conditions and the repressive attitude of the Dutch Government towards the national leaders weakened the national movement. Meanwhile, the rise of fascism and socialism abroad impressed the national leaders and caused them to see the advantage of co-operating with the Dutch. But the rebellious attitude of the Indonesian Communists influenced the national movement and caused to a more aggressive and impatient attitude towards the colonial power. Gradually things so happened that most of the "Indonesian leaders were either imprisoned or removed from areas where they derived their political support."^{"11"}

A decisive turn was observed in the Indonesian national movement after the First World War. "Not only did the First World War bring a revitalized nationalism to Indonesia; it also brought the doctrines of internationalism, socialism and communism."^{"12"} The idea of independence was taking on new shades of meaning; the Dutch in Indonesia felt a renewed sense of partnership with Indonesians as the country weathered the depression and began to experience a revival of trade and production after 1936. That sense of partnership became deeper with the outbreak of World War II; and deeper still when Holland became cut off

10. John Bastin....op. cit., p 119

11. Ibid.p 120

12. Harrison Brian...op.cit. p 243.

from her overseas colonies by German invasion."¹³ Now most of the Netherlanders had come to accept the sound and rapid national growth in Indonesia. But they were so astonished and surprised at the peaceful development of national movement in Indonesia that they could not think of granting an independent status to this colony in an earliest time. This problem was, however, solved with the arrival of the Japanese on the Southeast Asian scene.

JAPANESE INVASION : The Indonesian national movement was not strong enough at the time of the Japanese invasion in 1940 over Southeast Asia. But it responded well towards the Japanese and extended her collaboration to the new rulers. But soon the Japanese began to lose their confidence of victory and it was largely recognised in 1945 by according de facto recognition to the republican leaders—— Sukarno and his colleagues ——and then attempting to bring the Dutch and Indonesians together to discuss the future political status of Indonesia."¹⁵

"On August 8, 1945, Sukarno, Hatta and a third Indonesian, Wediodiningrat by name, left Batavia by plane for Saigon. They had been summoned by Marshall Terauchi, the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese armies in the Southern regions, to confer with him about the proclamation of Indonesian independence."¹⁶ On 17 th August, Indonesia was declared independent in the name of the Indonesian people by the Japanese Commander of Java.

But it took another four years for absolute sovereignty of the Indonesian people to be gained. After the end of the IIInd War, the British Government sent troops to Indonesia. They disarmed the Japanese troops, liberated about two lakhs of Dutch and other Allied prisoners of war and internees. They found "an organised, armed and

13. Ibid p 244

14. Harrison Lrian...op. cit. p 254

15. Mills...op.cit. pp 112-3

potentially violent Indonesian republican movement in being, prepared to oppose the re-establishment of Dutch rule. This situation was met first by recognising the national roles played by the Indonesian leaders, then offering them to discuss the future political status of Indonesia with the Dutch Government.

At last, Indonesia was transferred full sovereignty over the Dutch in December, 1949. The period provided a solid basis for Indonesia to be politically organized, between the Japanese invasion and the British intervention which led to a sound situation in which the sovereignty was peacefully transferred to the nationals by the Dutch.

(ii) Nationalism in Malaya

Malaya about the size of England, comprised of the islands of Singapore, Penang with Province of Welisley, Malacca, the States of Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, Pahang, Johore, Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan and Trengganu.

The island of Penang was bought by the British the Malay Sultan of Kedah in 1786 and the Province of Welisley a few years later on the term of paying 10,000 dollars annually to the Sultan. The island of Singapore was ceded to the Englishmen in return for an annual pension of five thousand dollars to the Sultan of Johore to whom it belonged. The seaport of Malacca was exchanged in 1824 for the British possession of Benkoelen in Sumatra to the Dutch. These were called the Strait Settlements which were totally in British possession.

The remaining nine states were brought under British control between 1874 and 1909 through signing treaties with the Sultans of these States separately. Four of them — Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan

and Pahang were protected states and not colonies." British protection over them was maintained in practice through the Governor of the Strait Settlements in his other capacity of High Commissioner for the Malay States, and through the separate British residents or Advisors who were attached to each state."¹⁶

The States of Johore, Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan and Trengganu were separate protected States, commonly known as the Unfederated Malay States. The rulers of.....(these states)had separately agreed to be guided by British Advisors, but they were not prepared to enter into a formal association through which British guidance might be more easily able to achieve uniformity among them in policy and administration."¹⁷

There was general satisfaction among the Malayan people due to the internal independence of the Malayan States and the economic prosperity under the British rule. That is why there was a slow development of nationalism in Malay. According to Brian Harrison;

The reasons for delay in the awakening of Malayan nationalism were various; together they might be summed up as the combined effect of pluralism and prosperity. There was the political and administrative pluralism that arose out of the division of the Malay Peninsula into three Strait Settlements and nine Malay States."¹⁸

16. Ibid p 245

17. Ibid

18. Ibid. p 244

To the Malay leaders themselves, the main reason for the slow development of nationalism in their country was the lack of sincere leaders. To Ishak Haji Mohammed, a prominent Malay national leader;

"The failure of the movement (during)the pre-war days) can be attributed to the lack of really sincere, daring and honest leaders among the Malays. Usually the choice of leadership then fell on prominent Government servants even if they had the necessary qualification for leadership in any movement. Even if they had the necessary qualifications, they had not the adequate time to pay attention to the national need, and perhaps because of their position, they took little notice of the condition of the people."¹⁹

The another important factor responsible for the lack of national consciousness among the Malays was the Malayan population so racially diverse and including so many transient elements. There were three divergent races which made up the bulk of the Malay population—— Malays, Chinese and the Indians. In 1947, the population of Malay was 5,808,000. Of this total, the Malays numbered 2,512,000 or 43%, the Chinese 2,608,000 or 44.9 %, the Indians 605,000 or 10.4 %, and the Europeans (principally British) 17,940 or three tenths or 1 per cent. The Malays, who had been in an overwhelming majority in the pre-British period were outnumbered by the Chinese."²¹ This ratio between the three Asiatic races is almost the same as in 1941.

Keeping in view this ratio of the three divergent races in Malay, one can easily understood how could nationalism develop in Malay while the large number of the Chinese and Indians,immigrants of course, were loyal to their own native countries rather than Malay. Their aim of living in Malay was to earn more and more wealth and then return

19. quoted by Bastin...op. cit. p 121

20. Mills...op. cit. p 136

return to their native lands. The Malays considered them as "unwanted immigrants who came in after the British had established law and order and made it safe for them to do so. Only the Malays regarded Malay as their native country and gave undivided loyalty to it."²¹

One more important factor contributing towards the slow development of nationalism was that, the Malaysians themselves were more loyal to the Sultans of their respective states than Malay as a whole, due to the independent status of each state.

Malay nationalism "was full of caution in its progress. Its growth was so slow that it gave the impression that nationalism among the Malays was an evolutionary, rather than an revolutionary attitude. It showed more drag and reluctance than drive and eagerness and in this way was very different to Indonesian nationalism."²²

These characteristics of the Malay nationalism delineate the slow development of national consciousness among the Malays. But this does not mean that they had nothing to ask from their foreign rulers. Movements were going on for getting more and more economic and educational facilities, administrative and constitutional arrangements for the gradual transfer of sovereignty to the Malay people. Several factors contributed towards the awakening of national consciousness among the Malays—— especially the Muslim reformist movements, western education, ideological issue held by certain prominent groups, Malay racial consciousness and the need for administrative and constitutional reforms as demanded by the Malay intelligentsia.

To Radin Soenarno;

Malay nationalism before 1945 formed

21. Mills...op.cit. p 136

22. Radin Soenarno in the Journal of Southeast Asian History(1,1,1960, pp 22-28), quoted by Bastin...op.cit. p 121

a story quite unique in many ways. Its peaceful and evolutionary growth gave the impression that the Malays were still very much asleep politically before the (Second World) War. This of course, was not the case. Underneath the mantle of feudalism and the calm social surface, complex and cultural and socio-economic processes were at work....(They) were not comparable to those similar processes taking place in Indonesia; but they (cannot) by any means be ignored if a true understanding of the post-War Malay political movement(is) to be obtained. After all the physical manifestation of any nationalist movement was only one of its aspects and not the most important either. Perhaps non-violence was a Malayan virtue, for it was the hall mark of the pre-war history of Malay; and not even such a significant historical event as the political uprising of the Malays could fail to share it."²³

JAPANESE INVASION :

The Japanese invasion of Malay in 1941 caused exciting changes in the attitude of the Malayan people. While it shocked and disturbed their peaceful and calm life on the one hand, it provided a natural situation for adopting habits of violence, and the instinct of staging mass demonstrations against their new and old masters. In the words of John Bastin again;

"the sudden change of masters and the impact of violent Japanese nationalism and pan-Asianism was a most intensive school for nationalist feelings and thoughts about political questions."²⁴ Further, "the tyranny and oppression of Japanese rule stimulated Malayan nationalism. All three races led to feel that they would be hapier

²³. Radin Soenarno...op.cit. pp 127-8

²⁴. Ibid. p 152

if they could manage their own affairs without foreign control. The Japanese followed the policy of divide and rule, and stirred up the latent Malay hostility towards the Chinese. But they completely failed in their effort to arouse hatred against the British."²⁵

Now the demand for self-government was intensified. The communists who were very active among the Chinese, adopted violent attitude towards the Japanese as well as the Britishers. In 1946 two abortive attempts were made to paralyse the government by a general strike. The communists maintained contact with the Communist parties in China, India and Australia."²⁶ In 1948 they even tried for an armed revolt to establish a Communist republic which failed and resulted in the banning of the party, by the British Government."²⁷

Except to the above mentioned effects of the Japanese invasion on Malay, there were some other factors which contributed to the acceleration in the national movement. A sharp rise in the death rate noticed during the Japanese Occupation, was the sign of public health administration's failure. Then the educational institutions were effected largely as the Japanese troops looted the schools too. The industries of tin and rubber were destroyed. All these events aroused the national sentiments of the Malayan people against their new masters, and they had to adopt violent methods to pressurise the alien Government to transfer sovereignty to them.

Soon the Japanese began to loose their control over Malay, as on their regions and had to retreat. Then came the British

25. Mills...op.cit. pp 196-7

26. Ibid. p 211

27. Ibid. pp 211-215 (see for details)

Government on the political scene of Malay again. They were wise enough in realizing the decline of their empire in the various parts of the world. India became free in 1947, Indonesia in 1949, Ceylon in 1948 and Burma in the same year celebrated their day of independence. At last, "after a long period of tutelage", Malay was declared free from foreign rule on August 31, 1957.

(iii) Burmese Nationalism

The British control over Burma was the result of three Anglo-Burmese wars fought between 1823-1886, when final annexation was made, and the Britishers got complete control over Burma. Rich in timber, teak, trees, rice, oil, lead, zinc etc., Burma proved to be very profitable to the Britishers from commercial point of view. Generally, there was material satisfaction among the Burmese people. Socially, the Burmese did not like or understood the British Indian system of law as it was different from their obligations and customary law.

The First World War brought many grievances for the Burmese people. During the War years there was great unrest and disillusionment among the masses against the West. The economic condition of the people became much poor. Unemployment created irritation among the youths, landless farmers and labourers became so frustrated that they arose against the Britishers though indirectly. To John F. Cady;

"The naturally volatile temperament of the Burman male lent itself to lawlessness and to non-recognition of police and courts proved powerless to curb. The virus of lawlessness struck Upper Burma during the course of World War I, when widespread displacement of the population within the area weakened social controls."²⁸

28. Cady, John F -- quoted in Lennox A. Mills (Edited) : The New World of Southeast Asia, University of Minnesota Press, London(1950) p 136

The happenings going on in the neighbour countries also influenced the national consciousness of the Burmese people. The movement in India by the Indian National Congress greatly affected them. The main features of the Burmese nationalism, during this period, are summarised by Cady as follows;

"The nationalist movement in Burma was associated with hostility to the British rule, hatred of the Indian coolie and moneylanders, and conservative Buddhist opposition to Western cultural influences generally. Conservative channels through which nationalist sentiment could find expression was generally lacking."²⁹

After 1930, the national Burmese movement became violent which caused the overall prevalence of crime. The economic distress also contributed towards the increasing demand of political independence for Burma. The constitutional amendments introduced by the British Government from time to time could not satisfy the Burmese people. The conditions were nearly explosive when the Japanese occupied Burma along with other Asian countries in 1942. The Burmese became more and more organised against any foreign rule. The Japanese adopted guerrilla techniques to cut the British reinforcement into Burma. They were assisted by the majority of Burmese in keeping Britain away from Burma. But when Japan had to retreat from the occupied areas, Burma again came under British control. Now the situation had absolutely changed.

Negotiations were arranged between the British Government and the Burmese national leaders which resulted in the constitutional activities by establishing a cons^{itu}ent assembly. Elections for this purpose were held in April 1947. Negotiations covering defense

arrangements were concluded in August 1947 and final declaration of Burmese independence was made on January 4, 1948.

(iv) Ceylonese Nationalism

The growth of nationalism in Malay, Indonesia and Burma delineate their own characteristics unique in nature and widely different from each other although the main objective of all these national movements was the same ——— political independence for their countries. Ceylon was ruled by the Europeans for four and a half centuries, first by the Portuguese (1505-1658) followed by the Dutch (1658-1795) and finally by the Great Britain (1795-1948). The main interest of the Portuguese was to have more and more converts. They very little contributed to the general welfare and upliftment of the Ceylonese people. While the Dutch inherited the religious policies of the Portuguese, they inaugurated a period of religious conflict and passed a number of laws prohibiting the practice of Catholicism." 30

The Dutch, however, contributed to the spreading of illiteracy among the Ceylonese people. They also gave due response to the administration of the land and made certain improvements in the administrative of Ceylon. They introduced the Roman-Dutch law to the judicial administration and made amendments in the existing judicial system based on native laws, customs etc.

"Unlike the earlier powers, British rule had a profound impact on Ceylon. Despite their frequent protest that it was not their intention to interfere with native customs and practice, the British found themselves initiating changes which were to have a

30. Aiyar, S.P. : The Commonwealth in South Asia. Lalvani. Bombay (1969)

lasting effect on the country and set it on the road to modernisation. The history of British rule, in this respect, bears a striking resemblance with that in India. The East India Company's primary interest in the early seventeenth-century India was trade but it found itself involved in native politics and rapidly developed political ambitions. In the conditions of insecurity which prevailed, acquisition of territory was found to be a necessary condition of trade."³¹

Although the national movement in Ceylon was calm and peaceful, but many undercurrents of cultural and religious nature were going on there as a part of Ceylonese national movement. The love for their past, their language constituted the chief aspect of this current. The spread of Western education awakened the Ceylonese people and they developed the feeling of one nation having glorious past. The newly emergent middle class under the Western education received a new world of Western learning and ideas which ultimately resulted in the realization of the national consciousness. This class also played a key role in the awakening of the Ceylonese people. They insisted on more and more representation in the Government.

When the Second World War broke out, the Ceylonese national leaders "did not insist that their co-operation with the rulers was conditioned to their being^g granted independence after the war. This attitude was in striking contrast to that of the Congress in India at this page."³² Actually the Ceylonese lacked charismatic leadership which could turn the national movement into a mass movement like that in India. Nor there was any enthusiasm among the people themselves. Ceylon was declared sovereign from the British domination in 1948.

31. Aiyar, S. ...op.cit. pp 37-38

32. Arasaratnam, S., quoted by Aiyar, S. op.cit. p 68

(v) Indo-Chinese Nationalism

France had obtained control over Cambodia and three provinces of Cochin-China in 1867 after a series of negotiations with Siam which surrendered its rights over Cambodia in 1867, and the three states were obtained from Annam. The increasing rivalry for control in South and Southeast Asia between France and England led to the expansion of the areas of control of each of them. This rivalry between China and France over Indo-China finally resulted in the withdrawal of the Chinese claim of suzerainty over the country. In 1887, all the Indo-Chinese territories under French control were amalgamated into a single administrative unit under a Governor-General.

The national sentiments in Indo-Chinese people were extremely different from those developed by other Asian peoples. In Indo-China, the effects of the French revolution of 1789 provided ideological bases for nationalism in this French colony which was more a protectorate than a colony. The French rule in Indo-China has the following main features;

"The States of Cambodia, Laos, Annam and Tonkin were protectorates, not colonies, and French rule over them was indirect; native rule and indigenous custom and institutions were modified but preserved. But as elsewhere in Southeast Asia, a facade of indirect rule not incompatible with an inner reality of centralized power, and the association of native with the French administrators in the government of Indo-China was in practice extremely limited."³³

Education played a key role in the awakening of national consciousness in Indo-China. The introduction of Western education helped in the spread of liberal ideas among the elites. The

33. Harrison, Brian....op.cit. p 290

ratio of educated persons in Indo-China was more than in any other country. Tension arose with the rapid absorbing of liberal ideas among the intellectuals. Their national consciousness was more sound and valuable than any other South and Southeast Asian nation. "The political tensions arose out of the reaction of a comparatively intelligent people to the apparent conflict between liberal, revolutionary theory and conservative colonial policy."³⁴ The Indo-Chinese people were so politically conscious that they mostly insisted on western education especially the political and social techniques which "preceded the development of a revolutionary nationalist movement." The educational element was so active behind the revolutionary nationalism that the scene of conflicts were observed mainly between the French administration and the Vietnamese intellectuals and students.

The Vietnamese national movement became much developed during the First world war, much earlier than in any other Asian country. The hundred thousand Vietnamese who had been brought to France as soldiers and workers during the war proved to be motivating element in the rapid development of Vietnamese nationalism. They brought home communist colouring and political ideas under which influence nationalism inevitably became more radical.

The effect of Japanese Occupation over South-east Asian countries was extremely different from that on Indo-China. While foreign rule was swept away from these countries, but nothing happened in Indo-China like this. The Japanese had not to apply forcible

34. Harrison, Brian, ...op.cit. p 250

occupation in Indo-China because the political consciousness prevailing there led to peaceful military occupation. The post-war situation in Indo-China was such that France could not control the affairs of this region herself as other powers were active there and "the liberation of the country from the Japanese had to be carried out by other forces — by the British in the south and centre, and by the Chinese in the north."³⁵

Discussion or negotiations remained the only way to solve the problem of Indo-China. Meanwhile, the political organizations in the country had strengthened their position. It was their highly organized parties and political consciousness which brought the negotiations to an end in a very short period. They were granted independence in the same year i.e. 1945.

Thus, we observe that the national forces were highly organized in Indo-China.

(vi) Nationalism in the Philippines

".....Philippines consists of 7,000 islands which stretch for some 1,100 miles off the east of Asia. Their northmost point is 65 miles south of Formosa, and their southernmost tip is only 43 miles north of the Dutch East Indies. On the map, the Philippines range themselves into an imaginary donkey's head: Luzon forms the exaggerated ears; Mindanao, the mouth; Palawan and the Sulu Archipelago; the outline of the neck; and the Visayan Islands look like splotches on the face and forehead."³⁶

For more than three centuries Spain was the political mistress of the Philippines. It formally started to establish and exte-

35. Harrison Brian...op.cit. p 255

36. Mills.op.cit. p 18

end her influence on the East in the later half of the 16th century when the city of Manila was founded in 1571. The Spanish rule ended when Spain collapsed and American forces occupied Manila on 13th August, 1898.

During the Spanish rule, the impact of French Revolution had reached Philippines and impressed the intellectuals. The two important daily newspapers of Philippines viz; *La Esperanza* and *La Solidaridad* were established in Manila in 1847 and 1888 respectively "in the interest of Filipino propaganda, and through^{out} its course urged reforms both in religion and government."³⁷ Several national leaders like Rizal, del Pilar and A. Mabini emerged as powerful national leaders whose writings and movement awakened the national consciousness of the Filipinos. Two unsuccessful attempts were made to oust the Spanish in 1872 and 1896 which revealed the anti-Spanish wave among the natives. "Spain tried to prevent the entry and spread of dangerous thoughts, but it was impossible. The heresies of the French Revolution found their way into Asia, often by way of the sailors, who had plenty of time to think and to talk on the journey out. More and more of these merchants seamen came to the Philippines after the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. Sons of the intellectual classes of the Philippines sometimes completed their education in Europe, and an occasional scion of the nobility took up the cause of the ignorant and illiterate masses on his return."³⁸

The main causes which led to the nationalism in Philippines were the defects of the Spanish colonial rule in this colony "..... notably the absence of the spirit of progress, the pr va-

37. Ibid. p 25

38. Ibid pp 24-25

ence of abuses and corruption in the civil service, the maladministration of justice, the absence of intellectual freedom, the failure to develop the natural resources and the undemocratic denial of social and political rights to Filipines."³⁹

"Actually the first and most outstanding aim of Spanish colonisation was to spread Christianity..... Economic wealth and political grandeur, although coveted by the Spanish Kings and conquistadores, were to Spain secondary colonial aims."⁴⁰

American forces occupied Manila on 13th August 1898 which established American rule in the Philippines for about half a century. While the Dutch, The French, the English and the Spanish missionaries and traders were active in south and southeast Asia for many centuries, the Americans were strangers in this region. That is why the American rule in this region was too short and different in its nature from others. Since the very beginning of their rule, they insisted on the economic and political independence of the Philippines

"All American Presidents, from McKinley to F.D. Roosevelt, and all American Governors-General, from Taft to Murphy, declared in their official statements that independence would someday be granted to the Philippines."⁴¹ In his message to Congress in 1899, President William McKinley said, "The Philippines are ours, not to exploit, but to develop, to civilize, to educate, to train in the science of self-government."⁴²

The statements by Mr. Jacob G. Schurman, President of the First Philippine Commission, Governor Francis Burton Harrison, former Democratic Congressman from New York, bear the same spirit for Philippine's inde-

39. Zuide, George F....quoted by John Austin, op.cit. p. 2

40. Ibid, p 36

41. Ibid, p 108

42. Ibid.

pendence.

The training for the self-government was started in 1913 when Filipinos got a majority in the legislature by being given five seats out of the nine. The next step towards the goal was the Filipinization of the government services. The number of Americans was reduced to a very small number, while the nationals were appointed on government posts in a largest number.^{"43} Rapid modernization of public works, hygiene, transport, education and justice was taken over as the base for Philippines' sound self-government. The Jones Law of 1916 provided a golden opportunity for the Filipinos to get training in constitutional government. "The Law was virtually an American made constitution providing for a complete form of autonomous government in the Philippines. In harmony with the Montesquiean doctrine of separation of powers, it demarcated governmental functions into executive, legislative and judicial."⁴⁴

"A further constitutional step along the path towards independence was the promulgation in February, 1935, of a new constitution which granted general suffrage in the Philippines. When the government provided under this constitution took office at the end of that year, the Commonwealth of the Philippines was established and a thorough reorganization was begun."⁴⁵

But this pace of development was disturbed greatly by the Japanese invasion on Philippines. The defeat of the Japan in the war (II World War) declined the Japanese occupation

43. For details, see John Bastin. Section 19

44. Ibid. p 111

45. Ibid. p 116

therein, and they had to retreat from this country like Indonesia, Indo-China, Malaya etc. The Americans granted full political independence to their lonely subjects in South-eastern Asia on 4th July, 1946.

The role of national leaders during the American rule was, on the whole, peaceful. Nationalism was received with constitutional measures rather than adopting violent approach towards the rulers. There were a few occasions when they had to adopt non-cooperating or violent methods to pressure the American Government. For instance, the policy of Governor Wood (1921-1927), who could not receive the confidence of the Filipinos, irritated the nationalist elements in the country and led to complete boycott of the Government. The forces of nationalism were most active during the three years' Japanese occupation, which ultimately led to the independence of the land both from the Americans and the Japanese.

Thus we see that the wave of nationalism had spread all over the Asia especially the South and the Southeastern regions. Although their approach were different, techniques were unique but the goal was the same i.e. to achieve freedom from colonial Powers. There were many factors which contributed towards the development of nationalism ——— for instance, the economic exploitation of these colonies on a large scale, the spread of Western education, the acquaintance of their peoples with the political ideals and theories of European thinkers, the French and the Russian revolutions and the socio-economic and political developments going on in their home countries themselves.

Now we come to the two great nations of Asia — India and China who too went under this struggle for national independence. The nature of these two national movements is unique in itself. Emphasis has been put on the national movement of India in the Twentieth century. The Chinese and the Indian support given to each other's movements will also be given due response while discussing the growth of Indian freedom struggle.

(B) INDIAN NATIONAL MOVEMENT AND THE EMERGENCE OF INITIAL POLITICAL SYSTEM :

" The history of nationalism in South Asia shows better than anything else the profound, many-sided impact of British rule on India (undivided) and Ceylon. It was a product of English education which spread new and revolutionary ideas in the traditional societies of South Asia; it became the spirit which seized the new classes created by the break up of the old society."⁴⁶ Each and every aspect of life was influenced by the foreign rule in this region — the culture, education, economy and the most important one — the political life. The spread of Western education, economic exploitation of natural and human resources, social and religious awakening of the peoples, the discovery of their glorious past and the closed character of the bureaucracy were the main factors which contributed towards the development of nationalism in India (undivided).

ORIGINS OF INDIAN NATIONALISM : " The early origins of Indian nationalism i.e. prior to its break up as Hindu and Muslim, can be traced back to the period of renaissance in Bengal in the early nineteenth century. The leading figures of this movement, including Rammohan Roy, were concerned with problems of social reform with education

and the freedom of the press. Their efforts to reform Hinduism and provide it with a social ethic presents one important cultural strand in Indian nationalism.⁴⁷ The old class system began to decline and new classes emerged. The hold of feudal lords over the peasants was also effected. A new class of merchants emerged as an influential part of society, then that of landowners, educated middle class. The artisans were wiped out.

NATIONALISM AFTER 1857 : "It was only after the First war of independence, could nationalism organize itself on an all-India basis and strengthen the movement for Independence."⁴⁷ This very important event in the history of Indian national movement had far reaching changes in the administration, the attitude of the people towards the British, the official policies of the Britishers themselves and the bureaucracy.

The British came to India for commercial interests. The huge natural and human resources provided easily and on cheapest cost attracted them so much that they went a step further by getting political power gradually. The establishment of English colonial Government in India after 1857 brightened their economic prospects. "The establishment of textile industry in the 1860s rapidly intensified the conflict of interests between Indian capitalists and those of Manchester and these were beginning to express themselves in political terms."⁴⁹ There was an unfair and unequal competition between the two which naturally led to the exploitation of Indian resources on a large scale.

47. Ibid, pp 44-5

48. Ibid, p 46

49. Ruchaman, S.L. ... quoted by Aiyar, S.P., op. cit., p 47

The economic changes led to the expansion of communication system. Railways were introduced and developed rapidly, roads were constructed, and these developments broke the isolation between different sections of the Indian people and helped in the spread of nationalism. The basic cause was the growing popular distrust and disillusionment against the British economic policy, which ultimately helped in rousing the feelings of Indian people against the British.

Another most important factor contributing towards the Indian nationalism was the spread of education among the Indians like other South and Southeast Asian nations. It "instilled the political ideas implicit in Western culture", and, "stimulated individual criticism, comparison and ambition." In urban areas especially nationalism became widely felt, if not clearly understood, as a result of the spread of literacy and the development of the press.⁵⁰ Our Western educated leaders along with the indigenously educated leaders, tried to pose national problems before the Indian people through the press and platform. The writings of our leaders and writers such as Rabindernath Tagore, Bankim Chander Chatterjee, created national consciousness among the common man.

While the Indian elite was impressed by the French Revolution of 1789 indirectly, those who were educated in the British Universities came into direct contact with the political experiments going on in England. The British Parliament had already established an outstanding position as the mother of Parliaments and was thought an

50. Narasimha : History of Freedom Movement in India-Vol. I, Publications Division, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, New Delhi (1961), p. 310

ideal place for free discussions. Such conventions and customs as practiced in England greatly influenced the thinking of Indian leaders studying there. Indian elites educated there played a very important role in the development of national movement in India — like Surendarnath Banerjee, Bankim Chandra and those like Mahatma Gandhi, Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, Jawaharlal Nehru etc.

"In England tremendous changes were taking place in both the spheres of practice and of thought....New problems were arising. New forces had begun to work. New ways of production of wealth on a large scale were spreading. With them new attitudes on mind, manners and morals were appearing. The new spirit which breathed upon the waters of life was bound to affect India which could not escape the consequences of the stir in the Western world."⁵¹ Voltaire, Rousseau, Kant, Burke, Bentham etc. were the champions of revolution in manners, sentiments and thought. They exercised a great influence over the thought and practice in England. And these influences reached India through different channels by intensifying the spirit of nationalism in India. They contributed towards the awakening of political consciousness among the Indians.

The social backwardness and the illiteracy of Indian people proved to be one of the main hurdles in national awakening. There was a lack of unity and solidarity among the different sections of the Indian society. Many social evils were prevalent there, There was most horrifying practice of 'satti', the low status of a widow in the Hindu society, their opposing attitude towards the attainment of English education etc. were the manifestations of Indians' backwardness. So there

51. Tarachand : History of Freedom Movement in India. Vol. I, Publications Division, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting. New Delhi. (1961), p. 310

was a great need to reform the Indian society so as to prepare it for the nation-building. Various missions like Ram Krishna Mission, the Arya Samaj, the Prarthana Samaj, the Brahmo Samaj, the Muslim reform movement etc. , and various organizations and associations contributed towards the social reforms in the Indian society. All these movements have some general ideas working behind them— the social and cultural awakening of the Indian people which was must for the strengthening of nationalism in the country. The social reformers gradually achieved their purpose and more and more Indians were joining the national movement with much consciousness.

THE BIRTH OF INDIAN NATIONAL CONGRESS : Three notes of Lord Ripon and their counter effects became the immediate causes of the birth of the Indian National Congress in 1885. In these notes, he expressed his views on the "increased difficulties of governing India due to the rising number of Britons on the country, and their hostility to the advancement of the Indians."⁵²

"There is no definite evidence available to suggest that before his departure from India Ripon encouraged Hume to organize educated Indians into a compact body in order to counteract the leanful influence of Anglo-Indians. In view , however, of Ripon's constant endeavours throughout his viceroyalty to strengthen the influence of public opinion in this country; his strong antipathy to the Anglo-Indian party and his extremely friendly relations with Hume, the possibility of such an encouragement cannot entirely be ruled out. But whether or not Ripon was the real inspirer of the Indian National Congress, there can be little doubt that, both in its origin and objectives, it bore unmistakably

52. For details, see; Senrotra, S.N. : The Emergence of the Indian National Congress. Vikas (1971). pp 37 -380.

imprint of his ideas and of the events of his viceroyalty.⁵³ The subjects which Hume discussed with Indian leaders while in Bombay were : the holding of an annual conference of representative men from all parts of India; the organisation of a central 'national association' to direct political activity throughout the country; the preparation of a charter of Indian demands to be presented to Parliament; the establishment of a 'telegraphic agency' to despatch news to the British press giving India's point of view and counteracting the misrepresentations of Anglo-Indians; particularly those of the Calcutta correspondent of the Times; and the formation of an 'Indian party' in Parliament.⁵⁴

The joint efforts of Indian leaders, some pro-Indian Englishmen and the general need to organize Indians into some sort of body led to the emergence of the Indian National Congress in 1885. The organising efforts of A.O.Hume are notable in this concern. "It was dominated by Western educated, Western oriented intellectuals who looked upon India's link with Great Britain as one of the fortunate accidents of history. Providence, it appeared to them, had brought British rule to India. They spoke of the Congress as the result of a "Divine Dispensation".⁵⁵

In the beginning, the Congress was dominated by moderates, who believed in a gradual development towards self-government and political independence through the co-operation with the English Government. A.C. Banerjee, Dadabhai Naoroji, Gopal Krishna Gokhale were

53. Mehrotra, S.R. ...op. cit., p 381

54. Ibid, pp 352- 3

55. Aiyar, S.P., op.cit., p 165

the main exponents of moderates' views. Till the end of the nineteenth century, the extremists had arisen in a considerable position in the National Congress. The cause behind the rise of extremism in the National Congress, were mainly the famines, plague, discontent and the growing disappointment among the Indians which led to violent events in the history of Indian national movement. Further, the "lack of insight and imagination" in the policy of Lord Curzon led to further discontent among the Indians. Tilak, Lala Lajpat Rai, Bipin Chander Pal and Aurobindo Ghosh were the extremist leaders in the Congress. Tilak through "Kesari" wrote against the British policy in India. His "writings were a call to the masses to press forward relentlessly and not be content with the pace of progress set by the constitutionalism of the moderates."⁵⁶

The coming years saw the emergence of a new movement as a part of national independence movement — the Swadeshi movement. In his Presidential address, Dadabhai Naoroji said : "we do not ask for any favours. We want only justice. Instead of going into further details of our rights as British citizens, the whole matter can be comprised in one word — self-government or Swaraj, like that of the United Kingdom or the colonies."⁵⁷

What were the main differences between the two groups within the Congress, how they contributed to the national movement for getting independence, how they responded to the British policies — are questions of interest to be discussed. Briefly speaking, the main difference between the two groups was that of methods and approach. The moderates believed in the sincerity of the British Government and in adopting constitutional methods to get independence in a gradual

56. Niyar, *op.cit.*, p. 168

57. Quoted by Niyar, p. 169

manner. They were against violent agitation in opposition to the British Government. While the extremists led by Tilak, did not believe in constitutional methods and considered them as useless and a wastage of time and efforts. Accordingly, the Britishers adopted coercive policy in ruling India and not that policy which was being practiced in England itself. Indian people could not tolerate such a dual policy anymore. They wanted justice, equality and morality. They could not wait for a long time to be awarded self-government through progressive stages. They must be given independence without any wastage of time, and it could not be got through constitutional ways. Pointing out the main difference between the extremists and the moderates, Tilak wrote in his Kesari that "what we aim at doing, now is to make it feel that all is not well. The immediate question for us is how to bring pressure on this bureaucracy in which we have no effective representation and are debarred from all except subordinate positions? It is only in our answer to that question that we differ from the so-called moderates."⁵⁸

The reforms in the economic and administrative affairs of India recommended by Morley-Minto in 1905, were embodied in the Indian Council's Act of 1909. The effects of these reforms became beneficial to the national movement by narrowing the gap between the moderates and the extremists which it did not expect. The ineffective position of the elected officials of the Council comparatively to those of nominated ones created irritation and discontent among both the groups in the Congress. It ultimately led to the well organization of national forces and the narrowing down of the gap between them. The introduction of communal electorates weakened the national unity as a whole but at

58. Quoted by Aiyar, S.P., op. cit., p 171

the same time led to the strengthening of different elements in the Congress.

The reforms introduced by Indian Council Act of 1909 did not satisfy the Indians. The Congress in 1913 demanded more constitutional reforms. During these years, the First World War was going on there. In 1916., Congress declared its political aim as the attainment of self-government. During the war years, Hindu-Muslim unity was remarkable which was seen in the Lucknow Pact which demanded self-government for India. On 20th August, 1917, a declaration was made on behalf of His Majesty's Government which provided "the increasing association of Indians in every branch of administration and the gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view to the progressive self-realization of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire."⁵⁹ moderates were satisfied with the promises made in the Declaration but the extremists had still doubt the British policy towards India. Tilak's view was that the declaration was unsatisfactory both in language and in substance." The political unrest in the country meanwhile was increasing.

In 1919, Gandhiji refused to join Mrs. Annie Besant's Home Rule Union, he thought, would embarrass the Government and hinder the war effort. Now Gandhiji had emerged as a prominent national leader. "By July, 1920, he put himself at the head of the Swaraj movement, although he did not still clearly indicate what it meant for him."⁶⁰ The death of Tilak put Gandhiji on the seat of leadership which was undisputed. Indian people extended full support to Gandhiji.

59. Declaration of August 20, 1917. Quoted by Aiyar, S.P., op.cit. p179

60. Ibid., p 184

The programme of non-co-operation was adopted by the Congress in 1920 which asked the Indians — to surrender all offices and titles, and resignation of seats in local bodies, refused to attend official functions, to withdraw children and young people from Government schools and colleges and the substitution of national institutions, to boycott British Courts and the Board of Arbitration, to withdraw candidates from the Reformed Councils and to refuse, on the part of the voters, to exercise their franchise and to boycott foreign goods.

Indian people extended full support to Gandhi and responded well to the movement of non-cooperation. The British official got irritated over the newly adopted attitude by the Indian people and their leaders. Difference also arose between the Members of British Parliaments over Indian affairs. Some claimed that the British Government was not doing justice to the Indian people while some of them criticized the behaviour of Indian leaders. A Reform Inquiry Commission was appointed by the Crown under the Chairmanship of Sir Alexander Muddiman to report on the working of dyarchy but before it could complete its work the Conservative replaced the Labour Government in Britain. The new Secretary of State, Lord Birkenhead adopted an unfavourable attitude towards national forces in India. The policy helped in the development of nationalism and growth of political unrest in India.

In accordance with the provisions of the Government of India Act of 1919, a seven-member Commission of inquiry under the chairmanship of Sir John Simon was appointed. It was boycotted by all sections of Indian people and nationalists adopted a violent attitude for resisting the official policies. This Commission submitted its report to the Parliament in 1930. The report was itself criticized and

rejected by the nationalists.

During the appointment of the Commission in 1927 and the submission of its report in 1930, an all Parties Conference met in 1928, appointed a committee under the chairmanship of Pandit Motilal Nehru, to discuss and determine a Constitution for India. Its report was published on August 07, 1928.

The Committee framed its Constitution on the basis of Dominion Status 'not as a remote stage of our evolution, but as the next immediate step'. The Motilal Nehru Committee of 1928 stated in its report: "We have.... made our recommendations on the basis (1) That we are agreed that nothing short of Dominion Status will satisfy India and (2) that the form of Government to be established in India will be the same and not lower than that of the other self-governing dominions."⁶¹

The Nehru report was not taken seriously by the English authorities.

The Lahore session of the Congress resolved for complete independence to be attained by legitimate and peaceful means.

"Pandit Nehru emphasized the need for rigid discipline and firm determination to make the coming struggle successful."⁶²

After the Lahore Congress of 1929, the urge for national independence increased. Now it was the only goal before the Indians to win complete freedom or 'purna swaraj' at all cost and at the earliest time. On Gandhiji's call, January 26, 1930 was celebrated as the Independence Day throughout^{out} the country. From that year onwards, 26th January was being celebrated as the Independence Day. The significance of that call was recognized by the Indian people when the Constitution

61Borman, Morotaj, Nehru II, quoted by Misra, Dr. B. : Constitutional Development and National Movement in India 1919-7, (1978).p 71

62. Misra, op. cit. p 77

of Independent India was inaugurated on January, 26, 1950.

This was the time when "Gandhi ji felt that the country was ripe for mass movement. He suggested the inauguration of this movement (Civil disobedience Movement) with the breach of the Salt laws. The salt tax hit the poorest in the land. Among the various reforms, Gandhi ji demanded such measures as reduction of the land tax, the military budget, the salaries of high officials; and amnesty for political prisoners and termination of colonial rule in India. He declared that if his requests were not met, Civil Disobedience would be initiated by way of pilgrimage, in defiance of the salt tax."63

The Civil Disobedience Movement was a strong manifestation of Indian nationalists' decisive attitude towards the London Government. According to the Gandhi Irwin Pact of 1931, this Movement was put off, the prisoners arrested in thousands and thousands of numbers were released. The Indian leaders were not assured Dominion status nor independence. According to the pact, Gandhi attended the II Round Table Conference of 1931, but it could not meet success due to certain factors. Instead, the British Government followed a coercive and repressive policy towards the nationalists. The situation further deteriorated all over India as the British Government went against her own assurances of solving the problems of India "wisely and justly." Due to the rigid attitude of the Government, Gandhi ji had to resume the Civil Disobedience Movement to press the demands of the Indian people. It put the Government into anxiety so that the Government had to reconsider the problems of India. Negotiations began there between the Congress leaders and the Government which led to the withdrawal of the Movement on the condition that the order banning the Indian National Congress would be lifted. Actually the Movement did not stop or fail but it continued in its spirit. Only the methods

of mass movement changed.

The Government of India Act of 1935 did not satisfy the Indians. This Act provided a Federal Government at the Centre and semi-autonomous Provincial Governments in the Provinces. Reservation of seats for different communities was also provided. The main feature of this Act was that it had the British idea inherent in itself that India was not yet ready for the transfer of power. According to this Act, Congress ministries were established in eight Provinces but they had to resign on November 15, 1939 due to conflicts with the Viceroy. On Feb. 20, 1940, the All India Congress Committee passed a resolution, which said:

"The Congress hereby declares again that nothing short of complete independence can be accepted by the people of India. Indian freedom can not exist within the orbit of imperialism and dominion status..... is wholly inapplicable to India."⁶⁴

The break of the IInd World War naturally effected the pace of Indian national movement. The famous August Offer from the Viceroy Lord Linlithgow in 1940 which assured of setting up a body after the end of the war, which would represent all principal elements in India's national life. It also promised for the new constitutional scheme acceptable to all sections of Indian society. The British Government rejected the Congress proposal for being granted complete independence after the war. The scheme of the British Government in turn was also rejected by the Congress as well as the Muslim League. The Indians' offer of conditional co-operation in war efforts with the British Government.

⁶⁴. quoted by Tiera, Dr. S., op. cit., p 127

Cripps Mission was sent to India to break the deadlock between the Indian national leaders and the British Government, on March 10, 1942. The draft of a Constitution for India prepared by the Mission was rejected by the Congress as well as by the League. On 8th August, 1942, the famous Quit India Movement's Resolution was passed by the Congress Working Committee at Bombay. The immediate reaction from the Government came in the arrest of all the members of the C.W.C. plus other national leaders present in Bombay at that time. This action could not control and check the rising demand for complete independence for India and caused grievous situation in the country.

The period between the Quit India Movement and the declaration of India's independence in 1947, was the most disastrous period in the history of India which saw the saddest and deteriorating conditions in the country. The Simla Conference, the setting up of the Interim Government under the Vice-Presidency of Mr. Nehru in 1946, were the most significant events of this period. But something very horrible was going on throughout India i.e. the communal riots caused by the demand of a separate State for the Muslims of the Indian sub-continent and the acceptance of this demand by the British Government which led to huge bloodshed.

Through these years of struggle against an imperialist power, Indians got encouragement and support from all dependent countries struggling for national independence. The Chinese leader Chiang Kai Shek and the great Chinese statesman Mr. Sun Yat-sen did all they could do to put pressure on the British Government both through direct as well as indirect communications to grant complete independence to India. Their efforts are being discussed in detail in the next Chapter.

C H A P T E R I I

GENESIS OF SING-INDIAN RELATIONS (1942- 1954)

CHAPTER II

GENESIS OF SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS

(1942-1954)

Although the history of Sino-Indian relations goes back to two thousand years, close political friendship was seen in the early forties between the two neighbours. That was the period when the Non-Co-operative Movement started by Gandhiji was at its peak. The peace loving peoples who were fighting for national freedom all over the world admitted the peaceful approach adopted by Gandhiji. The Chinese journalist and statesman Dr. Sun Yat-sen greatly admired the nature of the struggle in India and "pointed it out as an objective lesson for the Chinese journalists."¹

"Even though India was not an independent and sovereign state at that time, the leaders of Indian national movement adopted an objective and pragmatic approach about India's foreign relations. This was amply demonstrated at the Congress of the League against the Imperialism meeting at Brussels."² The Indian National Congress too declared its sympathy for the struggle of the Chinese people against imperialism. Jawaharlal Nehru, the great pioneer of India's foreign policy clearly adopted a policy of close friendship and mutual understanding towards China. He repeatedly admired their fight for the national ——— "To the progressive forces in the world, to those who stand for human freedom and the breaking of political and social bonds,....." Nehru said in 1936 with particular reference to China, "... we offer our full co-operation in their struggle against imperialism and fascist reaction, for we realise that our struggle is a

1. Quoted by Verma, S.P. : Struggle for the Himalayas. New Delhi. (1965) p 6

2. Ibid, p 7.

common one."³

Jawaharlal Nehru visited China himself in 1939 and expressed India's full sympathy towards the Chinese people in their struggle for freedom.

Nehru's visit was followed by the visit of the Chinese Nationalist leader, Chiang Kai-shek to India in 1942. "Chiang had expressed his desire before his coming to India to Churchill that he wanted to see Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru. Churchill had sent a reply through a personal message. The message ran in this way : "With regard to your seeing persons like Mr. Gandhi and Mr. Nehru, who are in a state at least of passive disobedience to the King Emperor, this will readily see is a matter which requires very grave consideration. It might make a most grievous impression in Great Britain and throughout the British Empire if any thing of this kind occurred..."

Chiang Kai-shek was not allowed to meet Gandhi at Wardha, but at Shantiniketan on 17th February, 1942. He was impressed with the courageous but peaceful struggle of the Indian people to get themselves liberated from an imperialist rule. "He advised the British Government in parting message to give real political power and freedom to India."⁵

Later on, Chiang asked the American Government to exert pressure on the British to relax their hold on India. It was Chiang who caused President Roosevelt to send a confidential letter to Mr. Churchill.

This letter included the contents of Chiang's message to Britain. Some of them were as follows;

"Inevitably Britain will regard the Indian National Congress, in seeking national independence, is dominated by sentimental

3. Ibid, p 7

4. Quoted by Misra, Dr. S. : Constitutional Development and National Movement. Varanasi. Patna. (1978) p. 17

rather than by reason....I think that in launching the freedom movement today when the Axis aggression is a pressing reality, the Indian Congress must have felt in their hearts a certain amount of anguish. If, however, the United States should show them no sympathy and pursue a *Laisses Faire* policy and thereby cause them to despair, I greatly fear that following the National Congress meeting in August there is danger of the situation going out of control. In case an anti-British movement or some other unfortunate incident occurs in India, the United Nations' war in the East will be adversely affected..... the United States as the acknowledged leader of democracy has a natural and vital role to play in bringing about a successful solution of the problem. In saying so, I have not the slightest intentions to arouse attention by exaggerated statements."⁶

Meanwhile, the country was facing its most critical situation and the most deteriorated stage of national movement. The famous Quit India Resolution was passed by the Congress Working Committee on 8th August, 1942. The immediate reaction from the British Government came in the arrest of national leaders. All the members of the C.W.C. including Gandhiji and the local Congress leaders were arrested. This aroused criticism from all sections of Indian society. The Congress organization was outlawed throughout British India. This suppressive action of the British Government was not liked by the Chinese leader. Chiang Kai-shek said to the British Ambassador at Hwang Shan; "the fact that arrests immediately followed the passing of the resolution of the Congress has made this

5. *Ibid*, p. 17

6. Nicholas Hanssorgh. *quoted by Libra, .op. cit., p. 175*

impossible. Despite this, we still must seek a peaceful solution of Indian problem.⁷

Sandhuji too corresponded with the Chinese leader the same year i. e. 1942, and expressed on his point that "... his appeal to the British power to withdraw from India was not meant in any shape or form to weaken India's defend against the Japanese or to embarrass you in your struggle.... I would not be guilty of purchasing the freedom of my country at the cost of your country's freedom."⁸

Thus the Japanese aggression caused to strengthening the relations between India and China in defending their countries from the Axis invasion.

Actually India and China had common goals to achieve, common interests to be defended and after all their fight against imperialism and fascist rule was to bring them closer. Those who observed such an atmosphere of common ideals, expected naturally that these ties will grow stronger after the independence of the two countries from the foreign domination. It was expected that there would be a lot of possible co-operation in the national reconstruction and development of the two nations in the near future. It was also hoped that they would support the freedom movements in the various parts of Asia and share co-operation in the field of solidarity and security along with the development in all fields of life in the years to come.

India got freedom in 1947, and the Chinese had a successful revolution in 1949. India adopted a foreign policy based on peaceful co-existence, non-alignment, self-determination and equality for all states.

7. Ibid, p. 10

8. Quoted by JAFFAR, op. cit. , pp 7-8

and nations. China reciprocated India's expression of friendship and goodwill. But unfortunately, the forces opposed to peace and Asian solidarity and fraternity were seen right in the early fifties. A series of events one after another happened there which continued to establish and escalate misunderstandings between the two countries and gave way to mistrust to the extent that it resulted in the involvement of military forces of both countries in 1962. The nature of China's behaviour in the field of political understanding and friendship suddenly changed and they raised new issues and placed the Indian leaders and intelligence in a difficult position. Expressions much clearer to be understood were given on various occasions—— for instance, at the Asian Relations' Conference in 1949, "when the Chinese delegation raised objection to the display of an Asian map in which Tibet was shown to be a territory outside China, and protested against India's official recognition of the Tibetan delegation."⁹

TIBET PROBLEM AND THE SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS :

The history of Tibet is full of struggle against internal and external authorities to secure and maintain her independence and sovereignty. Great disturbances in Tibet were caused from time to time by the Chinese military intrusion in the country. China tried many a times to get control over Tibet, sometimes she got success and sometimes failed in her trials. We can take a few examples for our purpose so as to bring the triangular politics between India, Tibet and China into light. Let us begin since the early years of the twentieth century. Chinese tried in 1910, 1915 and 1917 to get complete hold over Tibet, but failed. The Tibetans resisted bravely and conditions favoured

9. Kukul Bihari Lal : Communist China's Aggression. Praja Socialist Publ.

their struggle." In 1936, a Chinese mission was sent to Lhasa in connection with the death of the Dalai Lama and it stayed on till 1949. But its stay did not imply recognition of Chinese authority over Tibet. In 1936, Tibetans by themselves drove the Chinese communists from Kham but they otherwise took part in the civil war of China."¹⁰

As Tibet was already an independent sovereign state which had the authority to conclude treaties with other independent countries, it was a signatory side by side with Great Britain and China in the Simla Convention held in April, 1914. The Treaty signed at the Convention is called Anglo-Tibetan Regulation of 1914. It shows that Tibet had the right to conclude treaties not only with Great Britain but with China too. It also means that China had accepted the status of Tibet as an independent state.

"During the World War II, Tibet opened its own foreign affairs bureau, did not throw its forces on the side of China, and allowed only non-warlike goods to pass from India to China through its territory, thus asserting and maintaining her independence."¹¹

The Tibetan policy of China became doubtful in the eyes of the world's peace-loving peoples when a resolution was adopted by the Communist Political Conference, held at Peking in July, 1949. Accordingly, "Tibet would be retained as part of the People's Republic of China." "Chou En-lai, however, declared later that the principle of self-determination would be applied."¹²

The aggressive intentions of China got a clear

10. Fukut Bihari Lal....op. cit., p 3

11. Ibid, p 3

12. Quoted by Verma....op.cit., p 14

expression when a statement was made by the Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese Army in 1949 which showed that China was going to liberate all territory of China including Formosa, the Pescadores, Hainan and Tibet.¹³ On the New Year's Day, 1950, Marshal Chu-Teh declared the "liberation of Tibet as one of the basic tasks of the People's Liberation Army."¹⁴

So it was not unexpected when the Chinese troops entered Tibet on 7th October, 1950. Thus the process of the so-called "liberation" of Tibet began. The immediate rea^{ct}ion from India was asked: "From whom Tibet was to be liberated?" The Chinese action in Tibet had naturally affected the Indo-Tibetan as well as Sino-Indian relations. The Government of India sent a Note to the Chinese Government "to seek solution of their relations with Tibet not by force, instead by, the slower and more enduring method of peaceful approach."¹⁵

The reply of the Chinese Government was against the expectations of the Indian Government as well as of the rights of the Tibetan people. The Chinese Note said that "the problem of Tibet is a domestic problem of the People's Republic of China and no foreign interference shall be tolerated."¹⁶ The Indian advice that the Chinese suzerainty and Tibetan autonomy should be reconciled, was rejected instead it was regarded as a case which came within the confines of Chinese sovereignty. In another Note, Chinese Government declared ".....the relative autonomy granted by the Chinese Government to national minorities inside the country is an autonomy within the confines of Chinese sovereignty."¹⁷

13. New China News Agency, 24 September, 1949.

14. Quoted by Verma, ...op. cit., p 13

15. Note by the Government of India to the Chinese Government, dated 27th October, 1950

16. Chinese Note to the Government of India, dated 30th Oct. 1950

17. Ibid..... date 16th November, 1950

There was an anti-China wave in India and the public opinion was generally concerned over the situation in Tibet. The Prime Minister of India said in Parliament that "...it is not right for any country to talk about its sovereignty or suzerainty over any area outside its own range.... the last word in regard to Tibet should be the voice of Tibet and of nobody else."¹⁸

The change in India's earlier stand on Tibet was due to certain factors. Earlier India was following the British policy towards Tibet to maintain her as a buffer State between India and China, and wanted to continue her rights in Tibet as enjoyed by the British Government. Soon the situation changed and the balance of power in Asia began to shift from the emerging Indian power to the newly emerging Communist China. After 1947, the formal and informal negotiations between the Chinese Premier Chou En-lai and the Indian Ambassador K.M. Panikkar, led to the withdrawal of the long enjoyed rights in Tibet. "Chou En-lai recognized the legitimacy of our trade and cultural interests in that area and suggested that the political agency at Lhasa, an office of dubious legality, should be regularized by its transformation into an Indian Consulate-General in exchange for a similar Chinese office in Bombay." The Indian Ambassador further states that "there was no outstanding issue between us and the Chinese at the time of my departure."¹⁹

Faced with the accomplished return of Chinese power to Tibet in 1950, the Indian Government reacted pragmatically. The attempt to foster at least a degree of Tibetan independence, to maintain certain element of buffer status for Tibet had failed. Physically, there was

18. Nehru in Parliament. Speech on 7th Dec., 1950. Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Govt. of India. New Delhi.

19. Panikkar, K.M.: In Two Chinas. George Allen & Unwin. London (1955) p 175

nothing India could do about it; military intervention, braving immense logistical difficulties as well as war with China, was beyond practical consideration. The choice was between commitment to the lost cause of Tibetan independence, or of pursuing a policy of friendly relations with China.²⁰ But this policy was misunderstood in China on the one hand, and there was a lot of pressure on the Indian Prime Minister Nehru to help the Tibetans in their struggle against the Chinese intrusion. Naturally India had to change her policy towards Tibet but a little. India didn't supported the Tibetan cause openly, instead she insisted on the internal independence of Tibet. This policy provoked the Chinese and they became hostile towards India, accusing her of being a partner to an imperialist plot against China.

The Chinese intrusion in Tibet was condemned all over the world, China did nothing, but sharply criticised India and the capitalist countries of interfering with her "domestic affairs." Meanwhile an agreement was signed between Tibet and China on 23rd of May, 1951.

"It established Central Chinese authority over Tibetan external and its military. Indian Government was satisfied with the Agreement as it guaranteed internal autonomy to the Tibetan people and the established status, functions and powers to the Dalai Lama, as well as promised the policy of co-existence with neighbouring countries."²¹ The Chinese officials assured the Indian Ambassador in Peking, Sardar K.K.Panikkar²² to secure their ends by negotiations and not by military action.

"Military consolidation in Tibet was the first on concern of the Chinese Central Government. For this, a large number of

20. Maxwell, Neville : India's China war. Jaico. Bombay. (1970)pp 71-72

21. Mukut Bishari Lal..op. cit., p 6

22. Panikkar,...op. cit., p 105

Chinese forces were marched into Tibet, regional military commanders were organized, the old Tibetan Army was abolished, and the Commander and Vice-Commander of the Tibetan forces were enlisted with the Communist forces to bring them in line with the forces of occupation.^{"23} Not only this, the Chinese interfered with their religious matters, too.

SINO-INDIAN AGREEMENT ON TIBET, 1954.

This Agreement was concluded between India and China on 29th April 1954, ratified by the Indian Parliament on 3rd June, 1954. The most important part of this is its preamble which lays down the famous five principles of peaceful co-existence, later popularly known as Panchsheel. The preamble states:-

"The principles and considerations which govern our mutual relations and the approach of the two countries to each other are as follows:-

- (i) Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty;
- (ii) Mutual non-aggression;
- (iii) Mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs;
- (iv) Equality and mutual benefit; and
- (v) Peaceful co-existence.^{"24}

Nehru regarded this Agreement as a very important event. He expected that "if these principles were adopted in the relations of various countries with one another, a great deal of the trouble of the present day would probably disappear."²⁵

23. Sukut Bihari Lal....op. cit., p 7

24. Jawaharlal Nehru — Speech in Parliament...op.cit., 15th May, 1954

25. Ibid.

The rise of China was a major political event of the 20th century. Accepting the new changes in world politics, Nehru was wise enough to initiate talks between India and China on Tibet. The conditions in Tibet were deteriorating, which could harm the Sino-Indian relations. On the other hand, the United States was contemplating a treaty on arms aid to Pakistan in 1952 which could be concluded only in 1954. One more factor which could be regarded as contributing towards the conclusion on this Agreement was the opening of the Geneva Conference on Indo China in 1954.

According to the 1954 Agreement, India lost most of her rights in Tibet which she inherited from the British. New Chinese trade offices were allowed to be opened in New Delhi and Calcutta along with the existing one in Kalimpong. India was granted permission to carry on her trade agencies in Gartok, Gyantse and Yatung.

As far as the boundary question between the two countries was concerned, the "Vice-Foreign Minister Chang Han-fu, Chinese representative at the 1954 negotiations is alleged to have told Indian Ambassador Raghavan that the Chinese did not wish to touch on the boundary question. Nevertheless, it is likely that not only the specific issue of the border but the larger and more crucial problem of the boundary delimitation at least came up for discussion. In fact, it was probably a point of contention that China refused to incorporate into the agreement an acceptance of the Indian claimed alignment."²⁶ According to this agreement, India formally abandoned its traditional position that Tibet should be an autonomous buffer zone."²⁷ The Post

26. Howland, John : A History of Sino-Indian Relations — Hostile

Co-existence. Van Nostrand, Princeton (1967), p 35

27. Ibid, p 85

and Telegraph offices in Tibet were handed over to China and military escorts stationed at Yatung and Gyantse for the protection of Indian traders were evacuated. The Indian rights as a result of previous treaties with Tibet were also given up. The most alarming thing which was regarded as "the Tibet region of China" in the very title of the Agreement was accepted by India. Thus India accepted the Chinese claim over Tibet and allowed the Communists to exercise de-jure sovereignty too in Tibetan affairs.

UPRISING IN TIBET AND SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS :

The Chinese invasion of Tibet in 1950, and the strengthening of the Chinese control over Tibetan affairs led to great unrest among the Tibetan people. Great pressure was being put on the 13th Dalai Lama to accept Chinese control over Tibet and to function as a puppet of Chinese communism. The other member of the Royal family as well as Tibetan officials were duress too. People were being convinced that the line of the Lamas would come to an end after the 13th Dalai Lama. Indoctrination of the new Tibetan generation was started so as to train them as Chinese tools. Meanwhile, roads, military fields were being constructed all over Tibet to connect all important Tibetan points with the Chinese military headquarters. The 17-point Agreement was signed on May 23, 1951, titled as an Agreement on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet between the Central People's Government and the Tibet Local Government. "The 17-Point Agreement is a significant document since not only provides a false front for the Chinese absorption of Tibet but an indication of China's true nationalities doctrine."²⁶

Another massive Chinese military intrusion in Tibet in 1952 established "an effective occupation of Tibet." The situation in.....

Tibet was such that the Tibetans were to provide all supplies of food and other daily necessities to the People's Liberation Army. Thousands and thousands of Tibetans had to work as labourers with the Chinese Army in construction works. Thus, the humiliation of Tibetan people on a large scale and the pressure on the Dalai Lama resulted in the uprising among Tibetans. The centre of their (Tibetan Nationals) activities became the Kham region of Tibet where guerrillas were semi-organized to face the Chinese military actions, which had become apparently hostile against the revered Lama and the Tibetan people in general. Dalai Lama was continuously put under pressure to order his Army to move against the Kham rebels but he refused to take any action against his own people. Instead of the tacit assurances from the Chinese Premier that "troops were being withdrawn from Tibet,..... but in fact reinforcements were steadily coming in. Three Divisions were believed to have reached by Lhasa by March, 1959."²⁹

"Despite the military force which Peking could maintain on this inhospitable plateau, the person of the Dalai Lama was still the main obstacle to direct rule. The obvious and classic solution would have been to keep him under secure control in China where his sanction for Chinese rule in Tibet, could be extracted under pressure or if necessary forged."³⁰ He was forced to go to Peking to attend the meeting of Chinese Communist Party for this purpose, but failed in all their attempts. These circumstances, at least, compelled the Dalai Lama to leave Tibet and take asylum in India. China put her maximum pressure on the Indian Government to refuse to grant asylum, but "India could not remain indifferent at this stage and while giving support to their

29. Ibid, p 105

30. Ibid, p 105

('Tibetans') cause, she gave refuge to the Da lai lama...³¹ Meanwhile keeping in view the revolt in Tibet, the Chinese authorities had to request Prime Minister Nehru to postpone his programmed visit to Tibet for which they themselves had already invited. "The Government of India also became seriously concerned about the possible effect of the Tibetan unrest on the Sino-Indian relations as well as its repercussions in the matter of India's border security."³²

With the flight of Dalai lama to India, hostilities broke out between India and China which, later on, took an aggressive form when China invaded India on a massive scale.

REACTI . . . OF THE MAJOR OPPOSITION PARTIES IN INDIA :

Very sharp reactions came from the Indian public. The Opposition parties gave due response to the problem of political changes which had taken place in the Chinese policy towards Tibet and India too, "India brought the situation (in Tibet) to the notice of the U.N. Rafiq Zakaria, the Indian delegate, told the U.N. General Assembly that the situation in Tibet 'cries out for the attention of all mankind.' He said that it was first raised in the U.N. in 1950, India opposed its inclusion on the agenda because 'we were assured by China that she was anxious to settle the problem by peaceful means. However, the situation in Tibet instead of improving began to worsen."³³

Thus, India openly supported the cause of the Tibetan people. The Opposition parties of India too were annoyed with the Chinese behaviour and supported the struggle of the Tibetan people for

32.Nisami, T.A. : The Communist Party of India and India's Foreign Policy.

Associated. New Delhi. (1971) p 250

32. Karnik, V.B.: China Invades India. Bombay. Allied. (1963)p 149

33. Quoted by Nisami,...op. cit., p 251

their political, religious and cultural independence. The Chinese invasion of Tibet, her military strategy, the humiliation of the Tibetan people and the pressurization of Dalai Lama to accept Chinese programme of the so-called "peaceful liberation of Tibet" was condemned all over India. The Opposition parties raised their voice against the injustice being done to the Tibetans, criticised the cool behaviour of the Indian Government, and drew the attention of the peace loving peoples of the world towards the Tibetan crisis. The C.P.I. did not join her voice with other Opposition parties in these matters, instead, adopted a pro-China policy and ignored the national security and integrity of their own country.

T.H. COMMUNIST PARTY'S ATTITUDE :

The Communist Party of India, since 1947 had adopted an anti-national policy towards both the internal and external matters of India. It followed the Chinese line in considering India a country not independent. They had the opinion : "India's struggle for peace is inseparably linked with the struggle for India's full and unfettered national freedom which means, first and foremost, freedom from control of the British who continue to be the dominant imperialist power in India."³⁴

While India was being accused by China as a partner in an imperialist plot against China, the C.P.I. declared that "..... instead of joining hands with the partisans of peace against the aggressors and branding the U.S.A. as chief aggressor, the Indian Government is carrying on a suspicious play between these two camps and is flirting with the U.S.A. thus facilitating the struggle of aggressors against peace loving countries."³⁵ It advised the Indian Government "not to play

34. Resolution of the Central Committee of the C.P.I. 1953, p 9

35. Programme of the C.P.I. October, 1951, p 22

between peace and war but a united front with peace loving countries and friendship with them," was needed by India.

When the Chinese military action in Tibet was being justified by China, the C.P.I. said; "..... the peoples of Asia led by the Great Chinese People's democracy are now battling to free themselves from imperialism,"³⁶ a seal of approval on the Chinese policy towards Tibet.

The Trade Agreement on Tibet between India and China was greatly appreciated by the C.P.I., which stated in her election manifesto of 1957 that ".....by sponsoring, together with People's Republic of China, the historic Panchsheel and by establishing relations of friendship and co-operation with the socialist democratic and peace loving States, India has won an eminent position in the comity of nations..."³⁷

The Indian communists supported Indian demand for seating China in the United Nations and said that the Indian people... "... want the People's Republic of China to be accorded its rightful place in the United Nations Organization."³⁸

The main obstacle in the Sino-Indian relations being the problem of Tibet, was a point of much importance for the Indian communists as it was for China herself. The C.P.I. too regarded the Tibetan revolt as an action of handful "reactionaries and surf-owners", supported from outside elements especially by Chiang Kai-shek and American imperialists. It also warned Indian Government not to interfere with the

36. Ibid, p 22

37. C.P.I. — Election Manifesto, 1957

38. Ibid.

internal matters of a foreign country. They also supported China's claim that Tibet, for centuries had been a part of China. The Indian Government was also accused by the Indian communities of giving refuge to the Tibetan rebels and supporting their guerrilla activities from Kalimpong in India. A C.P.I. statement said that the Principles of Panchsheel "enjoin on us strict neutrality and non-intervention in each other's affairs. This also means that we should not allow our territories to be used for hostile or prejudicial acts against each other."³⁹

In its statement, the C.P.I. send greetings to the Communist Party and the Government of China for leading the Tibetan people "from medieval darkness to prosperity and equality." This statement issued by the Communist Party of India led to a lot of critical wave of discussion against the C.P.I.'s anti-nationalist policy in the Lok Sabha on April 1st, 1959. Nehru himself had to broke his hesitation and revealed in Parliament that C.P.I. had "no kinship" with Indian nationalism. He also expressed the view that C.P.I.'s view on Tibet "represented an entirely different approach from the point of view of Indian national sentiment."⁴⁰

When the Tibetan issue was again discussed in the Indian Parliament in May, it put the Indian communists in a very difficult and complicated position. The communist leader S.A. Dange tried his best to have defensive speech on his party's views on Tibet, but failed. He had to accept that his party's views differed from those of hold by the Indian Government towards Tibet. He expressed the hope that the contro-

39. Sen, n33, pp 305-6

40. For details of Nehru's views, see also Nehru in Parliament.

Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India. 1959

versies between the two countries on this issue could be resolved on the basis of Panchsheel and the required recognition of the Chinese claim over Tibet on the part of China.

"The most serious consequence for the Party for its Tibetan policy was its complete isolation from the mainstream of Indian public opinion.....In fact, the communists were so cribbled and confined by their ideology that they could neither keep pace with India's aroused public opinion or catch up with it later. This was a sad experience for a party which prides itself on its vanguard quality and intimate links with the masses." 41

PRAJA SOCIALIST PARTY'S REACTION TOWARDS THE SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS :

The Praja Socialist Party, was one of the major Opposition parties in India during the period under discussion. It supported Indian Government's policy towards China in welcoming the successful Chinese Revolution of 1949, the demand for seating China in the U.N.O. and above all for close relationship between the two countries.

But the military action of China in Tibet and the increasingly aggressive attitude of China towards India led to changes in the policies of the P.S.P. towards China and Tibet. The National Executive of the Party stated :

"To attempt to justify the invasion of 60 lakh square miles of territory on the basis of sovereign rights which are so doubtful and untenable as they are imperialist in an irony of which no modern government should have been capable. The people of Tibet alone may decide in a free vote or plebiscite their form of government or of

41. Varley, Guseph : At the Crossroads. Minerva. Calcutta. (1974), pp 57-8

alliances with the outside world."⁴²

The Party urged the people of India to assist to the Tibetan people in maintaining their independence and evolving a policy of socialism.

During the discussion on Tibet problem in the Lok Sabha, the P.S.P. leader Acharya Kirplani stated : "China has destroyed what could be called a buffer state between India and China. In international politics, if a buffer state is abolished by a powerful nation the later is considered an aggressor whose advance to one's borders is considered dangerous."⁴³ He called the Chinese action in Tibet as "a deliberate action of aggression."

On an another occasion, the Praja Socialist Party leader criticised the Panchsheel Agreement of 1954, and said the doctrine of Panchsheel "was born in sin because it was enunciated to put the seal of our approval upon the destruction of an ancient nation which with the spritually and culturally."⁴⁴

The Praja Socialist Party didn't support the idea Tibet was an integral part of China nor considered it as an internal matter of the Chinese Government. It openly and emphatically supported the Tibetan people's struggle for independence. "Tibet Day" was observed all over the country by the P.S.P. units on 23rd March, 1959. It also demanded the Indian Government to put the Tibetan issue on the U.N. platform and get the support of the world on the annihilation of a simple people. The Party demanded a firm policy towards China by the Gover-

42. Quoted by Pillai, K. Raman : India's Foreign Policy — Basic Issues and Political Attitudes. (1969), p

43. Vigil, Vol. No. 14, May 22, 1954

44. Lok Sabha Debates. Vol XVII, 19 August 1958, Col. 1676

ment of India. "The Party expected a flexible and self-confident foreign policy from the Government."⁴⁵

They accused the Nehru Government of adopting a policy of "appeasement" towards China which was dangerous for the national security and integrity of India. Thus, the P.S.P. adopted a national policy towards China and Tibet.

THE J-RA SANG 'S ROLE IN INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICY :

"The Party's foreign policy," stated the Party's Election Manifesto of 1952, "will be guided primarily by the enlightened national self-interest, ~~that is~~, that is, considerations of welfare and progress of the country."⁴⁶ The Party gave prior importance to the international relations of India, especially with China and Pakistan. It condemned the Chinese policy towards Tibet which, in the Party's view, had "destroyed Tibet's age-old freedom." The Party also took note of the Chinese maps which showed large Indian territories as Chinese and asked the Government of India "to instruct her representative at Peking to protest emphatically against this aggressive policy of China to declare categorically the McMahon Line (existence between Tibet and India) must stand intact and in no way interfered with."⁴⁷ The Party asked the Indian Government to "take immediate and effective steps to see that China's aggression in Tibet," might "cease her armies of occupation withdrawn from Tibet and Tibet's independence is secured."⁴⁸ It demanded

45. Hartmann, Horst : Political Parties in India. Meerut. (1971), p 94

46. B.J.S. Documents — Resolution passed by the C.N.C. at Delhi on
Dec. 20, 1953

47. ———— : Resolution passed by the C.N.C. at Delhi on
Dec. 20, 1953

48. ———— : Resolution passed by A.I.C.U. at Poona on
July 3, 1959.

Government's activities on large scale both on international as well as on international platforms to support the cause of the Tibetan people. Keeping in view the growing Chinese' troops activities alongside the Indian borders and the cases of the Chinese intrusions into Indian territory, the Government should give priority "to national security and great attention be paid to the defence of our borders."⁴⁹ In Party's view, "the borders between India and Tibet are clear and definite through definite treaties, usage and transition. There was no confusion, doubt or controversy in this matter and all talk which creates confusion or doubt should stop since it lends support to the unjust role of China."⁵⁰ They accused her of adopting a "dual policy" towards China as "aggression and peaceful negotiations" could not go side by side.

Thus, the Jami Sangha adopted an extremely nationalist policy towards the Chinese expansionist policies in Tibet and onto India. They alarmed that the Chinese action in Tibet would be followed by the same in India in the near future too. This was later on proved by facts and events.

THE KALACHAKRA PARTY'S ROLE IN SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS :

"The fundamental principles of Kachakra Party contain one point which is rather unique for political parties. The last of the twenty one points allows party members to adopt any position they may choose on all questions not falling within the scope of the principles ..."⁵¹ In this way, the Party has no fixed policy

49. —————: Resolution passed at Poona by the C.C.C. , Sept.20,1959

50. —————: Ibid.

51. Hartmann,...op. cit., p 139

regarding foreign affairs. Any member might hold any view may be it different from other leaders' views on foreign relations. On the whole the Party believed in regarding China "as the principal menace to freedom in India." It didn't considered non-alignment as meaningless for India after the aggressive designs of India's neighbours put on India. Instead of following a neutral policy, India should form regional security pacts with Asian countries.

The Swatantra Party shared her views on Tibet with the Jana Sangh. The Swatantra leader N.G.Ranga said in Parliament that "the whole history of relations between China and Tibet and India proves that it can not be treated as an internal problem of China....we should help Tibet to continue to remain free."⁵² They also supported the idea that the Tibet problem should be discussed in the United Nations.

Like the Jana Sangh ^{and} other rightist parties, the Swatantra did not welcome the negotiations on diplomatic level because they would be useless due to the increasing aggressive attitude of China towards India. Not only this, the Swatantra leaders joined hands with the Jana Sangh in demanding severity of diplomatic relations with China and do not support her seating in the world body. In Party's view.....there can be no negotiations until foreign outposts which are an act of aggression are first removed."⁵³ The Party also accused Indian Government of adopting a policy of "complacency" and "appeasement."

In brief, the attitudes of different Opposition parties of India towards India's relations with China and their reactions to the aggressive policies of China towards Tibet as well as on Indian

52. Lok Sabha Debates. Vol. 46, 31 August, 1960, Cols. 5995-6

53. ————— Vol. 9, 7 December, 1961, Col. 3879

can be broadly classified into two categories — pro-Communist and anti-Communist. The chief characteristic which is found in the foreign policies adopted by all these parties is the same i.e. the change according to the ups and downs observed in the Sino-Indian relations. The Communist Party was under dual pressure—— one from China and another from Russia, which later on caused to a split in the Party. When Chinese leaders sharply criticised Nehru's foreign policy based on non-alignment, the Indian communists did not hesitate in doing the same. At a later stage, Chinese leaders obviously appreciated the role played by Nehru in maintaining world peace, the communists too praised Nehru's policies towards China and Russia openly. The third stage saw the deterioration of Sino-Indian relations which was apparently resisted from the Tibet problem. Now the attitude of the C.P.I. completely changed and the country observed their anti-national activities. This was the influence of the communists on the Indian Government that India kept herself abided by the Panchsheel which China continued to violate.

The anti-communist parties put also pressure on the Indian Government. On the Tibet question,⁵⁴ all non-communist parties had concluded that the revolt was spontaneous, that it had considerable popular support, and that it was nourished by nationalism. They expressed profound sympathy and support for the rebels. There was always an emotional overtone in their reactions to the developments in Tibet. Even Nehru admitted that Tibet affected 'some deeper chords in our hearts! No doubt, there were differences among these parties on Tibet, particularly on what were the appropriate steps for the solution of the Tibetan problem. But they all agreed that China was wrong in Tibet and Tibet was the victim."⁵⁴

54. Varkey, Ouseph..op.cit., p 57

C H A P T E R I I I

NATURE OF SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS AND THE OPPOSITION

PARTIES OF INDIA

CHAPTER III

NATURE OF SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS AND THE OPPOSITION

PARTIES OF INDIA

When the Kungtong Government was replaced by the Communist regime in the mainland of China and formally declared on 1st October, 1949, India was the second nation outside the Soviet Bloc which gave immediate recognition to the Chinese Republic. The formal Indian recognition was announced in December 1949. Nehru told the Lok Sabha that it was not a question of approving or disapproving of a major event in history and dealing with it.¹ He stated that..... this revolution was not some kind of palace revolution. It was a basic revolution involving millions and millions of human beings. It was a stable revolution with strength behind it and popularity behind it at that time, whatever might have happened later. It produced a perfectly stable government, strongly enough entrenched and popular. Our liking it or disliking it had nothing to do with it. Naturally we came to the decision that this Government should be recognized and within two or three months we recognized it.²

The more important step which surprised the whole world was India's demand for the membership of Chinese People's Republic in the United Nations. This caused a lot of criticism of India's foreign policy by most of the countries of the world and especially by

1. Lok Sabha Debates, March 17, 1950, Vol. 3, Col. 1699

2. Nehru, J. : India-China Relations — Speech delivered in Lok Sabha on Nov. 27, 1959. Publications' Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, New Delhi. 1959.

Western bloc led by the United States. The Indian mission abroad had to take pains to justify this policy. The Indian leaders, chiefly the Prime Minister and the then Defence Minister V.K. Krishna Menon (1957-1962) spoke enthusiastically for the necessity of seating China in the United Nations. Mr. Nehru said "....Indeed China ought to have been there long ago but for certain complications in regard to Marshal Chiang Kai-Shek."³ While a member of the United States' delegation expressed his "shock" at the approach adopted by India in this concern, our Defence Minister, Mr. Menon criticized the attitude of the United States and branded it of being "guilty not only of a misstatement of fact but of doing a disservice to the cause of international friendship."⁴ He also protested against the statement given by a member of American delegation charging India with being mouthpiece of anybody, other than its own Government or its own people."⁵ Commenting on the speeches delivered in the General Assembly on the issue of Chinese admission to the United Nations in 1956, Nehru told the Indian Parliament that the policy adopted by Indian Government was based on accepting of realities. He assured the House ".....we have found in the last ten years that what we have said and what action we have proposed has been accepted by other countries year after year. They have around around after much damage had done as a result of their not accepting that advice..."⁶

3. Quoted by Menon, V.K. : Admission of China to the United Nations, I.S.I.,

New Delhi. pp 3-4

4. Menon, V.K. :..... op. cit., p 3

5. Ibid.

6. Nehru,----- India-China Relations, op. cit., p

India's approach was thus based on the de facto theory of governments in International Law, which holds that new governments should be recognized as soon as they are, in fact, in control of State 'without going into the nature of the government.' This was the policy which the United States usually adhered to during the period from 1793 down to the first Wilson Administration.⁷

While the Indian suggestion for a seat in the United Nations for China was welcomed by Marshal Stalin, it was politely rejected by the United States. Nehru complained about the refusal of the West to admit China to the United Nations, although it was only logical that this government should be represented in the United Nations.⁸

He further said: "On the other hand, the recognition of the Chinese Communist Government does not necessarily imply approval of the kind of government set up in China. Yet I must add that the Peking regime has adopted a seemingly friendly attitude towards us; which we reciprocate."⁹

Adopting a broad view of world affairs, he thought: "There can be no stable order or effective co-operation in the world if China and India are ignored, and relatively weak though they might be today, they are not so weak as to submit to any such treatment."¹⁰

Although India was supporting the case of Chinese admission on an international level with enthusiasm, the relations between the two countries were relatively cold and uneventful. Both of the Govern-

7. Kundra, J.C. : Indian Foreign Policy- 1947-54. Bombay. (1955), p 123

8. Nehru, J. : speech delivered in Parliament, August 3, 1950.

9. Ibid.

10. —————: China, Spain and War. p 21

ments were too busy in stabilizing their newly won freedom and planning for reconstruction and development in the various fields of national life. The Indian leaders both at home and abroad were of the view that China was a good friend of India and could not harm her nearest neighbour in any way. When the First Five Year Plan was started in 1951, Indian leaders also re-organized their approach to their neighbours. In other words, some thought was given to the foreign policy of India.

(a) DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGES :

Enthusiasm encircled the two neighbouring countries when diplomatic exchanges were established in ———and different delegations were exchanged between them. India sent a technical mission to China in May, 1954. China sent India two delegations——cultural and trade in October 1959. An unofficial delegation of lawyers from India went China in September 1955 and a cultural Indian delegation was sent in the same year. In October, 1955 a delegation of our educationists visited China. During the year 1956, four several delegations visited China——Planning Commission, agricultural, Parliamentary and Defence Services delegations. A Chinese women's delegation visited India in January, 1956. These exchanges of delegations aroused the interest of Chinese of Indian peoples into each other's progressive and reconstructive developments.

CHINESE PREMIER IN INDIA (1954): ^{relations} The/ between the two countries went on its peak during the period followed by the visit of the Chinese Premier, Chou En-lai to India in June, 1954 which gave the famous slogan of Hindi Chini bhai bhai. He was warmly received by the Indian Government and the people despite a call from some Opposition parties to boycott the reception arranged in honour of Mr. Chou En-lai. It will be discussed under

... role of the Opposition parties in Sino-Indian relations at the end of this Chapter. In a joint statement with our Prime Minister, he again affirmed his Government's faith in the Five Principles and declared "..... May Panchsheel grow from strength to strength and may we have world peace. May great friendship between the peoples of China and India develop further.

We would like to see these principles accepted by the whole world in the interest of the world peace and friendship between nations."¹¹

NEHRU'S CHINA VISIT (1954) Nehru paid a return visit to China on the invitation of the Chinese Premier in October, 1954. While in China, he raised with the Chinese leaders the question of some maps recently published in China which had shown an incorrect boundary alignment between the two countries and incorporated about 50,000 sq. miles of Indian territory within China. Mr. Nehru said that this was presumably due to some error; so far as India was concerned, she was not much worried about the matter because her boundaries were clear and well known and not a matter of argument. Mr. Chou En-lai, in reply, sought to treat the Chinese maps as of little significance. He said that they were merely a re-production of old Kuomintang maps and the People's Government had had no time to revive them.

Chou En-lai along with his Vice-Premier visited India twice in 1956 in November and December respectively. He declared :

"..... armed forces of China and India were for self-defence and not for aggression. We shall not create or aggravate international tension."¹²

11. Chou's speech; The Times of India, 2.12.1956

12. —————; Ibid, 2.12.1956

Chou En-lai declared that the Chinese Government had accepted the McMahon line with India as she had done with Burma. Chou En-lai told Nehru that they "were recognizing it because of long usage and because we were friendly countries." Chou was of the view that the McMahon Line was not a valid line..... it was of British imperialism and all that, but they recognized it, since the both countries were friendly to each other."¹³

The leaders of Sino-Indian Republics jointly made efforts and co-operated in bringing out a strong Afro-Asian community at Bandung in April, 1955. The Bogor Communiqué (December, 1954) laid down the basic purposes of the Bandung Conference as follows;

"(a) to promote good will and co-operation between the nations of Asia and Africa, to explore and advance their mutual as well as common interests and to establish and further friendliness and neighbourly relations; and (b) to review the position of Asia and Africa and their peoples in the world of today and the contribution they can make to the promotion of world peace and co-operation."¹⁴

The holding of the Bandung Conference could not loose the attention of the two world powers — the Soviet Union and the United States. Both of them responded well to the Conference. As far as the Sino-Indian relations are concerned, it proved an important platform for the exploration of ideas both by the Chinese Premier and the Indian Prime Minister. "Chou's talent for diplomacy capitalised on his anxiety and his assurances, even to pro-Western delegations, accounted for the sudden increase in good will for China."¹⁵

Chou En-lai emphasized peace and co-operation among

13. For details see, Nehru, J : India's Foreign Policy. op. cit., pp 350-4

14. Ibid, p. 273.

15. Ibid.

Afro-Asian nations." It is our belief, he said, that (with the seven point, mentioned in a resolution before the Political Committee of the Conference, as a basis) it is possible to have peace and co-operation among us, it is possible to safeguard peace. And first with peace among us. In fact, in these seven points we have said in our draft proposed that we Asian African countries advocate settlement of international disputes by peaceful means and support all measures that are being taken or may be taken to eliminate international tension and promote growth of peace."¹⁶

On the other hand, Nehru used the Bandung Conference as a platform from where he could propagate his Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence for the promotion of international peace and co-operation among the nations of the world. He had desire for Asia and Africa to restore their own dignity and independence of view in internal as well as external matters. He said :

"For long years, for hundreds of years, the countries of Asia and Africa were 'non-entities' in political, economic and international affairs. Their destinies were controlled by others. Asia was an outer fringe of Europe. Much more so was Africa. The decisions about Asia and Africa were made by other people in other countries. Now a change had come about. The nations of Asia, or most of them, were now free and independent. This was something deeper than a political change, this consciousness of freedom and desire to rely on themselves in co-operation with others... They did not think in terms of isolation but they (the Afro-Asian countries) thought in terms of self-respect, self-determination and self-progress which they desire to achieve in peace and in

16. cited in , Appadorai, A. : Essays on Indian Politics and Foreign Policy.

friendship with other countries."¹⁷

In an atmosphere of dignity and satisfaction, China raised hopes of unity among the Afro-Asian nations, and to find solutions to the common problems of their countries. The most burning question which posed a danger to world peace at the time of the Bandung Conference was the question of Formosa. Nehru arranged a number of meetings with the Chinese delegation. But they failed to yield any result when the Chinese Premier made an independent statement at Sir John's luncheon table in which he expressed his willingness "to start negotiations to relax, particularly on the Formosa question. Actually a tension had arisen behind the curtains between the leadership of the two countries. While India was anxious to solve Asian problems through negotiations and mutual consultations, the Chinese side did not like the Indian leadership in Asia and her mediatory role in solving problems.

Another significant point came to light when the Ceylonese Prime Minister expressed 'doubts and misgivings' about the success of the Panchsheel as sponsored by Nehru. Although China had accepted them in full when the Chinese Premier visited India in June, 1954. They were also verified when the Joint Sino-Russian Declaration stated the desire of the two signatories to build relations with Asia and other countries on strict observance of Panchsheel. But a state of doubt was created when China proposed her seven principles instead of supporting the Five Principles. The points made by Chou were embodied with a somewhat different wording in the Burmese resolution introduced in the Political Committee.

17. quoted by Appadorai, A..... op. cit, pp 179-80

(Post Bandung Developments)

The Bandung Conference was followed by the exchange of a number of diplomatic missions, delegations of various nature flew to and fro between New Delhi, Moscow and Peking. The friendship among these three countries became the burning topic for the journalists. The developments made in China and Russia expressed in Indian press created a pro-Communist atmosphere in India. The Indian Prime Minister paid a visit to Moscow in June, 1955 which was followed by the Russian leaders' return visit to New Delhi in November-December, 1955. Mr. Khrushchev and Mr. Bulganin were paid big state inspired and organized reception everywhere. From Indian point of view, these visits aimed at reducing the tension created by cold war and help in maintenance of international peace and co-operation. But the Soviet leaders during their speeches at different places in India, did not avoid their usual policy of accusing the Western bloc of imperialism, colonialism etc. They even offered their help to protect India's independence but in a patronising tone and in an indirect way. They made attacks on Western countries too in their offers and policy, though she had to bear the after effects of their abusing the Indian hospitality showed to them. There arose everywhere a strange crop of half-baked progressive professional opportunists and calculation Communists who looked and wrote about Russia and China either with utter incomprehension or with uncritical and reverent adulation. "Many of the views expressed during the period would make even their authors blush at their own stupidity."¹⁸

SHIFT IN CHINESE POLICY IN 1956 : The year 1956 saw a shift in the foreign policy of China towards her neighbours. The friendliness which was shown to her Asian neighbours at the Bandung Conference, seemed now to relapse. The Agricultural Programme announced by the Chinese Government, imple-

ented in the whole China as well as in Tibet, caused great dissatisfaction among the Tibetans. Revolt broke out in Tibet and was officially reported for the first time on August 7, 1956.¹⁸

Dalai Lama came to India to attend the Buddha Parinirvana celebrations on the invitation of the Indian Government, he was accompanied everywhere by Chinese officials which indicated the strained relations between China and Tibet. It is also reported that Dalai Lama did not want to return to Tibet of the worsening situations therein, but was persuaded by Nehru to return. The Dalai Lama was assured by the Chinese Premier on his visit to New Delhi in November, 1956, through the mediation of Nehru, of Chinese respect to Tibetan autonomy.¹⁹

Meanwhile in September, 1956 the Nepalese Prime Minister signed a treaty with China during his so-called "private visit" to Peking according to which China attained trade facilities in Nepal as she got benefitted from the Sino-Indian Agreement on Tibet, 1954. Not only this, China tried her best to isolate Nepal from India and influence her internal and external policies.

While these activities were going on in diplomatic circles, Chinese were reported carrying their problem activities along the two thousand miles long Sino-Indian border. Many events of territorial violations by the Chinese troops were reported by India and vice versa.²⁰

THE CHINESE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL POLICIES IN 1957 :

The year 1957 saw a major shift in China's internal and external policies. While major changes took place in the Chinese leadership itself, the Chinese leaders adopted an aggressive attitude in view of the estimates of Soviet economy, decisive shift in world balance of power symbolised with Sputnik I. Towards the end of the year, the

18. Karnik, V.L.: China Invades India. All India Bombay (1963) p 144

Chinese began the construction of illegal Aksai-chin road through the Ladakh region of Kashmir. The Government of India expressed her surprise and regret over the matter and said that "....the Chinese Government should not have constructed a road through indisputably Indian territory without first obtaining the permission of Government of India and without even informing the Government of India."²¹

YEAR OF GREAT LEAP FORWARD— 1958 : The year 1958 was announced by the Chinese as the "Year of Great Leap Forward", which meant acceleration of China's economic development. To achieve this goal of Communist regime, they pressurized their people by creating tension inside the country. The attitude of China became much aggressive towards her neighbours and especially towards India when Russia preferred India over China as the representative of Asia for the Five Powers Summit on Middle East problem alongwith the United States, Britain, France and the Soviet Union. This policy adopted by the Soviet leaders caused resentment of Soviet policy by China on the one hand, and the beginning of open rivalry over status between India and China. It also marked the beginning of a rift between Sino-Russian friendship and the division of the two great powers in Asia.

THE UNREST IN TIBET :

The Sino- Indian relations strained gradually in which the unrest in Tibet contributed most. It was indicated for the first time at the postponement of Nehru's visit to Tibet, to which he was invited by China herself. Things were worsening in Tibet and accused unsafe, on

19. See for details,.... Notes, Memoranda etc..... op. cit, notes 1-17

20. Ibid.

21. Informal Note given by the Foreign Secretary to the Chinese Ambassador 18, October, 1958.... Notes, Memoranda etc....op. cit.

Indian borders with China. The second most controversial issue between the two became the maps²² published on pages 20-21 of the China Pictorial (No. 95 July 1953) in which the borders of China have been indicated by a thick brown line. Though this map is on an a small scale, there are clear inaccuracies in it insofar as China's border with India is concerned.²²

These maps showing Ladakh, N.M.F.A. and other Indian territories as Chinese created suspicion and fear in the minds of Indian leaders. Although Government of India drew the attention of the Chinese Government towards this very important matter through Notes, Memoranda and Letters etc., but nothing was done on their behalf to make away the suspicion of Indians - ——— except the excuse made by Chou of not having enough time to correct those maps due to the business of developmental programmes as were implemented in China.²³

This naturally caused fears in New Delhi and pressed the need for constant vigilance on Sino-Indian border.

NEHRU'S BHUTAN VISIT AND CHINA (SEPT.-OCT. 1953);

The visit of Bhutan by the Indian Prime Minister Nehru, became a painful in the eyes of China. The Indo-Bhutanese talks resulted in the co-operation between the two in the fields of communication, economic development and others. These discussions took place in September-October 1953 and rumours began circulating by the middle of December that Dalai Lama has approached the Indian leaders for granting him political asylum. While the famine conditions were prevailing in China and the political unrest in Tibet was reaching its highest peak, tension got accelerated on Sino-Indian borders which was finally acknowledged on the arrival

22. Notes, Memoranda etc. ——— op. cit., p 46

23. For details see ——— Notes, Memoranda etc. ——— Letters by Nehru and Chou exchanged between them.

of the Dalai Lama in India on March 31, 1959. He was granted political asylum by the Indian Government which ultimately irritated China and she became openly hostile towards India.

PERIOD OF OPEN RIVALRY - 1959 (MARCH 1959)

From here a period of open hostility began between India and China. A chain of Notes, Memoranda, Letters etc. was exchanged between them which were first brought to the notice of Indian public in 1959. They were published in 1959 by the Ministry of External Affairs Government of India. They had far-reaching effects on Indian people and the political parties sharply reacted to them (it will be discussed under the "attitude of the Opposition parties in this very chapter).

China accused India of adopting an expansionist policy by giving political asylum to Chinese rebels, interfering with the internal matters of China, thus inheriting the British legacy in Tibet and so on. Mr. Nehru was sketched in the Chinese Press as a puppet of western imperialism and colonialism. Much was written against India, her leaders and her external policies, in the Chinese papers and magazines. All these things necessarily increased the tension already prevailing between them. Initial violent attacks on India were made and fully realised in Indian circles. Disturbances arose and increased gradually in number on Indian border. The Chinese troops opened fire on Indian soldiers at different points.²⁴ These incidents naturally aroused a strong national feelings of anger in India. Mr. Nehru, however, adopted a policy of avoiding clashes between the two nations. But things went fastly worsening on the borders and the peace keeping policy of Nehru could not stop

24. Notes, Memoranda, Letters etc.....op. cit.,

Chinese troops from violating Indian territories on a large scale in the very near future. Major incidents of this nature occurred at Longju and in the Ladakh region of Kashmir. Their approach towards a war in 1962 will be discussed in the coming chapter.

Now we have to see the reaction of major political parties on the conditions discussed hereto.

ATTITUDE OF THE OPPOSITION PARTIES TOWARDS SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS :

The formulation and implementation of foreign policy in a democratic country is not the job of a single body or a particular authority. A variety of factors, attitudes, circumstances, various political, social, religious, economic and other forces contribute towards the making and implementation of the foreign policy of a democratic State, by acting and interacting inside the State and society. These various elements may be different from country to country according to their own problems and circumstances, but the basic things remain the same i.e. they influence the making and implementation of their foreign policy.

Actually the political parties are an essential part of a democratic political system. While they are products of various socio-economic, political and ideological factors, they influence in turn the internal and external affairs of the country. Any change in domestic affairs ultimately affects the external affairs involving the political parties of the land which act or react to these changes. Actually, "foreign policy is a projection of domestic policy into a wider field and in this sense, the views of the opposition parties on foreign affairs truly reflect their posture in domestic affairs."²⁵

After independence in 1947, the political parties in

25. Pillai, K.Raman..op. cit., p.192.

India had to perform manifold functions. The most important were to acknowledge the people with the day-to-day developments in world politics, to help in creating an articulate public opinion and to have a vigilant eye upon the external policies of the Indian Government. They ultimately influenced Government's external policies.

There were a few political parties at the time of independence, C.P.I. or the Communist Party of India was the most important Opposition party. It took much time for the political parties to emerge and develop their position in the political life of the country. Soon there emerged many political parties in the coming years and some of them got stabilized their position and began to influence the internal and external policies of the Government. In the first decade which followed independence, there had become four important Opposition parties in India, viz; the Communist Party of India, the Swatantra Party, The Praja Socialist Party and the Jana Sangh. In this concern, we have to point out how far these political parties were successful in influencing Government's policies, especially in the formulation and implementation of India's foreign policy towards her great neighbour --- China. It does not matter what strength they had in legislatures --- at State or Central level. To understand their attitudes and influences, it will be better to go through the details of each party one by one.

(a) Communist Party of India

The C.P.I., being a part of international communist movement, had a global outlook. It stood for a policy of socialism, anti-imperialism and world peace and supported the anti-imperialist policies of the Indian Government. It strongly opposed what it characterized as the "..... manifestation of Western imperialism in Korea, Egypt, Hungary and Kashmir.

It adopted an uncompromising attitude towards 'western imperialism and racialism.'²⁵

The Indian communists were extremely against the foreign policy adopted by the Nehru Government covering the period 1947-54. They mainly criticised the Government for adopting a policy having imprints of British imperialism, thus accusing Nehru Government of being inclined towards 'western imperialism'. But it favoured the Government when the latter supported China's struggle for freedom, then in recognising the Chinese People's Republic and trying for her admission to the United Nations. This was the apparent aspect of Indian communists' policies. But internally, the reason for her partial support to the Nehru Government was not for being pro-India, but being ^{pro}-Russian, pro-China and pro-communism above all. It can be observed from the resolution which the Third Congress of the Party passed. It stated:

"The growing might and the powerful peace policy of the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China and the peoples' democracies, the smashing of the vaunted monopoly of the imperialists in the field of atom and hydrogen weapons, the increasing power and sweep of the struggles of the colonial peoples, the scotching of the American inspired fascist provocation in Berlin, have further strengthened the struggle for peace."²⁶

SHIFT IN C.P.I.'S ATTITUDE: A decisive shift came in the attitude of the C.P.I. towards Nehru Government's foreign policy when Nehru visited China in 1954, and C.P.I. welcomed the visit and supported the Government on the order from Russian Government, reversing their earlier orders not to support Nehru and condemn him as an American agent. They even had to go

to such extent, on the order of their Russian boss, to say or declare that India was not a really a free country.

In case of China's admission to the United Nations, the world knows to what extent India supported her cause. But the Communist Party of India called the Indian Government to vote against the American proposal to denounce People's China in the U.N.O. as "the half hearted and vacillating nature of the Government's policy," and, therefore, to wage and determine battle to mobilise a mass opinion in favour of a consistent peace policy."²⁷

While all the Opposition parties did not welcome the Panchsheel Agreement of 1954 as it surrendered many Indian rights to China, the Communist Party saw in it a wide scope for friendship and co-operation between the two neighbours — India and China. They did welcome the Indian Government's policy not to interfere with the Chinese action of so-called "liberation of Tibet" from "Western imperialists," as Tibet was a part of China.

The border clashes on Sino-Indian border were a matter of serious concern for the entire nation, and urged the need for a tough policy towards China. But the C.P.I. supported Nehru for adopting a conciliatory approach for which Nehru was extremely criticised by each and every section of the Indian society.

The Bandung Conference was welcomed by the India communists. The Party organ Red Age remarked Bandung as "the culmination

27. Democratic Research Service. Communist Conspiracy at Karachi (1954)

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of the victorious phase in the battle of the Asian masses against imperialists which began nearly a year ago. With Dien Bien Phu and the Panch-sheel."²⁸ Communist oriented the All India Peace Council called on all "Peace Committees and all peace-loving organizations and individuals to join hands to observe May 15 as Bandung Day in honour of the historic Afro-Asian Conference,"²⁹ held at Bandung in Indonesia in 1955. In this concern, this must be remembered that doubts created and controversies emerged between the two when Chou En-lai presented his Seven Point Programme by avoiding the Panchsheel Principles. As a result, a brief gulf was created between India and China. Commenting upon the result of the Bandung Conference, Mr. Saifuddin Kitchlew, the Communist leader said;

"The Bandung Conference was a triumph of the will for peace and freedom of Asian and African peoples. It was a colossal defeat for the imperialist powers and their nefarious schemes to continue to dominate and exploit Asia and Africa."³⁰

The following years of the Afro-Asian Conference till 1959, were of unrest and disturbances in Tibet. "The contacts of India with Tibet ——— geographical, commercial and, even more, cultural and religious — are very old. This relationship is something deeper than the changing political scene. Large number of people in India venerate the Dalai Lama, and he was our honoured guest some time ago. Because of these contacts our reaction to anything that happens in Tibet is bound to be very deep."³¹ And the following day of this statement, Nehru received and

28. New Age (weekly), May 3, 1955. p 16

29. Ibid. p 15

30. Ibid.

31. Nehru, J.: Statement in Lok Sabha, March 30, 1959. ——— op. cit. (1961)

got confirmed the news of Dalai Lama's arrival on Indian soil. It was told to Lok Sabha on 1st April, 1959, that is, the next day of his arrival.³²

Charges were made against Nehru and Indian Government by the Chinese Press criticising the Indian policy. They claimed that India had given asylum to rebels from Tibet region of China and provoked the Tibetans against Chinese Government. Nehru denied these reports strictly and said;

..... that the Dalai Lama entered India entirely of his own volition. At no time had we suggested that he should come to India.³³

About granting asylum to Dalai Lama, he informed the House: "We had naturally given thought to the possibility of his seeking asylum in India and when such a request came, we readily granted it."³⁴

About the charges of putting restrictions on Dalai Lama, Nehru denied those charges; "but in the special circumstances, certain arrangements had necessarily to be made to prevent an mishap."³⁵

The Communist Party's organ Red Age devoted several of its pages to discuss the Tibetan problem from the point of view of the Party. Contributions included some top leaders of the Party and a few well known fellow-travellers. The main themes of this elaborate propaganda were : the counter-revolutionary character of the revolt, the indefensibility of the goals and interests of the rebels, the reactionary nature of their supporters and sympathizers, the liberating and laudable role of China in Tibet, the necessity of non-interference and non-intervention in Tibet which was China's internal, and the value of Sino-Indian friendship.³⁶

32. Ibid. ——— statement in Lok Sabha, April 1, 1959 .

33. ———, April 27, 1959.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid.

36. Varkey, Guseph.....op. cit., p 55

(b) The Swatantra Party's Attitude

founded in 1959, when Chinese threat to the Indian borders was increasing and leading towards a tragic turn, the Swatantra Party considered it essential for the security of India to have an alliance with the West because non-alignment was nothing to the interest of India. It "sought to correct the pro-communist bias in India's foreign policy. It questioned the validity of non-alignment and openly pleaded for a positive alliance with the West. It maintained that an alliance with the West, in effect the U.S., is absolutely indispensable; everything must be done to bring this about."³⁷

Although the Party gave priority to China in foreign policy matters but difference of opinion among the party leaders could not express unanimous opinion about the Sino-Indian relations and could not influence the making and implementation of India's foreign policy towards China. But they were agreed on some points that the Government of India was following a policy of 'double standard' which observed when the Government of India could not go to the rescue of the Tibetan people in 1950, and voted in favour of the Soviet Union to suppress the Hungarian crisis in 1956. It, therefore, demanded "new orientation" of India's foreign policy.

As the Party emerged on the political scene of India in a period when friendship between India and China had come to an end and reversed its hostile relations, the Party gave importance to Sino-Indian relations in foreign policy and defence matters. But, surprisingly enough, the foreign policy issues had no place in the fundamentals of the Party. One more thing which astonishes us is that every leader of the Party was free to express his ideas on foreign policy matters on his

37. Pillai, K. Raman....op. cit., p 195

own behalf. That is why the approaches of different Swatantra leaders were varying. There was a group in the Party having some soft corner for China, headed by Kallolacharya known as Rajaji. Another group was impressed by Jana Sangh's "enlightened national interest" under the leadership of B.K. Chaudhary, while Dasani and others were anti-communist and pro-western.

But in case of Chinese intrusions in India and the Chinese policy towards our country, all the Swatantra leaders held a general opinion that Communist China was a danger for India.

In regard with the policy of non-alignment, Panchsheel and other principles of India's foreign policy, they were to be practiced in normal days and not in crisis as created by China. These principles should be abandoned in such a grivious situation and an expedient policy should be adopted. In view of the growing Chinese threat to India, the Party advised the Indian Government to sever diplomatic relations with China, to refuse to sponsor her admission to the United Nations, to recognise Tibetan Government in exile and to attempt to negotiate joint defence agreements against China with other Asian nations, including Pakistan and more recently with Japan.

They adopted a resolution on Tibet in the very first National Convention at Patna in March, 1960 which expressed the sentiments of the Party "on the cruel fate that has befallen a nation of peace loving people at the hands of aggressive and imperialist communism."

The Swatantra leaders insisted that with the "rape of Tibet" and Chinese border incursions (including the construction of Aksai-Chin road, which connects Sinkiang with Tibet across India).

territory) the old notions had been rendered meaningless, if not suicidal.³⁹ They, therefore, demanded a "new orientation" of India's foreign policy, but never suggested, like all other Opposition parties, what type of orientation should be made. Swatantra feels that the policy of Non-alignment has lost meaning and the foreign policy has to be brought into closer relations to the realities of the international situation. In the changing context, they demanded the building up of regional security in Asia.⁴⁰

According to Swatantra attitude : "The whole history of relations between China and Tibet and India proves that it cannot be treated as an international problem of China. We should help Tibet to continue to remain free."⁴¹ B.G.Ranga of Swatantra Party said in Parliament that it was the duty of India to raise the question of Tibet in the United Nations.⁴²

When the activities of Sino-Indian border by the Chinese military personnel began to intensify by the end of 1959, and a large area of Indian territory was gradually and casually captured by them, all Opposition parties barring the C.P.I., raised their voices against Chinese policy towards India. The Swatantra Party in its very first National Convention urged that "a firm and vigilant policy should be allowed at least from now on in dealing with the Chinese aggression against India." They were of the view that "when our territorial integrity had been violated and our side occupied by a communist power, the concept of non-align-

39. Erdman, Howard, L. : The Swatantra Party and Indian Conservatism,

Cambridge Univ. Press. (1967) pp 205-6

40. Nortmann, Horstop. cit., p 160

41. Ranga, B.G.— on Sino-Indian relations. Lok Sabha Debates..op. cit,

Vol. 46, 31st August 1960, Columns. 5955-6

42. Ibid.

ment has little meaning. Our policy, therefore, now needs to be revised and brought into closer relations to the realities of international situation."⁴³

(c) Role of the Praja Socialist Party

The Praja Socialist Party (PSP) formed in 1952, followed the socialist line in supporting the Government's foreign policy. The Party had no disagreement with the Government so far as the basic policy was concerned. Their criticism were directed against the methods adopted to implement the policy. The party held that under the garbs of non-alignment showed emotional alignment with one of the power blocs and often succumbed to the pressure of big powers. It expressed the view that the manner in which the Government dealt with "western imperialism" was indicative of "double standard." It urged the Government to adhere strictly the policy of non-alignment."⁴⁴

The P.S.P. played an active role in the case of China, Hungary and Goa. The party adopted a determined stand in regard to "Russian imperialism."

As far as the aims of the party are concerned, it stands for the ideals of (i) world Government; and (ii) peace. The pursuit of the twin objective necessitates adoption of a positive foreign policy. This comprises of four elements : (i) freedom of people, (ii) democracy and social justice, (iii) comparative equal returns to human labour throughout the world, and (iv) active neutrality.

It reveals the point that the P.S.P. gave priority to foreign policy matters and exercised a considerable role in influencing the foreign policy especially towards China. Since the very beginning the party leaders warned the Indian Government of the danger of Chinese expansionist policies.

(fn contd. on the next page)

The P.S.P. welcomed the success of the Chinese Revolution and the establishment of the Communist regime in China. It also supported India's strife for seating China in the United Nations and to get a permanent seat for Communist China in the Security Council. But, at same time, the Party condemned China's policy towards Tibet which ultimately affected India's interests and created a danger for the Asian countries.

The military action by China in Tibet, was regarded as an "act of aggression" by the Praja Socialist Party. In its Nagpur session in November 1950, the National Executive of the Party stated :

"The attempt to justify the invasion of 8 lakh square miles of territory on the basis of sovereign rights which are as doubtful and untenable as they are imperialist is an irony of which no modern Government should have been capable. The people of Tibet alone may decide in a free vote or plebiscite their form of government or of alliance with the outside world."⁴⁵

In the very session, the Party noticed and pointed out an expansionist trend in the Chinese action as it was done in case of Tibet and asked Indian Government to strongly protest against the Chinese action in Tibet and compel them to let the Tibetans decide their fate through votes or plebiscite. The Indian acceptance of Chinese suzerainty over Tibet was severely criticised by the Praja Party. When the Tibetan issue was discussed in the Indian Parliament in May 1954, the P.S.P.

(contd) 43. Swatantra Party Documents....op. cit., p 22

44. Pillai, K. Ramani....op. cit., p 194

45. Socialist Party of India---Himalayan Policy of India. Bombay.(1951)

leaders fully utilized the chances and raised their voice against Chinese policy towards Tibet as well as India's surrender of her rights in Tibet. Criticising both the Governments for their foreign policies, the Praja Party leader Mr. Aswarya J.B. Kirpalani said:

"The plea is that China had the ancient rights of suzerainty. This right was out of date, old and antiquated.....I consider this as much a colonial aggression indulged on the part of China as any colonial aggression indulged in by western nations.....In this age of democracy when we hold that all people should be free and equal, I say China's occupation of Tibet^{is} a deliberate act of aggression."⁴⁶

They realized the strategic situation of Tibet and saw expediency and goodness of India in not going to war with China when she later invaded Tibet. But this does not mean that they recognised the claim of China over Tibet. We must know to be an act of aggression against a smaller and weaker nation. As such it is as much of colonialism as that of any imperialist country in the west which occupies other people's land in Asia or Africa."⁴⁷

Mr. Kirpalani, the P.S.P. leader said: "China has destroyed what could be called a buffer state between India and China. In international policies if a buffer state is abolished by a powerful nation, the latter is considerable an aggressor whose advance to one's borders is considered dangerous."⁴⁸

Referring to the maps published in China, he said: "... in the new maps of China other territories on the borders of India like Nepal, Sikkim etc. are shown as Chinese. This should give us an idea of the aggressive of China."⁴⁹

46. Lok Sabha Debates. Vol. V, Part II, 5-12 May 1954, Columns. 7548.

47. Kirpalani, J.B. : India's Foreign Policy. Vigil, Vol. V, No. 14, May 23, 1954.

Regarding the Tibetan issue, the P. .P. leader thought that "Tibetans are a separate nationality. They have little affinity with the Chinese. They are culturally more allied to India than to China, at least Communist China, which has repudiated its culture."⁵⁰ He considered "the invasion of Tibet and its conquest as much of a colonial aggression on any indulger in by western imperialists."⁵¹

Later on when the situation deteriorated in Tibet due to the suppression of Tibetans and the flight of Dalai Lama to India, the Pragra Socialist Party declared Party's solidarity with the Tibetan people. To draw the attention of the Indian people towards the serious condition in Tibet and train the public opinion in Sino-Indian relations, the Party used all means of mass media. The Party units over the country observed 29th March, 1959 as the Tibetan Day. A statement was issued by Jaya Prakash Narayan, a P.S.P. leader which said:

"India should put on record her clear verdict that aggression has been committed against Tibet and the freedom of a weak nation had been 'snuffed out by a powerful neighbour.'⁵²

Bhri Kehta, addressing a public meeting at Bombay warned that "today it may be the turn of Tibet, tomorrow that of Nepal and the day after tomorrow it may be ours."⁵³

The National Executive of the Pragra Party held a meeting at New Delhi in April 1959 to consider upon Sino-Indian relations and

48. Nirpalani, J.B....op. cit.,

49. Ibid.

50. Ibid.

51. Ibid.

52. Janata.— 29 March, 1959.

53. Ibid.

Tibet, in which the Party extended its support to the Tibetan people to safeguard their old culture and the right to self-determination.

In case of raising the Tibetan question on the platform of the United Nations, the Party supported that this problem should be put before the world community and asked the Government of India to support the cause.

After Tibet, the next important point in Sino-Indian relations was of the Panchsheel Agreement of 1954. This agreement was criticized by the Party leaders as it provided India's surrender of her rights in Tibet. Although the Party hailed the Five Principles of peaceful co-existence, but it was suspicious of the Chinese intention in the sub-continent. It feared that China might emerge as the most dominant power in Asia and might cause danger to the security of Asian countries. They also had doubts if China would respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of her neighbours and promote peace in Asia. Criticising the Panchsheel, the P.P.S.P. leader, Mr. Airpalani said in Parliament that;

"This great doctrine (Panchsheel) was born in sin.....
sin because it was enunciated to put the seal of our approval upon the
destruction of an ancient nation which was associated with us spiritually."⁵⁴

Soon after the signing of the Panchsheel Agreement, the Bandung Conference was held in April 1955 which was participated by 29 Afro-Asian countries. The Conference was welcomed by the Party which considered it as "the most important conference of the century", which "succeeded in bringing together as many as twenty nine nations of Asia and Africa on a common platform."⁵⁵

54. Lok Sabha debates. Vol. 18, 19th August, 1958, Column. 1676.

55. Janata. 1 May, 1955, p 11-12.

But the role played by the Indian Government was accused of not condemning and guarding against the Chinese and Soviet imperialism. Regarding the conflicts on colonialism and imperialism among the participating members of the Bandung Conference, the Party expressed the view that "the conflicts between the two views could have been resolved by referring openly to both colonialism and imperialism, new and old, by name as dangers and by giving them quite notice on behalf of resurgent Asia and Africa." This in their opinion "would have been fair and would have represented a true synthesis or approach to a synthesis." Criticising the "prejudiced view" of Prime Minister Nehru the Party hold the view that "the result is a form of words condemning 'colonialism in all its manifestations' as an evil in vague terms. The synthesis of the final version embodied in the communique is only a verbal tour de force. It dilutes the problem but does not solve it."⁵⁶

The sincerity of the Chinese offer to all the leaders of Asian countries to trust upon Chinese intentions seemed doubtful to the Proja Socialists. But they were of that China might be given a "chance to prove her bonafides."⁵⁷ They thought that the economic conditions prevailing in China "would not permit her to pursue the hazard of world revolution in this part of the globe by aiding communist parties," and "will not have any time for economic expansion."⁵⁸

As far as the result of the Bandung Conference, the Party organ wrote that it "has produced only a shame synthesis a mere verbal solution. In effect, it plays into the 'peace tactics' of the communist strategy

56. Janata, May 15, 1955, pp 5-6.

57. See for details --- Janata, May 8, 1955.

58. Ibid.

of world was for the souls and bodies of all humanity." Referring to Nehru views on colonialism as expressed and observed at Bandung, it said that "Nehru's refusal to recognise the colonialism of Russia torpedoes the compromise formula effectively and belies his promise to observe the terms of the consensus arrived at."⁵⁹

The years following the Bandung Conference were 4 years of increasing disturbances and tension on Sino-Indian borders. The Praja Socialist Party was of the view that China, due to her deliberate plan of action, was increasing tension on Indian border and was intruding into Indian territories along the whole northern border of India from I I P. to Ladakh. In their Fifth National Conference, they asked the Government of India to firmly resist the Chinese activities on Indian borders and use diplomatic as well as military measures in compelling China to vacate each and every inch of the occupied Indian territory.

The Chinese refusal for recognising the McMahon Line was also pleaded by the Party which believed that it was a traditional boundary in the Himalayas between India and China confirmed by customs, traditions and treaties.

They accused the Indian Government for adopting a policy of appeasement, as was done by Jana Sangh and the Swatantra Party. Like all other opposition parties barring the C.P.I., the Praja Party blamed Indian Government for keeping the Indian people in dark about the incidents of the Sino-Indian border and the letters, notes, Memorandas etc. exchanged between the two Governments and which revealed hostile Chinese tones and illegal claims over Indian territories. The Indian authorities "failed to

see the true character of the Chinese totalitarian and military regime" even after the Chinese invasion of Tibet. By signing the treaty with China in 1954..... "We gave up all our rights in Tibet, not in favour of free Tibet, but in favour of China."⁶⁰

On Panchsheel Principles, the P.S.P. leaders J.L. Kirpalani, indicated that "it does not incorporate moral imperative. It implies mutuality. You cannot exist with yourself.....I submit that the Panchsheel Principles congeal the status quo at its present level, however, inequitable and unjust."⁶¹

The Praga Party also charged the Government of India for not correctly assessing the role of the Communist dictatorship in China and leaving its Himalayan frontiers unguarded even after the rape of Tibet. N.G. Goray, a P.S.P. leader while addressing the 11th Annual Congress at Indore (Feb. 26-28, 1960) said that "it would not be improper for Indians to boycott the visit of Mr. Chou En-lai in the present situation." "The dispute between China and India could no longer be described as a border dispute. It was a naked aggression on the part of China. Far from vacating areas they had forcibly occupied, the Chinese forces were still penetrating deeper in our territory while our Government was sitting and praying that, if not ourselves, at least the show would prevent the Chinese from advancing." He further said that P.S.P. had no objection to negotiate between the two countries, but there should be certain pre-conditions for negotiations."⁶²

Mr. H.V. Kamata, Chairman State P.S.P., in a brief

60. Kirpalani, J.L. — Lok Sabha Debates. Nov. 1959. columns 1732-1733

61. Ibid — Column 1733

62. Janata, March 27, 1960. p 2

speech, appealed to the people to defend the nation's freedom and preserve its democracy."⁶³

The border incidents which had started increasing in number and level, were of serious nature for the P.S.P. leaders. They warned the Government of India at different times to be aware of the Chinese expansionist policy but no attention was paid in return. During 1960-61, the border incidents had crossed the limits of mere "minor problems" and got the nature of high military strategy but in spite of the cry of the Opposition, the Government failed to safeguard the Indian borders. The Party accused Nehru of adopting a policy of appeasement and demanded that "a policy of firmness and vigilance" should be adopted and military preparations should be made for India's defence.

Keeping in view the failure of India's foreign policy towards China, all the Opposition parties demanded the resignation of the Foreign Minister Mr. K.P.S. Menon who was responsible for the inviolation of the Indian territory, in their view. It urged the Government for not adopting a policy of conciliation and adjustment with China and asked for an early vacation of Indian territories, forcibly and illegally occupied by China. Such a firm stand was a pre-requisite for negotiations with China. Such a strong was the position of the Opposition that Nehru could not escape from their pressure and could not talk freely as ever, with the Chinese officials.

Official Meeting 1960 : The Chinese and Indian Officials' Meeting in 1960

When the Nehru-Chou talks were rejected by the Praja Party, as they were meaningless and useless. They condemned the public reception of the

Chinese Premier and asked the people to keep away themselves from such occasion. Demonstrations and public meetings were held in this regard and got much support from the public as well as the Opposition parties.

Memorandum was sent to Prime Minister Nehru from all Opposition parties except the C.P.I. for not surrendering even an inch of Indian territory and asked him to stand firmly against China for which they promised their full support. This resulted in a favourable effect upon the official policy of Indian and Nehru had to keep them in view while corresponding Chinese.

Ganga Saran Sinha, a socialist leader appealed to the Indian Prime Minister that "we must ever keep in view the question of national integrity and defence, It is true that at times, circumstances we render us helpless and there are things beyond our control. But must also consider whether our neutrality ——— this non-alignment policy ——— is going to mean submissiveness? Whether it is going to lead to inactivity? Therefore, the primary question of national integrity has to be faced."⁶⁴

(d) Jana Sangh's Reaction

"The Jana Sangh, of all the Indian political parties, is probably the most intensely nationalistic, most strongly opposed to communism, the Soviet Union and China, and the strongest enemy of Pakistan in India (its political programme still include the re-unification of the sub-continent) . Since its very inception, it has bitterly opposed the Government of India's Soviet and Chinese policies in general and towards Tibet, Hungary and Czechoslovakia in particular."⁶⁵

64. Janata , May 15, 1960.

65. Bandopadhyaya, J. : The Making of India's Foreign Policy.(1970)

born in 1951, its roots reach the R. S. — a strong nationalist party which aims at the achievement of "Hindu, Hinduism and Hindustan" as its basic aim. The Jana Sangh under the influence of this Rashtriya Swayam-Sewak Sangh, soon emerged as a strongly organized party and got the position of a stable opposition party in a very short period. Since its very birth, it tried to influence the making and implementation of India's domestic and foreign policies. As far as the objectives of its foreign policy are concerned, they "will be guided by the enlightened self-interest, that is, considerations of welfare and progress of the country. True to traditions of Bharat it will work for the maintenance of world peace and mutual understanding. While standing for the democratic way of life it will retain friendly relations with all countries friendly to Bharat. It has no imperialist designs and will resist any such move, direct or indirect on the part of others. It recognise the inherent right of every nation to determine its own pattern of life outlook and does not regard it possible or desirable that all countries should be cast in one world."⁶⁶ Regarding joining the power blocs, the party considered that "the objective of the Indian foreign policy should be to avoid involvement in the power blocs and to win the friendship and support of as many countries as possible that she may be able to reconstruct her shattered economy and successfully execute her plans for the future and to strive for the maintenance of world peace and better understanding among peoples of the world."⁶⁷ The Party emphasized on the point that "India must stand for the development

66. J.S. Documents — Election Manifestation — 1952

67. J.S. — Resolutions on Foreign Policy and Defence — Vol. II, Resolution No. 52-09.

of freedom and democracy in the world. Her natural sympathy lies with all those countries which are struggling against colonial determination.⁶⁸

Regarding India's foreign policy towards China in particular, the Jana Sangh paid special attention since its very beginning. The Party denounced Chinese invasion of Tibet and warned the Government of India that the Communist Government of China is increasingly becoming more aggressive on the northern frontiers of India. In the opinion of the Party, China destroyed Tibet's age old freedom by overthrowing Tibet. Jana Sangh accused China of "constructing military bases there within striking distance from Northern India," "issuing maps containing large areas of Indian territory in the north-eastern zone and showing them as her own territory," and molesting Indian pilgrims to Mount Kailash and Mansarovar and Indian traders trading with Tibet. The Party, therefore, asked the Government of India "to instruct her representative in Peking to protest emphatically against this aggressive policy of China and to declare categorically that the McMahon Line (existing between Tibet and India) must stand intact and is not interfered with," and to ask the Chinese Government to "stop the molestation of Indian pilgrims and traders in Tibet."⁶⁹

With regard to Tibet, the Jana Sangh made certain proposals, the implementation of which, the party maintained, would enable Tibet to regain its independence. These proposals were that (i) India itself should move in the United Nations to take up Tibet's case; (ii) that India should approach the free nations of Asia (outside the communist orbit) on the issue of China's aggression in Tibet so that they might make common cause in support of Tibet's independence; and (iii) that full facilities

68. Ibid.

69. ——— , Resolution No. 52-15

shall be given to the Dalai Lama to function in India on the political plane as the Government of Tibet. On 21 st August, 1959, A.B. Vajpayee moved a non-official resolution in the Lok Sabha urging that India should take the Tibetan issue to the United Nations. Regarding China's admission to the U.N.O., he said; "we want that China should be admitted to the U.N. because we have faith in the U.N. and we think that whatever the form of Government the People of China may have since the Government of China is the actual Government and is actually in possession of the administration of that country China should be admitted to the United Nations."⁷⁰

When China and India met at the Bandung Conference along with other nations of the two continents, the Jana Sangh. welcomed the spirit working behind the Afro-Asian Conference which was held in Bandung, in Indonesia in April 1955. This Conference was held to discuss mainly the problems of peace and co-operation among the nations of Asia and Africa. India played an important role in its meetings and put forth the Panchsheel Principles of peaceful co-existence. The mouth-piece of the Party — the Organiser wrote in its editorial :

"The resurgence in Asia and Africa is, therefore, anybody to see. The writing is on the wall in black and white. It may be delayed by tactics like making 'Asians fight Asians.' But it cannot be denied for long now. We have no doubt that by and large people in the West want to help Asia and Africa. The common humanity of mankind is asserting itself. Only we might "inject the voice of reason into world affairs," work hard for own salvation and let the new world deal for man."⁷¹

70. Lok Sabha Debates. Vol. 33, 17-29 August 1959. Columns 3682 and 3686

71. Editorial in the Organiser (Delhi) 25 April, 1955 , p 1

But it warned that the menace of communism is real and great, and regarded it as "a great retreat from civilization," "a child of colonial - cum- capitalist exploitation" which we have to steer clear of them from the scene of Asia and Africa.

Immediately after the border incidents in 1959, the Jana Sangh observed "Defence of the Borders' Day" on 6th September, 1959 and "Drive Out the Invaders' Day" on 15th November 1959. A resolution passed at the Eighth Plenary Session of the Party in January, 1960, stated that "the most disturbing aspect of Government's failure on the China front is its persistent refusal to appreciate that Chinese penetration born out of any misconceptual maps etc., or even out of spite because of our granting asylum to the Dalai Lama — in fact, China's inroads commenced long before Dalai Lama's arrival — but are only phases of a planned and deliberate scheme of Red Expansionism in the countries of Southeast Asia.

The Party demanded that immediate steps should be taken to "eject the Chinese aggressor" from the Indian soil and that reciprocal restrictions be placed on Chinese diplomatic and trade agencies in India. It urged the Government to revoke its recognition of China's suzerainty over Tibet and affirm its support to the cause of Tibet's independence and announce its withdrawal of support to China's case for admission into the United Nations."⁷²

The Party found "nothing new" in the Five Principles of Peaceful co-existence, though admitted that there are merits in the policy of co-existence based upon Panchsheel. In the Party's view ".....a country, cannot tolerate the existence of different systems of thought within its borders, can never have a relation of genuine co-existence with

72. "Jana Sangh Resolves" — the Organiser (Delhi) 1st Feb, 1960. pp 13-14

a country that believes in different systems of thought or polity."⁷³

The policy followed by Nehru regarding the Tibetan issue, was considered by the Jana Sangh as "the weak-kneed and short sighted policy... that has encouraged Communist China in her aggressive policy in Tibet and which has brought a big military and aggressive power right on the borders of India herself, imperilling her own security."⁷⁴ The Party declared it essential that China must clear out of Tibet, and that, Tibet should become an independent State. India should direct all her efforts towards securing Tibet's independence."⁷⁵

The Chinese had started interfering with the territorial integrity of India and disturbing Indian borders at several points during different periods, and then continuously threatening India's security. Jana Sangh had warned of the expansionist and aggressive policy of China as early as 1953 but the Government of India did not pay heed to it. The intrusions into Indian borders by the Chinese in the Ladakh region of Jammu and Kashmir, U.P. and large parts of N.E.F.A. during the period 1959 to 1961 caused of public opinion against China's expansionist programme.

The Jana Sangh took a strict note on the development on the Sino-Indian border during this period and passed many hard-word resolutions regarding the problems of India's defence. The Party accused Nehru of following a dual policy in this concern, China was continuously intruding into Indian territory. It demanded that ", (1) China should be asked to vacate all the occupied territories by a fixed date and in case

73. I.J.S. documents—op. cit., Resolution No. 55-08

74. —————, Resolution No. 59-06

75. Ibid.

of failure all steps should be taken to liberate the occupied Indian territories; (ii) the whole northern frontier should be handed over to the army and immediate necessary steps should be taken for developing and strengthening transport and communication in the concerned areas; (iii) all maps, newspapers and periodicals showing parts of Indian territory as Chinese should be banned; (iv) China has deliberately broken the Agreement negotiated between India and China in 1954 by creating obstacles in proper functioning of our Consulates and Trade Agencies in Yangtse, Yatung and Laktok. Therefore, the Government of India should act reciprocally towards Chinese trade Agencies and Consulates situated in Delhi, Calcutta and Lalimpong.⁷⁶

In the Party's view, there was no place left for negotiations to settle down the border problems between India and China as the Chinese aggression continued. The Central Working Committee of the Jana Sangh expressed her fear that China might consolidate her aggression and augment the danger of even further aggression. It, therefore, expressed the opinion that "..... the challenged posed by China needs to be met by an all round intensification of national endeavour in every single walk of life."⁷⁷

By the year 1960, the situation in Sino-Indian border had much deteriorated. The casual incidents of military intervention along the border by the Chinese Army had increased the fears of public and the Opposition Parties to such an extent that Nehru was being criticised for his Chinese policy as he was never done. Jana Sangh, which was

76. NSS Documents....op. cit., Resolution No. 59-10

77. —————, Resolution No. 59-13

warning the Government about Chinese threat since the very beginning and its expansionist programmes, now adopted a more strict and tough policy towards China and put her maximum pressure on the Government of India to take sincere note of the then recent developments on the Indian border and to adopt a resisting policy towards China, which had posed "a challenge to the freedom of the countries of the south and southeast Asia."⁷⁸

For Jana Sangh, there was nothing wrong with our foreign policy in principle but in practice we have failed to protect and promote our national interests.

In an another resolution, Jana Sangh's warning of a massive Chinese aggression of India was repeated which, accordingly, would fulfill the expansionist policies of Chinese Government. It also blamed the Indian Government for ignoring the developments of its borders and for surrendering all its political and economic rights in Tibet by according formal sanction to China's suzerainty over Tibet. The Government of India failed in foreseeing the greatest danger of Chinese aggression while China was constructing strategic roads alongwith Indian borders since 1953.⁷⁹

According the Party views, the invitation of Prime Minister Nehru to Chou En-lai for talks on border problems was against the honour and sovereignty of the nation because it was given at a time when Chinese violation of Indian borders, on large scale, continued. Assuring party's full co-operation to the Government of India in the "most different steps that would be required for taking China from a position of strength and for ending her aggression; the Jana Sangh observed the

78. ———, Resolution No. 60-03

79. For details see — BJS Documents..op. cit., Resolution No. 60-04

period from April 10 to April 17, 1960 as "Act with Firmness" week.⁸⁰

On the Sino-Indian Officials Meet, the Party expressed the view that there was nothing to negotiate and it was in the ^{interest} greatest of China to gain time, which was trying to twist the facts and evidence to suit her own stand and bog up the whole issue in fruitless arguments and counter arguments. In Jana Sangh's view "no useful purpose would be served by sending the team of Officials to China."⁸¹ It was repeated that China should be asked to vacate Indian territories occupied by her enforceably at an early date.

Thus we see that Jana Sangh took sincerely the problems of Tibet, Indo-Tibetan border, Sino-Indian border and the minor problems as well. In its view, the Government of India followed a policy of "appeasement" towards China which was against the honour and dignity of India and threatened India's territorial integrity.

The Jana Sangh thought that the McMahon Line was the actual border between Indian and China and approved by treaties, pacts and traditions. Tibet was an independent and sovereign State which was "overrun" by China. The construction of strategic roads in Tibet, the invasion of Tibet, creating and increasing trouble in Tibet, interfering with the Indian territories and then invading Indian borders were all linked with each other as parts of the Chinese expansionist programmes. China was a threat, in Jana Sangh's view, not only for Tibet, India and other countries of south and southeast Asia, but also for the peace of the whole world. It, therefore, demanded a complete withdrawal of the Chinese forces from Indian territory, strengthening of Indian defence system, a tough diplomatic

80. ————, Resolution No. 60-10.

81. ————, Resolution No. 60-14.

policy towards China, India's withdrawal of support to China's admission into the United Nations and to put the Tibetan issue before the world community in the U.N.C.

CHAPTER IV

SINO-INDIAN CONFRONTATION — NATURE AND IMPACT

CHAPTER IV

SINO-INDIAN CONFRONTATION — NATURAL AND IMPACT

The Chinese aggression of India in 1962 was not an unexpected event which took place suddenly. A thorough investigation of the Notes, Memorandas and Letters exchanged and the Agreements signed between the Governments of China and India indicate that the border conflagration of 1962 was a result of a prolong border problem which arose at different points of the Indian border alongside the Himalayas. Since the independence of India, the two countries were having friendly relations which arose to its peak during the early years of the ru period. India took note of the developments which started to be seen of the border with China after the Agreement for Trade was signed between the Tibet region of China and India in April, 1954.¹

At first, Chinese Government complained that "over 30 Indian troops armed with rifles crossed the Niti Pass on 29th June, 1954, and intruded into Wu-Je of the Ali area of the Tibet region of China", and asked the Indian Government to "promptly investigate the matter" and withdraw the Indian troops immediately from that area. The Chinese 'allegation' was repeated on 13th August, 1954 and included other details about the entry of 33 Indian armed troops, which were, accordingly, "under the command of an officer called Bathauje", who was a "Deputy Commander of troops stationing at Kannan", accompanied by the District Magistrate of Salzanjapur (Chinese pronunciation), "a doctor radio operators and soldiers", who were "putting up in 17 tents."²

1. Note given by the Councillar of China in India to the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 17 July, 1954.

2. Note given by the Chinese Councillar in India to the Ministry of
(contd)

the Indian side authorities denied this charge and said that : "A party of our Border Security Force is encamped in the Hoti Plain which is south-east of Liti Pass and is in Indian territory." Instead , some of the Tibetan officials tried to cross into our territory in Hoti Plain, and asked the Chinese Government to "instruct the local authorities in Tibet not to cross into Indian territory" as they had already "instructed our authorities not to cross into Tibetan territory."³

An intruding attempt by a party of Tibetan officials into Indian territory and encamping of a party of Chinese at Hoti with 5 tents and 20 horses was reported by the Indian authorities to the Chinese Government in a Note given by Indian authorities to the Chinese Councillor in India. The Note included the repeated statement that such activities were "not in conformity with the Agreement signed between India and China on the subject of trade and border relations between India and the Tibet region of China", nor "with the principles of non-alignment and friendly co-existence between China and India nor in the spirit of the joint communique issued last year by the Prime Ministers of India and China."⁴

In the following month, the Chinese Government again reported the crossing of Chinese territory into south-east of the Tibet region of China by a batch of more than 30 Indian soldiers and "engaged in constructing fortifications at places very close to their garrison force stationing there, and assured the Government of India that there

(cont : External Affairs, Government of India, 13 August, 1954.

3. Note given to the Chinese Councillor in India, 27 August, 1954.

4. _____, 28 June, 1955

had been no "case of Chinese personnel crossing the border in the vicinity of the Niti Pass."⁵ Now the matter of the location of Ju-Je arose between the two Governments. According to the Chinese Councillor, it was 12 kilometers north of the Tunjun La, but the Indian point of view was that the Indian troops were encamping at Para Hoti which is 2 miles south of the Tunjun La, and is in the Indian territory.

Two incidents of crossing into Indian territory by the Chinese troops were reported from Larzan and Lilan, and the Indian Government asked the Chinese troops to withdraw immediately from its territory. China was warned by the Indian Government that "failure of immediate withdrawal of the Chinese troops beyond Tsang Chekka may lead to serious incidents which would mar the friendly relations between India and China."⁶ The Chinese Government insisted on the point that Tunjun La was within the territory of the Tibet region of China while India considered it as the border pass. Referring to the Five Principles, the Chinese Government expressed that it hoped that the questions of Ju-Je will undoubtedly be settled satisfactorily through the clarification of historical facts by means of investigation and study. They also suggested that "both Governments should refrain from sending troops into the Ju-Je area so as to avoid a situation in which the troops of the two countries confront each other, and to maintain the normal state of affairs along the Sino-Indian border."⁷

At Shipki La Pass, an incident of crossing into

5. —————, 11th July, 1955

6. Note given to the Chinese Councillor in India, 2 May 1956.

7. Note given by the Chinese Foreign Office to the Councillor of India, 8th June, 1956.

Indian territory by 10 Chinese Army personnel was reported from the Indian side of the pass and taking up positions about 2 furlongs from Nupsong Road on the Indian side of the pass. The matter was also reported to the Chinese Charge-de-Affaires in India, and a strict action was expected from the Chinese authorities "otherwise there is a danger of breach of peace."⁸ Two reports of serious situations developed between the Chinese and Indian border patrols in the region of Shipki La Pass. The Indian Government accused them of violating not only the Indian border, but harassing and threatening Indian troops. The Indian Government was "pained and surprised" and thought it no "different to visualise that the natural and direct result of such attitudes, if continued in, may be one of clash of arms."⁹ The Government of India also expressed the view that it will "consider any crossing of this border (Shipki La Pass) by armed personnel as aggression which they will resist."¹⁰ The Government of India expressed its surprise on the change in the Chinese view regarding the Kara Khoti area of Tunjun La (in the Indian territory), the Shipki La Pass and the Tunjun La Pass. The Government of India laid down the precise latitude of this Pass as :

" 30' - 53 latitude north,
79' - 59 longitude east."

This may assist identification of the pass, and avoid danger of confusion with any other Pass."¹¹ A case of Chinese violation

8. Note Verbale given to the Chinese Charge 'de' Affaires in India, 5th Sept. 1956.

9. Aide Memoire given to the Chinese Charge 'de' Affaires in India, 24th Sept., 1956 .

10. Ibid.

of Indian territory at Khurnak Fort was reported by the Indian Government also.

Keeping in view the growing over the Bara Hoti area between the two Governments, talks were held between the representatives of the two Governments at Delhi but no conclusion was reached at. Indian proposal for not sending civilian authorities by any side at Bara Hoti during the period of discussions was rejected by the Chinese Government. This caused engraving the situation more than before.

The Government of India took a serious note of the construction of a motor road by the Chinese "across the eastern part of the Ladakh region of the Jammu & Kashmir State, which is part of India." The Government of India expressed her fear : " This road seems to form of the Chinese road known as Yecheng-Cartok road or Sinkiang Tibet highway, the completion of which was announced in September, 1957."¹² The Indian Foreign Ministry stated her anxiousness "to settle these petty frontier disputes so that the friendly relations between the two countries may not suffer."¹³ The missing of an Indian party consisting of 3 military officials, four soldiers together with one guide, one porter, six pony-owners and thirty four ponies who were out on a normal patrol in this area near Chinglung in Indian territory was reported to the Chinese Government and the latter was requested to provide any information about the missing Indian party .¹⁴ The Chinese Foreign Ministry, in reply,

11. Note given to the Chinese Charge de Affaire in India, 3 Oct. 1956.

12. Note given by the Foreign Secretary to the Chinese Ambassador, 10 Oct. 1958.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid.

informed India that the above mentioned party "had already intruded into Chinese territory to conduct unlawful surveying activities within Chinese borders," and, "were, therefore, detained by the Chinese Frontier Guards." In addition, they complained of a violation of her air space by an "Indian aircraft penetrating deep into the air space over south-western part of Sinkiang of China to carry on reconnaissance and encircled low over Chinese garrisons." ¹⁵ The attitude was surprising for India. When no information was given by the Chinese authorities regarding the arrested Indian party kept for 5 weeks.

TALKS ON PARA HOTI :

Talks began on Para Hoti between the Indian and Chinese delegations on 19th April, 1958. An agreement was reached between the two delegations according to which, neither side would send their forces to that particular area until the matter is finally agreed upon and a permanent solution of the problem could be found. But, the Government of India was surprised when the Councillor Fu Mao informed the Director of the Eastern Division that the Chinese interpretation of the agreement not to send any troops was that no person actually carrying arms should be sent to the area by either side. The Indian Government complained to the Chinese authorities that "the Chinese party had taken to Para Hoti considerable building materials like lime, brick, timber etc. which seemed to indicate that the Chinese intended to construct permanent or semi-permanent structures in Para Hoti." ¹⁶ Further, an entrance by the Chinese personnel into the Lapthal and Sangona Balla areas on the

15. Memorandum given by the Foreign Office of China to the Councillor of India, 3 Nov., 1958.

16. Note handed to the Chinese Councillor in India by the Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, 10 Dec. 1958.

the Indian side of Bulcha Ihura Pass, was reported to the Chinese Government." 17

In the following year, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs reported to the Government of India about the Indian troops' intrusion and occupation of Bigitan, Samagar Sanpo and other places in the Tibet region of China and their collusion with the Tibetan rebel bandits.¹⁸ This note with surprise was received by the Government of India and ~~the~~ "she found no truth" in these "allegations," and assured the Chinese Government that the Tibetan refugees were disarmed as soon as entered the Indian territory and no encouragement was given to them. India "had no information about any rebel activities in this area." 19

A Chinese party consisting of nearly 25 persons crossed into Indian territory on 23rd July, 1959, and took an Indian patrol party into their custody inside the Indian border and encamped at Spangar which is in Indian territory. The Government informed the Chinese Government with the seriousness of the matter and lodged a strong protest against the Chinese "violation of the Indian border and the arrest of the Indian party engaged in bonafide duties within the Indian territory."²⁰ But they didn't accept the protest lodged by the Indian Government, claimed the Spangar and Jurnel Fort as Chinese territories, and in retaliation charged 6 Indian armed personnel with

17. Ibid.

18. Note given by the Foreign Office of China to the Indian Councillor in Peking, 23 June, 1959.

19. Note of the Government of India, 26 June, 1959.

20. Note given by the Ministry of External Affairs to the Councillor of China in India, 30 July, 1959.

the violation of Chinese territory who, accordingly, were detained and disarmed, and regarded "the unlawful intrusion of the above mentioned Indian armed personnel into Chinese territory," as, "in serious contravention of Sino-Indian friendship and the Five Principles of peaceful co-existence."²¹ Only the next day, the Indian sources reported a violation of Indian territory by an "an armed Chinese patrol strength approximately 200" at Shinsamang and pushed aback the resisting Indian patrol to the bridge at Lrokung, Samba which is in the Indian territory. The Government of India warned the Chinese Government that "Such incidents may result in an armed clash which would be contrary to the friendly relations subsisting between the two countries and the traditions of amity which has prevailed all along this frontier."²² On the other hand, a case of armed aggression on Chinese patrol was reported by the Chinese Foreign Office to the Indian Foreign Office which reportedly occurred at Migyitan where the Chinese frontiers guards were stationing and warned the Indian Government that the later will be "responsible for all serious consequences arising therefrom."²³

Migyitan, situated north of Longju began to spark in August 1959, when Chinese Foreign Office made a new complaint on 23rd June, 1959 that "the Migyitan area in the south-eastern part of the Tibet region of China was intruded, shelled (and) occupied by over 200

21. Note given by the Foreign Office of China to the Councillor of India, 6 August, 1959.

22. Note given by the Embassy of India to the Foreign Office of China, 13 August, 1959.

23. Note given by the Foreign Office of China to the Councillor of India, 27 August, 1959.

Indian troops."²⁴ The Indian reply was that "all that the Government of India did was to establish outpost at Longju (south of Migyitun) and Tamadal (some miles south of Janga Sumpo). Both these outposts, within the Indian side of the traditional international border, were established peacefully, and there was no question of shelling or using force in establishing these outposts."²⁵

One another important case of border conflict was the position at Longju. The Indian Note dated 27th August, 1959, was in protest of Chinese intrusion into the Indian territory at Longju where according to the Indian sources, Chinese forces first encircled the Indian post and then fired on it. The Note accused China of 'deliberate aggression' in an attempt to implement border claims by force, and warned that the Indian frontier posts had been ordered to 'use force on the trespassers if necessary.'²⁶

THE CHINESE MAPS : Meanwhile, the Government took note of a map of China published on pages 20-21 of the China Pictorial magazine (No. 95-July, 1958), in which the borders of China were indicated by a thick brown line. This map included four of the five divisions of India's North East Frontier Agency, some areas in the north of the State of Uttar Pradesh and large areas in eastern Ladakh which form part of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Further, the entire Tashigang area of eastern Bhutan and a considerable slice of territory in north-west Bhutan were also shown as Chinese. The matter was brought to the notice of Premier

24. Note given by the Chinese Foreign Office to the Councillor of India, 23 June, 1959.

25. Note given by the Government of India, 26 June, 1959.

26. —————, 27 August, 1959.

Chou En-lai when our Prime Minister Nehru visited China in October, 1954.

The Chinese Premier replied that the Chinese maps were based on old maps and that the Government of China had had no time to correct them.

The repeated printing of these Chinese maps officially was a matter of serious nature to the Government of India and it was again brought to the notice of the Chinese Government and the latter was asked that the matter of correcting these Chinese should not be delayed further.²⁷ The Chinese Government gave the assurance that they will not make changes in the boundary on its own and that "with the lapse of time and after consultations with the various neighbouring countries and a survey of the border regions, a new way of drawing the boundary of China will be decided on in accordance with the result of the consultations and the survey."²⁸ The Indian Prime Minister referred to the Sino-Indian Agreement of 1954, when "no border questions were raised," and an assurance was given to him by the Chinese Premier that the Chinese authorities would recognise the McMahon line as border with India as they had done with Burma. Mr. Nehru stated that "nine years after the Chinese People's Republic came into power, the continued issue of these maps is embarrassing to us as to others. There can be no question of these large parts of India being anything but India and there is no dispute about them. I do not know what kind of surveys can affect these well-known and fixed boundaries."²⁹

27. Note given by the Ministry of External Affairs to the Councillor of China in India, 21 August, 1954.

28. Memorandum given by the Foreign Office of China to the Councillor of India, 3 November, 1954.

29. Letter from the Prime Minister of India to the Prime Minister of China, 14 December, 1954.

In the same letter, Mr. Nehru drew the attention of His Excellency Premier Chou En-lai to the Chinese maps which "did not correspond to the actual frontier," and "ran right across the territory of India in several places", which made the Indian Prime Minister 'puzzled' over the policy adopted by the Chinese Government. Mr. Nehru expressed the feeling "that any possibility of grave misunderstanding between our countries should be removed as soon as possible."³⁰

The reply made by the Chinese Premier was of great surprise and shock to the Government of India as the former made astonishing statements in his letter dated 23 rd January, 1959. Accepting the fact that the border was not raised in 1954, but "this was because conditions were not yet ripe for its settlement and the Chinese side on its part, had had no time to study the question." Explaining the Chinese attitude towards the McMahon Line, he stated that it "was a product of the British policy of aggression against the Tibet region of China and aroused the great indignation of the Chinese people. Juridically too, it cannot be considered legal. I have told you that it has never been recognised by the Chinese Central Government." He said that "because the boundary between the two countries is not yet formally delimited and some difference exists, it is unavoidable that there should be discrepancies between the boundary lines drawn on the respective maps of the two sides." The most astonishing point put before by the Chinese Premier was that "on the maps currently^{published} in our country, the Chinese boundaries are drawn in the way constantly followed in the Chinese maps for the past several

30. Letter from the Prime Minister of China to the Prime Minister of India, 23 January, 1959.

decades, if not longer." He was sure that the survey of the boundary line with the consultation of the concerned countries "would give rise to confusion among our people and bring censure on our government."³¹ While the Indian Prime Minister thought the minor incidents on the Sino-Indian border as petty and avoidable in the larger interest of the age old friendship between the two countries but to be discussed at lower level, the Chinese Premier considered them "difficult to avoid pending the formal delimitation of the boundary,"³² and, therefore, suggested that both sides temporarily maintain the status quo until the minor boundary questions are finally solved.

The Indian Prime Minister in his reply stated that the traditional frontier between the two countries "has the sanction of specific international agreements between the then Governments of India and the Central Government of China." He drew the attention of the Chinese Premier to some of these agreements : —

"(1) Sikkim :— The boundary of Sikkim, a protectorate of India with the Tibet region of China was defined in the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890 and jointly demarcated on the grounds in 1895.

(2) The Ladakh Region of the State of Jammu and Kashmir :— A Treaty of 1842 between Kashmir on the one hand and the Emperor of China and the Lama of Lhasa on the other, mentions the India-China boundary in the Ladakh region. In 1847, the Chinese Government admitted that this boundary was sufficiently and distinctly fixed. The area now claimed by China has always been depicted as part of India on official maps and even a

31. Ibid.

32. Ibid.

Chinese map of 1893 shows it as Indian territory.

(3) The McMahon Line :--- this line was, in fact, drawn at a Tripartite Conference held at Simla in 1913-14 between the Plenipotentiaries of the Governments of China, Tibet and India. At the time of acceptance of the delineation of this frontier, Lonchen Shatra, the Tibetan Plenipotentiaries' letters exchanged, stated explicitly that he had received orders from Lhasa to agree to the boundary as marked on the map appended to the convention. The line was drawn after full discussion and was confirmed subsequently by a formal exchange of letters; and there is nothing to indicate the Tibetan authorities were in any way dissatisfied with the agreed boundary."³³

SITUATION ON SINO-INDIAN BORDER BEGINS TO BE DETERIORATE

situation
The/continuously deteriorating on the India-China border and the pressure from the Opposition parties as well as from the public on Nehru compelled him to adopt and formulate a "forward policy" according to which some symbolic posts were established in Ladakh and N.E.F.A. area in 1961. "This was probably one of the reasons which provided the Chinese to cross the McMahon Line in the Eastern Sector on 14th September 1962 and launch a large scale attack both in the eastern and the western sectors of the border on 20th October 1962 overwhelming the Indian frontier posts."³⁴

The defence ministries of India and China were

33. Letter from the Prime Minister of India to the Prime Minister of China, 22 March, 1959.

34. Pillai, K. Raman : India's Foreign Policy - Basic Issues and Political Attitudes. Meenakshi Prakashan, Meerut (1969) p 131

exchanging ever hottest and bitter Notes, Memorandas, Letters etc. throughout 1961 and till the summer of 1962. The Press on both sides was using militant tones and accusing each other of intruding into their territories. On political platform, the Indian as well as the Chinese leaders had taken positions. Meanwhile, the Ministry of External Affairs of India was being reported of the continuously increasing number of the Chinese troops on the Indian borders whereas China protested against the building of check posts by the Indian troops inside the Indian territory.

Some minor outbreaks along the border in the early months of 1962 had taken place in Ladakh where Indian and Chinese outposts interlocked, ignoring the exact line which the Governments of either side regarded as the boundary. A Chinese Note of April 1962 demanded the withdrawal of Indian troops from two checkposts near the Karakorum Pass in Ladakh. Unless these troops were withdrawn, the Chinese would feel obliged to resume their patrolling activities on the borders.³⁵ July brought fresh complaints from the Chinese about Indian probing into Chinese held territory. In the Ladakh area Indian outposts — established according to the Indian Government — "to defend Indian territory from further incursions," appeared in the Chinese eyes as "new aggressive standpoints."³⁶

While such provoking statements were being made by the Chinese side and passed to the Indian Governments, the Foreign Minister of India was calm and cool at the dining table with the Chinese

35. Note by the Chinese Government, 30 April, 1962.

36. The Times, dated 9 July, 1962. Quoted by Gott Richard — "China

Defeats India, Survey of International Affairs. Oxford University Press (1970) p 410.

Foreign Minister in Geneva on 23rd July, 1962. He was quite satisfied with the conditions going on the Sino-Indian border by stating the disputed areas in Ladakh were "largely unoccupied."³⁷ They have posts and we have posts. Sometimes they say we shoot first. Sometimes we say they shoot first——actually they shot first.³⁷ Such kind of irresponsibility cannot be expected from a highly responsible person in the government—— the Foreign Minister of a country. His irrational attitude led to the statement of the Chinese Foreign Minister at the very moment who remarked that "the problem of disputed territory in Ladakh was localised problem and it would not lead to war."³⁸

This was the political attitude expressed by a Foreign Minister while on military level, impressive preparations were being made to meet the Chinese dangers successfully. Roads and airstrips were being constructed by the Indian troops in the Ladakh region of Jammu and Kashmir.

A critical situation was to be faced by Nehru in August 1962 when the Indian Parliament opened its monsoon session. There was a strong opposition to his foreign policy, especially towards China.

FROM LADAKH TO NEFA : —

In September 1962, attention was directed to India's north-western border in Ladakh to the north-east frontier where the McMahon Line separates the I.E.F.A. territory from Tibet.

37. Hindu, 25 July, 1962.

38. See for details — Ibid—26 July, 1962.

The Chinese had established positions on the opposite side of N.E.F.A. border as early as October, 1961. From there, they violated the Indian border many times and news came one after another of minor Chinese intrusions into the Indian territory on N.E.F.A. border. Major cases of Chinese incursions were reported from Khinsemane, Dirang and Subansiri Divisions in that area. The Chinese seized the Dhola post and Thag La ridge in the Kameng Frontier Division on September 8, 1962. The month of September, 1962 saw clearly the diversion of attention from Ladakh to N.E.F.A.—making incursion in the Kameng Division which is very close to the point where the frontiers of India, Tibet and Bhutan met, and moved down the northern bank of the Namka Chu river. A Chinese armed patrol crept to the Indian outpost of Dhola, threw hand-grenades and wounded three Indian soldiers, on September 12.

About the situation at Dhola, General Kaul, reconstructing the background to the event of September 12, writes :-

"Our built up in the Dhola area compared adversely of the Chinese. Our ability to reinforce due to lack of troops and roads was limited. Our troops were on restricted scale of rations, and had no reserves. Clothing was scanty for the extreme cold. we were short of communication and there was hardly any defense stores available. e did not have adequate support."³⁹

During September 1962, the Chinese strengthened their position along the McMahon Line where the Indian Army was in weakest position facing the lack of communication, supply lines, accurate maps of passes, terrains and mountains. The number of complaints of

39. Kaul, General B.M.: The Untold Story. (1967), p 357.

intruding into each other's territory were being made throughout September, 1962. Situation along the whole Sino-Indian border had become worsed, which followed heavy fighting in the following month. Referring to these conditions of national importance, the Hindu wrote as early as 30th September, 1962 that;

"Sporadic fighting during the following weeks seemed to suggest that India was determined to force the Chinese troops back across the border. Official Indian recitence over what was actually happening was in marked contrast to what had previously been great willingness to discuss the subject and to brand the Chinese as aggressors. Now it seemed the Indians were talking softly but taking firm action. Mr. Menon, leaving for New York on 20th September, told reporters that there was no trouble at all.... a strange comment on the previous weeks' fighting had raised rumours of escalation in the world's press."⁴⁰

But Indian Army was not prepared well to take action against the Chinese intrusions in the L.D.P.A. area, which was to be proved later. The fighting in this area on 20th September, 1962, in the view of General K.S. Thimmaya, was to prove the weaknesses of the Indian Army. He said "it was not possible to make any kind of defensive stand due to the greatest difficulty in maintaining our forward posts which had to defend mainly on air drops and helicopters."⁴¹

The Army officers were calling for more military aids, better communications, rations, clothing for extreme cold and

40. The Hindu, 30 September, 1962.

41. Thimmaya, General K.S. : Chinese Aggression and After. International Studies. Vol. I, July-October, 1963.

other facilities to meet the aggression in Ladakh and N.E.F.A. successfully. But no firm policy was adopted to equip the Army with the necessary weapons and other requirements, though a sum of 120 crores was allocated for this purpose but it was not enough in view of the huge requirements of the Indian Army. Despite the alarming situation in Ladakh and N.E.F.A., both Mr. Nehru and Mr. Menon, according to Gen. Kaul believed as late as October 2nd 1962, that they had 'good reasons that the Chinese would not take any strong action against us.' 42

(a) FIRST BLOW OF CHINESE INVASION — OCTOBER, 1962

A massive Chinese invasion on India began on 10th October, 1962 in which they used heavy mortar and medium machine guns. But the attitude of the Indian Prime Minister was still calm and peaceful as it was revealed when he told the reporters while leaving for Ceylon on 12th 1962, that the Indian Army had been ordered "to clear the Chinese from the area which they were occupying south of the McMahon Line." 43

The Chinese aggression on India's northern frontiers intensified on 20th October, 1962. Khinsemano, Dhola, Lumpu near Khinsemane, Longju and other posts to the south-east, Bum La, Kibitoo and Jang were immediately overtaken by the Chinese army. The victory on these posts opened way for further designs of the Chinese aggressors and exposed to them the areas ahead and around.

The situation in Ladakh was still grave and

42. Quoted by, Woodman, Dorothy : Himalayan Frontiers. London (1969), p 282

43. Prime Minister on Sino-Indian Relations. Vol.I, Part II, External Publicity Division, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi.

difficult for the Indian Army to face because Chinese troops got control over the checkpoint in this region one after another. Here the main problem with the Indian Army was lack of communication and supply. The main points of Chinese aggression were the posts in the King Ka Pass, military potposts in the Chip Chap valley and near the Karakorum Pass.

Now the aims of publishing Chinese maps showing most of the Indian frontiers as theirs was fully exposed. They gained control over all such area, within two days which naturally was the result of high planning on the part of China and the ignorance on the Indian side. India lost many valuable lives of its brave youths, a lot of territory and arms and ammunitions etc.

After completing their goals in such a tactful manner, Chinese proposed a three point ceasefire on 24th October, 1962. It stated:

- (1) Pending a peaceful settlement, the Chinese Government hopes that the Indian Government agree that both parties respect the line of actual control between the two sides along the entire Sino-Indian border, and the armed forces of each side withdraw twenty kilometer from this line and disengage.
- (2) Provided that the Indian Government agrees to the above proposal the Chinese Government is willing, though consultation between the two parties, to withdraw its frontier guards in the eastern sector of the border to the north of the line of actual control; at the same time, both China and India undertake not to cross the line of actual control i.e. the traditional customary line in the middle and western sectors of the border.

(3) In order to seek a friendly settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question, talks should be held once again by the Prime Ministers of China and India."⁴⁴

Hsinhua News Agency reported on 24th October, 1962, that, in fact, the Indians invaded Chinese territories and were already in possession of 90,000 sq. miles of Chinese territories and the Chinese frontier guards had "to strike back in self-defence."⁴⁵

Indian Government's Attitude: Prime Minister Nehru asked China what was meant by the "line of actual control." He found "no sense or meaning in the Chinese offer to withdraw twenty kilometer from what they call line of actual control."⁴⁶ He asked the Chinese Premier: "Is this the line they have created by aggression since the beginning of September (1962)?" He called it a "deceptive device" in advancing forty or sixty kilometers by blatant military aggression and offering to withdraw twenty kilometer provided both sides do this....." He, therefore, asked them to "go back at least to the position where they were all along the boundary prior to 5th September 1962."⁴⁷

Prime Minister of China answered to the Indian Prime Minister that by "the line of actual control", he meant "the line which existed on November 7th, 1959 when he made a similar proposal."⁴⁸

44. White Paper VIII, Chou En-lai to Nehru. October 24, 1962. Note accompanying letter.

45. New China News Agency, 24 October, 1962.

46. White Paper VIII....op. cit.— Annexure to letter from Nehru to Chou. dated 27 October, 1962.

47. Ibid.

48. Ibid....Chou to Nehru. dated November 4, 1962.

In his letter to Chou, Nehru told him what he himself meant by the "line of actual control." He explained his point of view, i.e. the Indian Government's stand in the following way:

WESTERN SECTOR : "In the western sector, the line of actual control not only includes all the Chinese posts established in the three years since 1959, but includes all the Indian posts in the territory till 20th October 1962 and extends even further westwards, thus taking in an additional 5,000 to 6,000 sq. miles since their 7th November 1959 position...."

MIDDLE SECTOR : Nehru said that "the suggestion that the line of actual control whether on 7th November, 1959 or now coincides only in the main with the traditional and customary boundary if absolutely without foundation. The Chinese have never had any authority south of the main Himalayan watershed ridge, which is the traditional boundary in this sector....."

EASTERN SECTOR : In Nehru's view the Chinese proposed withdrawal to twenty kilometers "would leave Chinese forces in command of the passed leading into India while Indian forces would be 20 kilometer to the south, leaving the entire Indian frontier defenceless and at the mercy of any freshh invasion."⁴⁹

Keeping in view these arguments, the Indian Prime Minister rejected the three-point cease-fire proposal made by Chou En-lai.

REACTION OF THE OPPOSITION PARTIES

The opposition parties in India reacted sharply and bitterly to the Chinese aggression. They strongly condemned the invasion and asked the Government to adopt a firm policy against the

49. IIL....Annexure to Nehru's letter to Chou En-lai. Nov.14,1962.

aggressor.

THE JANA SANGH : The Jana Sangh adopted a strong attitude and demanded an urgent and vigorous action by the Government of India to meet the challenge posed by China. Calling of ex-armed personnel, armies from abroad, heavy arms aid from friendly countries, sending severing of diplomatic relations with China, closing Chinese Consulate in New Delhi to stop espionage and subversive activities, help for Tibetan freedom fighters, no talk with the invaders, beware of the Communists on the borders, seeking all parties co-operation to meet the aggressive policies of China, no association of Mr. V.K.K. Menon with the Defence Ministry, a strict watch over the fifth columnists, re-orientation of the third plan in the direction of defence production and, after all, the all round co-operation by the peoples of India.⁵⁰

THE SWATANTRA PARTY'S REACTION : The Party, since its very formation, was against the policy of non-alignment and emphasized on the need to establish alignment with the Western bloc especially the United States. The Chinese aggression provided them an opportunity to advance their ideals and objectives more promptly. They drew the attention of the people towards the failure of non-alignment policy and its results which became in the most dangerous form of Chinese aggression. It appreciated the "spontaneous, prompt and general manner" in which the United States, Canada and other friendly countries came to India's assistance by way of military equipment and otherwise.⁵¹ In their view, "the concept of non-

50. See for details — B.J.S. Documents—op. cit.,

51. Swatantra : "Call for change in Foreign Policy". November 17, 1962. p 10.

alignment had little meaning for India especially in a grievous situation created by the Chinese invasion."⁵²

N.G.Kanga, a prominent leader of the party, said in the Parliament : "Non-alignment has not served us; does not serve us any longer. The sooner we get rid of it, the better, the sooner we turn back to it, the better."⁵³

The party was the only one among the Opposition which rejected the value and importance of non-alignment, and directly attacked its utility for India.

Another leader of the party, C.Rajagopalacharya, wrote in Swarajya that "the initiative must be wrested from the Chinese. The military bases must be attacked. This requires an enormous value of procurement of arms of all kinds, virtually amounting to a complete de-facto alliance with the Western powers. Without this, India cannot cope with the present crisis. The Chinese power is too big for India to face alone."⁵⁴

COMMUNIST PARTY'S REACTION : "During the Chinese invasion, all over India various meetings were organized by the Communists to propagate that the "Government of India was responsible for the deterioration in the Sino-Indian relations, that China had not committed any aggression, that the bogey of Chinese was being raised by the Government in order to divert public attention from the international crisis facing the country. Party units were asked to carry on a whispering pro-China campaign in villages and towns. In this way, the C.P.I. with its persistent and mischievous

52. Ibid.

53. Lok Sabha Debates. Series 3, Vol. 9, 8 November, 1962, Col.159.

54. Swarajya, op. cit., p. 1.

propaganda designed to stir the will of the country to resist aggression.⁵⁵

On ceasefire issue, the Communist Party of India held its own view just opposite to the views of all the Opposition parties. V.B. Sinha in his work "Red Rebel in India," is of the view that "..... the Chinese cease-fire was considered by many persons as aiming at to save the C.P.I. from being banned and communists from quashed off in India." He further writes that the communists believed that the cease-fire was a real help to them, for it gave them time and convenience to rehabilitate themselves and find a new strategy to turn India Red.⁵⁶

When the whole nation was struggling hard to meet the Chinese invasion, the Communists were busy in a subversive campaign to delay the reinforcement of Indian forces and to give an opportunity to Chinese Army to advance further and occupy more areas of Indian territory. At places communists saboteurs blew up the railway lines by which these reinforcements were being sent. In the border mountainous areas there were not sufficient railway lines and roads, such Red sabotage caused terrible havoc to Indian defence. At Jorhat, communist saboteurs tried to derail a military train. At another place the communists organised labour strikes on the Union Steamer Co. boats serving East Bengal and Assam and disrupted vital supply lines to Assam. In Darjeeling, the communists set fire to the Rang Mook tea estate on Nov. 17, 1962, which resulted in a loss of one hundred thousand of rupees.⁵⁷

Besides these border areas, in cities and towns of great industrial and military significance also, the communists indulged

55. Quoted by Sinha, V.B.: The Red Rebel in India. New Delhi. Associated.

(1968), p. 131.

56. Ibid. p. 127.

57. For more details...see Sinha..op. cit.,

into subversive acts. They tried every method to decrease the production and hinder the supplies. When the people were working for more hours at the time of Chinese invasion, the communists in India started the mischievous propaganda that the war between India and China had come to a peaceful end and appealed to the labourers and workers of factories and mills not to do hard work and overtimes. In Bombay, Poona and other industrial centres of Maharashtra which if only a local variation of the Communist Party openly propagated among the workers that there was no danger from China anymore and that there was no need to increase the expenditure of defence.

Such statements were made by Mr. V.K. Saklecha, though he was not a member of the Communist Party, but under the influence of the I.N.T.U.C., and by Mr. Ganu Ram Tewari, F.L.C. and the General Secretary of Indian National Trade Unions' Congress (I.N.T.U.C.). In Indore, pamphlets were distributed among the people which asked the workers to welcome the "Revolution from the North."

When the Government of India rushed to recruit Nepali Gorkhas, who were exceptionally brave and efficient in mountainous fighting, the communists distributed pamphlets in Nepali language urging them not to join Indian Army and instead discouraging the Gorkhas. They gave the impression that Nepali and Chinese were one, and, therefore, the Nepali soldiers should not fire against Chinese soldiers. People in N.E.F.A. areas were discouraged to join Indian Army and contribute to the Defence Fund.⁵⁸

58. See for more details — Democratic Research Service Documents —

All this discussion makes it clear that the pro-China policy of the C.P.I. proved to be more harmful during and after the invasion than in any other situation. their activities were against the cause of the nation.

Actually the communists in India, since their very first appearance on the Indian soil have been working on the directives of Chinese and Soviet Communist regimes. It has been proved by many researches in and outside India. One of the most important source of such instigations is that have been done by the Democratic Research Service. According to their discoveries or rather disclosures, "Russia gave a free hand to China for expansion of communism in Asia as the best way to spread communism in the East through an Asian country."⁵⁹ India being the second most populated country of the world and enriched with natural resources was of great importance for China. "To attain political power in India, it was decided to get India invaded by the Liberation Army of Communist China, whose forces were already present in Tibet 'the Gate of India,' and other tactical places on the Himalayan terrain."⁶⁰ The author is of the view that "with the secret conspiracy of Moscow, Peking and the C.P.I., a detailed programme to invade India was made."⁶¹ The direct effects of the foreign influence on Indian politics could be seen in various situations, for instance, the case of the dismissal of the communist led government in Kerala and the withdrawal of the Chinese from some important posts in the northern border of India.

59. Cited in — Sinha, V.B....op. cit. p. 122

60. Ibid, p. 125.

61. Ibid.

The dismissal of the Communist government in Kerala on 31st July, 1959 due to the loss of people's confidence led to an aggressive attitude both from the C.P.I. as well as their bosses abroad. The Indian communists asked them to adopt military measures in India to establishing a communist government.⁶² This is of utter importance to be considered that China withdrew its troops from Longju, Aksai Chin and other areas which Chinese forces had forcibly occupied, on the request of Mr. Ajoy Ghosh, the then General Secretary of C.P.I. during his visit to Peking as a leader of communist delegation in the first week of October 1959. This was done keeping in view the then forthcoming elections in Kerala and China did not want to create a situation which may not be in favour of the C.P.I. prospects of coming into power.⁶³

The pro-communist policy of the C.P.I. can also be proved by the fact that when the incidents of Chinese intrusion into Indian territory increased in the following years, the communists of India openly adopted a pro-China attitude. Their fifth column activities increased all over India and especially in the border areas. They reacted bitterly to any move of unity from any section of the society or the Government to face the Chinese danger. For instance, an advertisement issued by U.P. Government to become unite and progress economically to defend the northern frontiers was much disliked by the Indian communists. The editor of Tanyug, a C.P.I. mouthpiece wrote that he had received "heap of angry letters" from comrades on this "lying and mischievous advertisement, and that the anger of the comrades was absolutely

62. See for details...Democratic Research Service, op, cit.; India, Tibet and China. Bombay (1959).

63. See for details..Sinha, V.B...op. cit., pp 125-142.

correct. he acknowledged that the C.P.I. did not consider as aggressor against India. China might have a mistake but it had not been guilty of aggression."⁶⁴

In September 1960, Hare Krishna Kinar, a prominent leader of the C.P.I. went to Peking to receive instructions regarding the attitude of the C.P.I. should adopt towards the Chinese aggression on the Indian Government.⁶⁵

(b) SECOND ROUND OF CHINESE INVASION — 15-22 NOVEMBER, 1962

The Chinese proposal to remain on the "line of actual control as it existed on November 1959," and to negotiate with India on boundary problems was rejected by India on 14th November, 1962. In his letter to Premier Chou En-lai, Prime Minister Nehru said : "..... the three point proposal, despite the manner in which it is put forth, is a demand for surrender on terms which have to be accepted while the Chinese forces in great strength are occupying large areas of Indian territory which they have acquired since their further aggression which commenced on 8th September, 1962, and the massive attack which they started on 20th October, 1962."⁶⁶

"Needless of the strategic realities, Indian leaders talked grandly about facing the challenge. It came on Nov. 15, the day after the three point proposal had been rejected when Chinese troops attacked on a 500-mile front in L.E.F.A. from Walong to Se La."⁶⁷

64. Quoted by Sinha, V.B.op. cit., p. 129.

65. Ibid, p. 130.

66. Letter from Nehru to Chou, 14 Nov. 1962.

67. Woodman, Dorothy : Himalayan Frontiers. London (1969), p. 291.

The Chinese aggression on November 15, 1962, concentrated in the Eastern and Western Sectors.

Position in N.E.F.A.: On a 500 mile front, the Chinese had little to be resisted and many of the important checkpoints inside the Indian territory were easily overtaken by the Chinese. Walong, Se La, Palit range and Bomdi La fell to Chinese troops within a very short period of twenty hours. They met some resistance from the Indian Army on the Se La post, but surprisingly crossed the Palit range by a yak track. They cut off the line of communication between the post at Se La and Bomdi La in this region, and thus the only of reinforcement to the Indian troops was destroyed and helped the Chinese to overtake these areas.

Position in the Western Sector. The main concentrating point of fighting between the armies of the countries in this sector was Chusul. All the positions around this India base were shelled down by the Chinese artillery within a very little time.

THE CEASEFIRE — 22 NOVEMBER, 1962 After one week's fighting, dominated by the Chinese military strength came to an end suddenly when China declared ceasefire on her borders with India on 22 November, 1962. They put forth three circumstances in which they (the Chinese) could strike back in their own defence, if these proposals were not accepted by India. These were as follows :—

"If the Indians should continue their attack after the Chinese frontier guards have ceased fire and when they are withdrawing;

(2) if after withdrawal, Indians advanced to the line of control in the eastern sector and / or refuse to withdraw but remained on the line of actual control in the middle and western sectors, and;

(3) if after withdrawal, the Indian troops should cross the line of actual

control and recover their position prior to September 8, 1962.⁶⁸

Not only this, they strictly forbade the Indian Army to cross on some particular points of the so-called "line of actual control". The Chinese statement declared blatantly that Indian forces should not cross again;

"the illegal McMahon line and re-occupy the Jechilang River area north of the line in the eastern sector, reoccupy Wu Je (Bara Hoti) in the middle sector, and restore their forty three strong points for aggression in the Chip Chap valley, the Galwan River valley, the Pangong Lake area and the Demchok area or set up more strong points for aggression on Chinese territory in the western sector."⁶⁹

The Chinese Government also proposed for negotiations between the officials of the two countries to discuss the problems implicit in a twenty kilometer withdrawal of the armed forces, the establishment of the checkpoints by each party on its own side of the line of actual control and the return of captured personnel.⁷⁰

Nehru, in turn, stated some general principles so as the problems between the two countries could be discussed and solved, These principles were : --

(1) We should create a proper atmosphere for peaceful settlement of our differences;

68. White Paper VIII. Statement given by the Chinese Government, Nov. 21, 1962.

69. Ibid.

70. Ibid, Memorandum by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Embassy of India in China, Nov. 26, 1962. Chou to Nehru, Nov. 28, 1962.

- (ii) we should settle our differences in a ~~very~~ friendly way through peaceful talks and discussions. If we fail, we can consider what other agreed peaceful method of settling our differences should be adopted;
- (iii) there should be no attempt to force any unilateral demand on either side on account of the advances gained in recent clashes;
- (iv) the necessary preliminaries for talks and discussions suggested should be consistent with the decency, dignity and self-respect of both sides; and,
- (v) the implementation of these proposed arrangements will not in any way prejudice either side's position in regard to the correct boundary alignment.⁷¹

REACTION OF THE OPPOSITION PARTIES TO THESE DEVELOPMENTS

On November 25, 1962, the members of Opposition parties in Parliament belonging to the P.S.P., Ganatantra Parishad, Jana Sang, Republican Group and Independent Group brought an amendment to the effect that the House regretted the failure of the Government of India to defend her frontiers from the Chinese aggression. It was a clear indication of the truth that the Opposition barring the Communists, were all united on the problem of national defence and integration. The Resolution passed by the united front of these parties on 25th November stated the attitude of the Opposition towards the Chinese aggression in a very clear and strong manner. It stated that the House regrets:—

- "(i) the suppression over a period of years from Parliament and the people of the fact of the Chinese aggression;
- (ii) the absence of measures to ensure the defence of the Himalayan

71. Ibid, Nehru to Chou. December 1, 1962.

frontiers such as suitable deployment of troops, adequate equipment of our forces, and the construction of necessary roads and air fields;

(iii) the fact that the latest letter of the Prime Minister does not contain the stand that negotiations between the two countries can take place only on the basis of prior acceptance by China of our frontiers and the immediate vacation by China of territories forcibly and wrongfully occupied by them;

(iv) the fact that in their eagerness for a negotiated settlement, the Government has suggested that India would withdraw from what has been always Indian territory, in return for the Chinese withdrawing from areas which also are ours, and;

(v) that the government has announced no clear plans to make the Chinese vacate Indian territories within a reasonable period.⁷²

All these parties were united on some general points of national importance such as the vacation of India's lost territory as soon as possible, the strengthening of India's defences, reorientation of India's foreign policy and after all not to accept the military victory of China for the dignity and safety of India. It was the result of the pressure from the Opposition that did not accept the ceasefire proposals immediately. The Opposition offered him a co-operating hand and pledged for national defence and integrity.

COMMUNIST PARTY'S REACTION

The Communist Party's official reaction to the Chinese

72. Quoted by Gupta, K. : India in World Politics. Calcutta (1969), pp.171-

invasion of October and November, 1962, could be easily understood from what Khrushchev's right hand man Mikhail Suslov, first secretary of the Communist Party of Soviet Union (CPSU), asked the Communist Party of India "not to say or do anything that would further strain Sino-Indian relations and generate more bitterness in China."⁷³ The Indian communists slightly moulded this foreign advice regarding the defence of their own motherland. They condemned the Chinese invasion but in a cool way.

Although, Z.A.Ahmad, a member of the C.P.I.'s five men secretariate and a respected member of the Party accused China of having "... made incursions into Indian territory," and assured that the Party "..... will defend every inch of Indian territory occupied by China."⁷⁴ The also approved the McMahon Line in the eastern sector and the traditional frontier in the western sector in its selection manifesto of February, 1962. These were hollow declarations and assurances of the Communist Party of India. Actually they were carrying just the opposite activities of what they were making statements. Various documents seized by the Indian intelligence inside the country which disclosed that the Communists were carrying on anti- India and Pro-China propaganda in frontier areas. To them, India was aggressor, not China. They thought Nehru's policies were dictated by the imperialists and it was India which did not desire peace and peaceful co-existence. The Communists were anxious for Sino-Indian friendship which could help expansion of communism in India.

CONSERVATION OF CEASEFIRE PROPOSALS

It was surely the pressure from each and every section

74. Ibid.

of the society through their parties, groups, associations etc. that Nehru was compelled to the situation not to accept the unilateral ceasefire by China. The Jana Sangh adopted a firm and strong stand while asking Government to reject these proposals. It characterized them as "... a clever ruse to deceive the people and to obtain time to consolidate her ill-gotten gains." To the Party, "...the Chinese offer is not a peace proposal at all but an ultimatum to surrender. They are humiliating and deceitful."⁷⁵

The Sawantantra Party, too, saw these proposals as deceitful and asked the Government to refuse for negotiation till the Chinese vacate all the territory forcibly occupied by China. P.K. Deo a Sawantantra leader, said in Parliament that the Chinese ceasefire proposals were a "... deceptive mirage to lure the Indian people from the high resolve, to counter the splendid solidarity and fortitude of this country and to dampen the spontaneous upsurge that he has been in this country."⁷⁶

The Communists thanked for the policy adopted by Nehru towards China and the "ceasefire by the Chinese after a short lived advance.., India's foreign policy survived the deeverest crisis it ever faced!"⁷⁷ They believed that they were with the Government of India in defending the country.

75. *Organiser*, 3 December, 1962, p. 4.

76. Lok Sabha Debates. Series 3, Vol. 10-11, 10 December, 1962, Columns-5112-13.

77. Party documents. Proceedings of the VIII Congress of the CPI(1964), p. 79.

No explicit statement was given by the Communists regarding the ceasefire Chinese proposals. The overall demand to ban the CPI, effected the communists in India very little. Prime Minister Nehru, however, adopted the policy not accepting the suggestions from a military strong China under the pressure of the Opposition parties.

(fn continued from page no.134)

73. Quoted by Bhat, Sudhakar : India and China. New Delhi (1967), p. 134.

CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION

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Sino-Indian relations during the period under study (1949-62) passed through a traumatic situation which greatly influenced global politics and, in a sense, balance of power. The politics in Asia and, in fact, in the third world as a whole witnessed a tremendous change during this period. The role of Opposition parties in the formulation of India's foreign policy under the circumstances assumes great political importance. The immediate concern was to revive and reassure India's place and position as an Asian power and thereby, determining the nature of her relations with the neighbours.

During the freedom struggle all political ideologies were relegated to a back seat and "achievement of independence" as a single issue dominated the political scene of India. Socialism and communism, with some success here and there, largely remained the preserve of the elite. The Congress constituted a political monolith and the traditions of the 'Opposition' in the Westminster sense could not grow. After independence, however, the Congress monolith started disintegrating and a variety of forces came to the fore. The Opposition in the Parliament, was therefore, a heterogeneous group with contradictory outlooks.

The ruling party under the charismatic leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru adopted a policy of non-alignment to keep away from the politics of the Super Powers. As Nehru was one of the founder leaders of this movement, he naturally found in it the bright and sound future prospects of India as well as for other countries of the Third World. The economic requirements of the Third World were seemed to be fulfilled in following a neutral path and of keeping their economies away from the

Super Powers' hostility. Nehru thought India's solidarity and development in economic planning without any Super Power's pressure. This was realized much later what Nehru dreamed of a prosperous sovereign India which could only be achieved through non-alignment policy as applied to political and economic fields of national life. "The non-aligned movement has been often blamed, and not wholly without reason, for being soft on the Soviet Union and hard on the West, especially the United States."¹

The Communist Party of India was too deeply committed to an ideology which was not yet attuned to Indian conditions. It nevertheless, adopted a clear policy regarding India's relations with her neighbours. It had its own reasons to condemn the policy of non-alignment.² The impact of Russia and China on the policies of C.P.I. was clearly visible. The development of Sino-Indian relations was considered to be a ominous sign of resurgence of Asia and downfall of Western imperialism.

The role played by China at the Bandung Conference was highly appreciated by the C.P.I. while all other Opposition parties, especially the Jana Sangh, expressed serious doubts and regarded^d it to be expansionism and a threat to Asia's peace and security.

While the rebel activities in Tibet increased after eight years of Chinese occupation of Tibet during 1958-59, the Chinese Government blamed the Indian Government for supporting the Tibetan rebels. The flight of Dalai Lama to India and asylum granted to him by the Indian Government provoked the Chinese officials and so did the communists in India. India's non-aligned policy was thereafter, attacked by the Indian communists.

1. Inder Malhotra : Thirty Years of Non-Alignment. Illustrated Weekly of India. September 12, 1976, p 10

2. For an analysis of C.P.I.'s attitude , see Chapter II.

On border questions, the C.P.I. favoured settlement of disputes through negotiations even in the case when the Chinese intruded into the Indian territories at several points on the Sino-Indian border, attacked Indian posts and injured and killed Indian soldiers.

When armed confrontation broke out along the Sino-Indian border the C.P.I. condemned the Chinese action of aggression against India. But the secret information collected by the Democratic Research service disclose the anti-India and anti-national policies adopted by the C.P.I. during that period of national emergency.³ Even after the ceasefire, the party stressed the need of sending diplomatic mission to China to pave the way for settlement of border disputes. The history of the C.P.I. reveals the significant aspect of the Party's aspect that it was neither realistic nor nationalistic. The influence of internationalism communism was visible clearly, throughout the life of the Party. The most important aspect was that the Party got impressed by the group politics of internationalism.⁴

In early fifties emerged the Jana Sangh, an important right wing party in Opposition. Since the very beginning, the Party showed dislike for the policy adopted by the Indian Government towards her neighbours especially towards Pakistan and China. The Jana Sangh leaders harboured serious doubts about the intentions of the Communist China. They considered expansion of communism a threat not only to India but to the whole Asia. The Jana Sangh, for the same reason, regarded non-alignment as a dangerous policy and later on, opposed Nehru on the Panchsheel. The policy was branded as useless and "nothing

3. See Democratic Research Service documents, op. cit.

4. See Nisami, T.A...op. cit, for the role of C.P.I. in this regard.

more than pious hope devoid of definite directions."

The Jana Sangh, since its very formation, stressed the need for a firm and vigilant policy towards China and Pakistan. The Party felt that the Government of India was insincere in the implementation of the objectives of its foreign policy. As far as the policy of non-alignment and India's relations with her two nearest neighbours were concerned, the Jana Sangh emphasized the need of India's territorial integrity and the defence of the motherland. The Chinese policy towards India since the Communist revolution in 1949 was doubtful in the eyes of the Jana Sangh. The Party leaders paid due attention to claims on border made by China as early as 1954 and asked the Indian Government to 're-evaluate' and 're-orientate' her policy towards China.

During the period of border incidents on Sino-Indian frontier the Jana Sangh proved to more sensitive and predicted a threat for India. In the wake of Chinese aggression and national emergency the Party offered her support to defend the country.

In 1952 emerged the left wing Praja Socialist Party as a result of the merger of K.M.P.P. and Socialist Party. The Party gave priority to India's relations with China and Pakistan. It favoured a tough policy when China blatantly violated the Panchsheel -- the five principles of peaceful co-existence to which it was a signatory. The Party was of the view that Panchsheel was "born in sin." Similarly, the Party considered the Tibetan crisis not an internal matter of China but an open violation of International Law. Both the Jana Sangh and the P.S.P. condemned Chinese action in Tibet which they regarded to be a threat to the sovereignty and integrity of India. The Praja Socialist Party supported the Nehru Government's foreign policy towards China and other countries in its objectives. The Party differed with Nehru on the method of implementing her foreign policy. The P.S.P. considered the policy of xxxxxx

non-alignment as a of basic importance in India's foreign relations, but was not satisfied with its implementation. The Party thought that the Indian Government was following a policy of "double standard" in dealing with the two power blocs. Instead, the Party urged that India should strictly practice the policy of non-alignment in her relations not only with the Super Powers but also with her neighbours.

The Swatantra Party was born in 1959, the time of increasing confusion and fears about the Sino-Indian relations. This Party too focussed her attention on the Sino-Indian relations. The Party shared the views of the Jana Sangh and the Praja Socialist Party that firm action should be taken against China. Nehru's 'soft' policy towards China could be harmful for India's security and integrity. As the Party saw the deteriorating conditions on the scene of the Indian sub-continent. So it was felt by the Swatantra leaders that India had to face a serious situation on her northern frontiers. It was the only Party at that time which regarded the policy of non-alignment as unsuitable for India and openly rejected its usefulness as a basic principle of India's foreign policy. Instead, the Party considered that an alliance with the West would help India greatly in meeting her defence problems. Such an alliance, the Party felt, should be positive.

The Swatantra, like the Jana Sangh, clearly saw the danger to India's territorial integrity from China. It emphasised the need for cordial relations with Pakistan. At the same time, the Party considered negotiations on border issues with China as "a national humiliation." The Party considered the Chinese action in Tibet as an act of "communist imperialism." Minoo R. Masani, a strong Swatantra leader said that "right from the beginning, the Chinese had a grand design and they had always been consistent in finding out how much of their nonsense India would stand. But the Government of India had never shown an awareness of

these realities." Masani expressed the view that "Nehru had suppressed facts and vital information regarding Chinese aggression, and he would have to bear a heavy responsibility in this connection before the bar of history."⁵

Thus was the role of Opposition parties in the formulation of India's foreign policy particularly towards China was considerable and impressive to a certain extent during the period 1949-62. The Opposition parties differed on different points with the ruling party, but they were all united in case of threat to national integrity of India. Their influence upon the foreign policy makers was the mistakable. There was, however, one exception that the C.P.I. did not share the Opposition opinion in most of the foreign policy matters. The Opposition parties were vigilant in this regard and tried to articulate public opinion on foreign policy of India. These parties except the C.P.I. were able in compelling Nehru to adopt a "forward policy" to defend the Indian frontiers from communist danger. Not only this, these parties emphasized the urgent need of re-evaluation of India's foreign policy. It is another matter that the Opposition parties did not seem to have made any visible efforts to make such an evaluation. All the Opposition parties except the C.P.I. were united on the objectives of Indian foreign policy but differed on their application. The Jana Sangh wanted a firm and vigilant policy towards China, the P.S.P. stressed the need for re-orientation of India's foreign policy to face the communist danger and get Western aid in this task, and the Swatantra Party saw its validity in a positive alliance with the West. Another achievement of the stress of the Opposition parties on Nehru Government was that India severed her diplomatic relations with China.

The ruling party under the leadership of Nehru kept the foreign policy issues entirely decided by him. "For quite some time Nehru did not disclose to the Indian public the forward movements of Chinese patrols apparently with a view to preserving an atmosphere of goodwill. But after serious clashes at Longju in Arunachal Pradesh (formerly N.E.F.A.) and Kongka Pass in Ladakh in July and October of 1959, he could no longer keep the nation in the dark about the growing tension in the Himalayas. Inevitably, there was a tremendous uproar in Parliament."⁶

The Opposition parties were not sincere in realising the problems faced by the Indian foreign policy makers. The dispute between India and China over the validity and authenticity were due to their way of interpretation by both countries. The Opposition parties ought to think of these problems. They ought to have a rational attitude towards Indian foreign policy instead of politicising the border dispute.

The next important conclusion that emerges out of study is that the Opposition parties except the C.P.I. had always been pro-West rather than being pro-communist. While the experiences achieved by Nehru and other foreign policy makers did not find any support in economic development of the country from the West because of their hostility towards non-alignment policy. Russia softened her policy towards ~~the~~ that growing movement and responded well. Thus Indian foreign policy became slightly Russian oriented. The Opposition parties ought to have realised the economic needs of India and give prior importance to national interest. In other words, Opposition parties must rationalise the national interests instead of politicising them.

Then third most important conclusion comes out regarding the behaviour of the ruling party towards the Opposition parties. The Congress Party never attached importance to the democratic needs of

Indian political system and thus, never invited the Opposition parties to discuss foreign affairs with them. This resulted in restricting the area of influence of the Opposition parties over the foreign policy making and implementation. The suggestions made by the Opposition were not taken seriously by the ruling party. On the other hand, the Opposition too adopted an ambiguous and vague method by just proposing "Re-orientation" of Indian foreign policy and never suggesting the ways to be adopted for this purpose.

In the end, it can be said that the Opposition parties failed to put forward clear alternatives whereas the ruling party ignored them or, at the most, did not pay adequate attention to them. They, thereby, restricted their area of influence. In any case, the impact of the Opposition parties on the foreign policy was minimal and not significant. The Opposition should have a clear ideology of its own so as to present an ^oimportant alternative to that of the ruling party whichever it is. A sound democratic system requires a healthy Opposition which India is yet to achieve.

fn continued from pages 142 and 143;

5. Lok Sabha Debates. Series 3, Vol. 9, 8 Nov., 1962.

6. Telang, G.M.: Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai. Illustrated Weekly of India,

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A P P E N D I X

APPENDIX -- A

CHRONOLOGY OF AGGRESSION (SINCE 1949)

1949

1 October. The People's Republic of China was proclaimed. Before the end of the year Sinkiang was subjugated and integrated into China.

16 December. Chinese troops reached Vietnamese border and began supplying weapons to communist-led North Vietnamese forces.

1950

1 January. Mao Tse-tung proclaimed "liberation of three million Tibetans from imperialist aggression" as a basic task of the People's Liberation Army of China.

13 August. The Government of India represented to the Government of China that they were concerned at the possibility of unsettled conditions across their border. They, therefore, strongly urged that Sino-Tibetan relations should be adjusted through peaceful negotiations.

21 August. The Government of China declared their willingness to solve the problem of Tibet by peaceful and friendly measures and their desire to " stabilise the China-India border."

7 October. Chinese troops entered Tibet.

15 October. Thousands of "Chinese People's Volunteers" actually regular army men, began moving across the Yalu River into Korea to support Communist North Korea's invasion of the Republic of Korea.

21. October. The Government of India drew attention to the harmful effects of resorting to military action as it meant unrest and disturbances on India's borders.

25 October. The presence in Korea of Chinese People's Volunteers, composed of whole divisions and armies of regular Chinese Communist forces, was

formally established.

30 October. The Government of China criticised the Government of India "as having been affected by foreign influences hostile to China in Tibet."

1951

1 February. The United Nations General Assembly, by a vote of 44-7, adopted a resolution branding China an aggressor in Korea.

23 May. Tibetan representatives in Peking signed a 17-point agreement which provided for Chinese occupation of Tibet but guaranteed the preservation of Buddhist institutions, the autonomy of the Tibetan government and the status of the Dalai Lama.

1952

Chinese Communist assistance to the Viet Minh's guerrilla operation in Viet Nam continued to increase. Shipments of Chinese Communist military equipment to Ho Chi Minh's forces, begun in 1950, by 1952 included artillery and other heavy equipment.

1953

2 April. Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Sir Mohammad Zafrulla Khan registered a ~~xxx~~ protest against violation of the border in Hunza.

27 July. Korean armistice signed after more than two years of negotiations.

1954

20 July. An Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between Tibet region of China and India was signed between India and China.

In the preamble of the Agreement, the two countries reaffirmed that they would abide by the Five Principles of mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful co-existence.

25 June. Mr. Chou En-lai's visit to New Delhi.

26 June. A Joint Statement was issued by the Prime Ministers of India and China, reaffirming the Five Principles.

17 July. The Government of China protested against the presence of Indian troops in Bara Hoti (which they called wa-je) in the Uttar Pradesh. This was the first time that the Government of China had laid claim to any part of Indian territory.

27 August. The Government of India sent a note to the Government refuting the allegation that Indian troops had intruded into Tibet and protesting against an attempt by Chinese officials to cross into Bara Hoti, which was south of the Niti Pass and traditional Indian territory.

January-June. The Viet Minh continued their offensive in Viet Nam, making use of the large quantities of military equipment supplied by Peking. Viet Minh forays into Laos and Cambodia.

1 September. Chinese Communist forces began intensive shelling of Chinese Nationalist troops on the Quemoy island group. Communist military activity in the Taiwan straits was intensive until February 1955, and was sporadic in 1956 and 1957.

18 October. Mr. Nehru visited China as part of his policy to preserve and promote the friendship between the two countries. While in China, he raised the question of some maps recently published in China which had shown an incorrect boundary alignment between the two countries and incorporated about 50,000 square miles of Indian territory within China.

Mr. Chou En-lai, in reply, sought to treat these Chinese maps as of little significance. He said that they were merely a reproduction of old Kuomintang maps and the People's Government had no time to revise them.

1955

18 April. Asia-African Conference at Bandung.

2 June. Unauthorized camping of a Chinese party at Bara Hoti.

15 September. A party of Chinese soldiers intruded ten miles across the border into Lamsan in Uttar Pradesh.

1956

28 April. An armed Chinese party camped half a mile east of Nilang in Uttar Pradesh.

26 July. The Government of China claimed that Bara Hoti was Chinese territory and denied that Tunjun La was a border pass.

31 July. The Burmese Government reported clashes with Chinese communist troops who had occupied 1,000 square miles in the Kachin and Wa states.

1 September. A party of Chinese soldiers crossed the Shipki Pass into India.

10 September. A Chinese party again trespassed into India across the Shipki Pass.

20 September. A Chinese patrol crossed the Shipki Pass and came up to Hupsang Khud. On encountering an Indian patrol, the Chinese party threatened to use arms.

28 November. Mr. Chou En-lai visited India.

19 December. Striking at an area of local resistance in Tibet, Chinese planes bombed the Tibetan village of Kham Chiri Gawn.

1957

September. Chinese soldiers arrested an Indian administration patrol patrol near Haji Langar in Ladakh, detained and maltreated them for almost five weeks.

27 September. Chinese survey parties crossed into the Lohit RFrontier Division and later moved into Burma.

October. A Chinese party came to Walong in the Lohit Frontier Division of the North East Frontier Agency.

5 October. Peking announced completion of a highway from China's Sinkiang Province to Tibet, running 100 miles through the Ladakh area.

1958

April-May. On the initiative of the Government of India, talks were held between representative of the two Governments on the question of Bara Hoti. The Governments of India suggested that pending a settlement neither side should send armed or civilian personnel into the area. The Government of China agreed not to send armed personnel, but resuded to agree not to send civilian personnel.

July. India protested against the Chinese occupation of Khurnak Fort, one and a half miles inside Ladakh.

23-24 August. Another intensive artillery bombardment of Quemoy begins, following a build-up of Communist air and surface near the Taiwan Straits.

27 August. The Communist radio predicted imminent landings on Quemoy and called on the Nationalist forces to surrender. Intensive shelling continued through October 6.

September. Chinese soldiers arrested an Indian patrol army on normal routine duty in the northern part of Aksai Chin and detained and ill-treated it for nearly five weeks.

September. A large Chinese party entered Bara Hoti with building materials, clearly in order to construct permanent or semi-permanent structures.

27 September. A detachment of Chinese troops crossed into the Lohit Frontier Division and later moved into Burma.

18 October. The Government of India protested against the construction of a motor road by the Government of China across the Aksai Chin area of Ladakh.

October. Chinese personnel constructed outposts at Lathal and Sanghamalla in Uttar Pradesh. The Chinese violated India's air space by flying over some parts of Uttar Pradesh.

14 December. Mr. Nehru wrote to Mr. Chou En-lai drawing attention to continued issue of incorrect maps.

17 December. The Government of India protested against air violations.

1959

23 January. Mr. Chou En-lai, in his reply to Mr. Nehru, contended that the Sino-Indian boundary had never been formally delimited and there were certain differences between the two sides over the issue. The Government of China had not raised the issue in 1954 because conditions were not then ripe for its settlement. He added that the McMahon Line had never been recognised by the Government of China. As for Chinese maps, Mr. Chou En-lai claimed that the boundaries drawn on them were consistent with those on earlier maps and laid claim to about 50,000 square miles of Indian territory.

10 March. Tibetans in the capital city of Lhasa, aroused by reports that the Chinese planned to abduct the Dalai Lama, began demonstrations outside Chinese offices. Chinese officials and Tibetan collaborators were attacked. Chinese troops attempted to suppress the demonstrations.

17 March. The Dalai Lama left Lhasa. Open fighting broke out in the capital. Chinese forces bombarded monasteries and centres of resistance, and attempted to intercept the Dalai Lama and his party.

28 March. Peking dissolved the local government of the Dalai Lama and replaced it with an administration nominally headed by the Panchen Lama, who was made acting chairman of the Preparatory Committee for the Autonomous Region of Tibet. Military control committees were formed throughout Tibet by the Chinese army.

31 March. The Dalai Lama reached safely in India and was given asylum. An ~~editorial~~ editorial in the People's Daily demanded complete suppression of the Tibetan revolt.

6 May. The People's Daily published the CCP's official statement about the Tibetan revolt. It is the culmination of attacks on "Indian Expansionists."

20 June. The Dalai Lama told a press conference at Mussoorie, India, "that the Communists were guilty of aggression in Tibet." He ~~said~~ said that the 1951 agreement was "thrust on the (Tibetan) people...at the point of a bayonet." He described Chinese rule in Tibet as a "reign of terror."

28 July. A Chinese armed detachment intruded into the region of the western Pangong Lake in Ladakh, arrested six Indian policemen and established a camp at Spanggur.

7 August. An armed Chinese patrol crossed into Khinsemane on the Eastern Sector and pushed back an Indian patrol.

25 August. A large Chinese detachment crossed the frontier in the Subansiri Division of the North East Frontier Agency and occupied the Indian frontier post at Longju after opening fire on the small Indian garrison and outflanking it.

20 October. Chinese military forces advanced forty miles into Indian territory in the Chang Chenmo valley of southern Ladakh. Encountering an Indian patrol near the Kongka Pass, they opened fire, killing nine Indians. Ten other members of the Indian party were taken into captivity and subjected to harsh and inhuman treatment before release.

17 December. Chinese troops advanced further west and south of the Aksai Chin area and constructed roads in that territory.

1960.

19 April. Mr. Chou En-lai visited Delhi and had talks with Mr. Nehru for six days which, however, ended inconclusively. It was agreed that the officials of the two Governments should meet to examine all relevant documents.

1 June. A large Chinese party moved into Taksang Gompa which is about five miles within Indian territory in the Kameng Frontier Division of the North East Frontier Agency.

25 June. A Chinese survey party visited Suriah.

28 June. In an incursion into Nepal, Chinese troops killed a Nepalese officer and captured a group of Nepalese soldiers. This incident and a Chinese attempt to claim all of Mount Everest slowed negotiations on the Sino-Nepalese border treaty.

22 August. The Government of India brought to the notice of the Government of China fifty-two instances of violations of Indian air space since March 1960 by aircraft flying from Tibet.

13 October. An armed Chinese party visited the vicinity of Hot Springs in the Western Sector.

1961

20 April. Chinese personnel crossed into Sikkim near the Jelep La Pass.

May. Chinese personnel intruded into Indian territory near Chusul in the Western Sector.

July. A Chinese patrol crossed the Eastern Sector of the Indian Alignment about one mile west of Chemokarpola in the Kameng Frontier Division.

August. Chinese forces established three new check-posts in Ladakh, at Point 78-12 E., 35.19 N., at Nyagsu and near Dambuguru. Roads linking these posts with rear bases were constructed.

12 September. Armed Chinese personnel came into Sikkim across the Jelep-la Pass.

1962

14 January. A Chinese patrol advanced twelve miles further forward from the check-post at 78.12 E., 35.19 N.

January. Some Chinese civil and military officials crossed the border in the Eastern Sector near Longju and proceeded to Roi village half a mile within India.

April-May. There was consistent advance patrolling by the Chinese in the Chip Chap area of Ladakh.

30 April. The Government of China announced that they had ordered patrolling in the whole sector from the Karakoram Pass to the Kongka Pass and demanded that India withdraw two of her posts which were situated well within Indian territory.

May. A new Chinese post was established in Indian territory about 10 miles south east of Spanggur.

2 June. The Panch Sheel Agreement of 1954 lapsed.

10 July. Chinese troops encircled an Indian outpost in Galwan Valley in Ladakh.

8 September. Chinese forces were sighted taking positions near Dhola post south of McMahon Line in Kameng Division of NEFA.

12 September. Chinese troops entered NEFA area near Tawang.

21 September. Chinese soldiers crept into Indian territory and threw hand grenades. Sporadic fighting continued for the next few days.

10 October. Chinese attacks on Indian posts. Seventeen Indian soldiers were killed in twelve hours of heavy fighting near Dhola in NEFA.

11 October. Exchange of firing continued. Reinforced Chinese troops captured Thag La Ridge, the traditional Indo-Tibetan boundary.

20 October. About 30,000 Chinese troops began a largescale invasion of NEFA.

21 October. Chinese crossed Nanka-Chu river four miles south of the McMahon Line. Dhola and Khinsamane posts abandoned. Chinese occupied two Indian posts in Ladakh. A helicopter carrying casualties was shot down in NEFA.

22 October. All seven Indian posts lost in Ladakh. Indian post at Asang Dhar in NEFA abandoned under massive Chinese attack.

23 October. Peking orders its troops "not to restrain themselves to the bounds of the McMahon Line."²

24 October. Two-pronged Chinese attack on Tawang in NEFA. Chinese captured Lampu, 10 miles south of McMahon Line. Indian posts at Brokenthong and Zaninthatg lost. Kibetoo in Lohit division abandoned. Galvan Valley post in Ladakh captured by the Chinese. Heavy fighting both in NEFA and Ladakh.

25 October. After bitter fighting Indian troops withdrew from Tawang. Heavy fighting in Siang division of NEFA. In Ladakh one more post captured by the Chinese.

26 October. Chinese launch a massive attack at the Eastern side of the McMahon Line to occupy Walong in the Lohit Division near the Burmese border. In the Tawang area the Chinese reached Jang village four or five miles further south on the route to Bondi Lan and Tejpur. Chinese flung hundreds of troops to overwhelm the post at Siang east of Longju. In the Ladakh region sporadic fighting continued.

27 October. A slight turn in favour of India; two attacks on the outskirts of Walong were hurled back.

28 October. Troops of the Jammu and Kashmir Militia in Darchok launched a counter attack and threw the Chinese forces back when they infiltrated between Darchok and Jara La.

In the NEFA front Chinese attacked the Indian personnel of a forward post in the Siang Division.

29 October. Indian troops had to withdraw in the face of invading Chinese herds from Lamchok 90 to 100 miles south east of the strategic airfield of Chushul and from Jara La eight miles north-east of Lamchok.

Indian troops recaptured Jang which they had lost to the Chinese on the 26th. In the Lohit valley Walong was bravely defended in the face of repeated Chinese attacks.

31 October. Indian troops continued shelling newly set up Chinese post in the Jang ~~xxxxx~~ area in their bid to recapture Tawang.

2 November. Uneasy calm continued in the fighting in NEFA and Ladakh except some exchange of fire in the vicinity of Walong in the Lohit division of NEFA.

4 November. Indian forces took back three hamlets situated between Jang and Tawang. In the Chushul area in Ladakh one of Indian transport planes was fired at by Chinese with small arms.

5 November. Chinese captured Daulat Beg Oldi near Karakorum Pass and two miles west of the Chinese 1960 claim line. With the capture of Daulat Beg Oldi, Chinese occupied all claimed areas in Ladakh.

6 November. Chinese concentrated heavy reinforcement, few miles from Chushul, thus threatening the Chushul airstrip in Ladakh.

In the Subansir division in NEFA Chinese troops and Indian patrols exchanged fire.

In Walong, eastern corner of NEFA, Chinese tried to approach an Indian post but were forced to retreat in the face of strong Indian firing.

7 November. Chinese pressure continued in Walong in the Lohit division in NEFA and near Chushul in Ladakh.

8 November. Chinese stepped up offensive with mortars and automatic weapons at Walong from the north and north-east to capture the town from surrounding hills to gain access to the strategic Lohit river valley.

9 November. Indian troops shelled Mrol in the Tawang area in NEFA. Chinese concentrated their troops in the three areas viz, Chushul in Ladakh, Tawang valley in the West of NEFA and in the vicinity of Walong in the Lohit division near Burma border.

19 November. Bomdi La fell.

21 November. Chinese Government announced cease-fire.

1 December. Chinese troops begin withdrawal.

7 December. Prime Minister Nehru informs Lok Sabha that two Indian army personnel were killed and four injured by Chinese bullets since the cease-fire began on November 21.

8 December. Prime Minister Nehru informs Rajya Sabha that the Chinese had clarified that they would withdraw their forces beyond the watershed in the Eastern Sector but wanted to keep civil posts at Dhola and Longju.

1963

13 January. China's National Defence Ministry announces that the Chinese forces would continue to withdraw along the "entire Sino-Indian border" on 14 and 15 January, in the Eastern Sector north of the "actual line of November 7, 1959;" in the Western Sector 20 km. behind line of "actual control of November 7, 1959;" except at 70 posts to be retained as civil check posts.

19 January. Indian Officials spokesman says China breached her unilateral cease-fire on 34 occasions in NEFA in the first eleven days of ceasefire.

20 January. NCNA reports Chinese have withdrawn completely from Walong area to the north of the line of actual control as on November 7, 1959.

21 January. Defence Minister informs Lok Sabha that China had made three air intrusions over Indian territory since October 20, 1962.

2 March. China informs India about completion of military withdrawal along the entire Sino-Indian border.

6 May. Chinese reconnaissance plane penetrates deep into the Indian territory.

17 May. India protests to China against Rensang La intrusion.

17 May. India protests to China on sending troops into the demilitarized zone in the Spangur lake area in Ladakh.

15 June. Indian Prime Minister says six of the 26 civilian posts set up by Chinese are in the Indian territory occupied by China.

11 August. Chinese enter the demilitarized zone in eastern sector.

16 August. Chinese withdraw their post from Lepsang La on India's protest.

10 December. Government of India reveals that an area of 14,500 square miles in Ladakh territory and no area in NEFA is under control of China.

1964

26 February. India protests to China against putting up cairns in Ladakh to mark the 'line of actual control' as defined by China.

30 August. Hsinhua announces that China was setting up 'civilian' posts in the demilitarized zone along the Sino-Indian border.

1965

29 August. Chinese Foreign Ministry protests against "Indian acts of aggression" on China-Sikkim border.

8 September. China sends another note to Indian Government demanding dismantling of "all aggressive military structures."

17 September. China serves ultimatum to India demanding dismantling of all "Indian military installations on or over Sino-Sikkim boundary within three days."

19 September. China extends the ultimatum by 72 hours.

22 September. China withdraws the ultimatum on the excuse that India has destroyed the structures to which she had objected. She warns that the affair is not closed as India has not returned 75 yaks, 800 sheep and 2 Tibetans.

21 November. India lodges strong protest against Chinese intrusions into Sikkim.

23 November. Chinese soldiers enter Indian territory in the Daulat Beg Oldi area in Ladakh.

29 November. China is reported to have moved a battalion upto Nathu-la near Chumti Valley.

10 December. About 400 Chinese troops entered the Longju area upto a depth of about 2 miles and started digging trenches and other military works.

12 December. In North Sikkim, nearly 300 intruding Chinese soldiers and Indian patrol exchanged fire.

APPENDIX —(C)

(1) Note given by the Ministry of External Affairs to the Councillor of China in India, 21 August 1950.

The attention of the Government of India has been drawn to a map of China published on pages 20-21 of the "China Pictorial" magazine (No. 95—July 1958) in which the borders of China have been indicated by a thick brown line. Though this map is on a small scale, there are clear inaccuracies in it insofar as China's border with India is concerned. The border as depicted in the map includes as Chinese territory (i) four of the five Divisions of India's North East Frontier Agency; (ii) some areas in the north of the State of Uttar Pradesh; and (iii) large areas in eastern Ladakh which form part of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. It appears that the entire Tashigang area of Eastern Bhutan and a considerable slice of territory in north-west Bhutan have also been included as Chinese territory.

2. In the past, similar inaccurate maps have been published in China. The matter was referred to His Excellency Premier Chou En-lai by His Excellency the Prime Minister of India when the latter visited China in October 1954. His Excellency Chou En-lai had at that time replied that current Chinese maps were based on old maps and that the Government of the People's Republic of China had had no time to correct them. The Government of India recognised the force of this statement. Since, however, the present Government of the People's Republic of China has now been in office for so many years and new maps are being repeatedly printed and published in China, the Government of India would suggest that necessary corrections in the Chinese maps should not be delayed further. In this particular case, the map has been published in

a magazine, which is printed in an official press and is distributed by an official agency.

3. The Government of India, are, therefore, drawing the attention of the Government of the People's Republic of China again to this matter. They trust that the necessary corrections will be made soon. The northern boundary of India is clearly shown in the Political Map of India —3rd edition, 1956 (scale—one inch to seventy miles), which is freely available on sale. The Government of India will be happy to supply a copy of this map to the Government of the People's Republic of China.

(11) Memorandum given by the Foreign Office of China to the Councillor of India, 3 November 1958.

Reference the memorandum of the Indian Government dated August 21, 1958, on the rough sketch map showing "the development of railways and trunk roads in China during the First Five-Year Plan period" published in the "China Pictorial" (July issue, 1954), the Chinese Government wishes to make the following statement :

2. In the maps currently published in China, the boundary line between China and its neighbouring countries, including India, is drawn on the basis of maps published in China before the liberation. This was made clear to His Excellency Prime Minister Nehru by Prime Minister Chou En-lai when the former visited China in October 1954. Premier Chou En-lai explained then to His Excellency Prime Minister Nehru that the reason why the boundary in Chinese maps is drawn according to old maps is that the Chinese Government has not yet undertaken a survey of China's boundary nor consulted with the countries concerned, and that it will not make changes in the boundary on its own. The Chinese Government notes

with satisfaction that the Indian Government recognises the force of Premier Chou En-lai's statement on this matter.

3. The Chinese Government believes that with the elapse of time and after consultations with the various neighbouring countries and a survey of the border regions, a new way of drawing the boundary of China, will be decided on in accordance with the results of the consultations and the survey.